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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the impact of the British Military Administration (BMA) on 
social- cultural and political organisations in Libya during the period 1943 to 1951. The 
thesis is grounded on a careful reading of secondary literature which has been integrated 
into available official documents available in both Arabic and English archival sources, 
in addition to new oral data generated from interviews. Its main claim to originality lies 
in the light that these documents throw on our understanding of the BMA’s impact on 
civil society in Libya. 
The thesis adopts a case study approach focusing on specific themes to examine the 
BMA’s impact on education, the press (specifically newspapers), and social, cultural 
and political organisations in Libya. These are viewed as key areas of concern in 
developing states since according to the secondary literature, including press debates at 
the time and available archival documentation, these organisations awakened people’s 
interest in the right to self determination. It is argued that in addition to the major 
political and economic changes that took place in Libya during this period, it was also a 
time of revitalisation of social, cultural and intellectual activities, both within Libya 
itself and in its émigré communities in Egypt and Tunisia. The BMA was characterised 
by remarkable developments in education, and also saw unprecedented growth in the 
press and in cultural and voluntary organisations. These associations brought together 
groups of individuals to create civil society and provide the basis for the political 
organisations, which were later to evolve into Libya’s first fully fledged political 
parties. 
The transitional British administration succeeded in building a system that greatly 
improved access to education and educational standards for all throughout Libya, while 
at the same time creating an elite cadre of Libyans who would help administer the 
country. During British rule, the press also improved in both quality and quantity. The 
diverse range of publications in Arabic that emerged not only played an important role 
in covering Libya’s journey towards independence but also awakened interest in issues 
relating to national identity. The social, cultural and political associations that 
flourished, both at home and abroad, made a major contribution to promoting this 
national movement by helping to create and shape the coherence and consciousness of 
Libyans as a nation. The stability that the BMA brought to Libya facilitated the growth 
of these social and cultural organisations which in turn underpinned the establishment 
of the political parties that would eventually assume responsibility for running the 
newly independent Libya.  
The findings of the study show that the BMA in Libya enjoyed considerable success in 
shaping Libyans’ attitudes towards the value of education, press freedom and civil 
society and in preparing Libya for independence. When the British left, the Libyans 
they had trained demonstrated their abilities in the fields of education and 
administration. While the British inculcated a national consciousness in the Libyans, it 
was also clear that Arab nationalism and Pan-Arab unity were also viewed as attractive 
political alternatives.  
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1.CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
The British Military Administration (BMA) era represents an important part of the 
history of Libya as a nation.1 This eight-year period from 1943 to 1951 left its mark on 
various political, socioeconomic and educational aspects of life in Libyan society. This 
investigation explores the impact of the BMA in Libya from 1943-1951, focusing on the 
role played by the development of education, press, and socio-cultural and political 
associations during that period and their link to fostering nationalism. 
Amongst other things, this chapter provides a contextual overview of the BMA 
occupation of Libya in 1942-1951. It starts by presenting the background to the research 
question and then states the aim and objectives of this thesis. It then outlines the original 
contribution to knowledge made by this research and describes the limitations of the 
research and the problems that it presented. The focus then shifts to a discussion of the 
concept of nationalism followed by an examination of the meaning of nationalism in an 
Arab and Islamic context. The third section of this chapter addresses the socio-cultural 
and political factors that are thought to facilitate the creation of nationalism. The 
research methodology is then discussed, providing a rationale for the approach taken in 
this thesis to collecting primary and secondary data, in particular the decision to use oral 
testimony and the difficulties which this presents for the historian. The penultimate 
section of the chapter addresses historiography. The chapter concludes with a summary 
of the contents of the thesis, outlining how it has been organised.  
1.2 The Focus Of This Thesis: The BMA In Libya  
Following the Allied victory in World War Two (WW2),2 the Libyans hoped that they 
would be able to secure their independence from Italy.3 However, contrary to their 
                                                 
1 Applying the term ‘Libya’ to this North African territory is a fairly modern development. The origin of 
the term is ascribed to the Egyptians as far back as the third millennium; the Greeks used it to refer to the 
whole of North Africa, and the Romans to the region of Cyrenaica. In 1911, Italy adopted ‘Libya’ as the 
official name of the colony, which consisted of the Provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. See: 
S. Raza, ‘Italian Colonisation and Libyan Resistance: The Al-Sanusi of Cyrenaica (1911–1922)’, A New 
Journal of African Studies, 9 (2012).  
2 The four major Allied powers in World War Two were the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America, the Soviet Union, and France.  
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hopes and expectations, Libya became subject to BMA 4  from 1943-1951 under a 
mandate from the United Nations.5 For ideological reasons, the British government was 
eager to keep the Soviet Union away from the southern shores of Europe and, as a 
result, Libya’s geographical location was viewed as being of key importance to 
Britain’s strategy of having pro-Western regimes in the region.6  
The BMA years proved to be a crucial period of transition for Libya and more broadly 
for the Arab world as a whole. The BMA helped to develop Libya’s education system,7 
increasing its number of schools 8  and introducing new, more inclusive educational 
approaches intended to tap into the potential of all Libyan children, regardless of class 
or gender. Its policies also encouraged associational life by means of social and cultural 
activities, including the development of literary societies, cultural organisations and 
sports clubs. A generally liberal approach to press freedom substantially increased the 
diversity of local publications available and also helped to stimulate intellectual debate.  
These social and cultural developments coincided with the development of a new type 
of political consciousness within Libyan society, its spread facilitated by returning 
émigrés and teachers from neighbouring Arab countries who brought with them the 
latest ideological tendencies. 9  By the start of the 1950s, the people’s nationalist 
aspirations became reality when the United Nations declared Libya to be an independent 
nation state. 
What distinguishes the rule of the BMA in Libya was that many Libyans regarded the 
British as allies who had rescued them from Italian rule, and as a result Libyan 
nationalists engaged in a peaceful political struggle which continued to characterise 
their behaviour throughout the eight years of BMA rule. For a historian, the BMA 
                                                                                                                                               
3 E. E. Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, ACLS history e-book project, (New York, 2001), p.227. 
P.Gifford, Libya: The creation of a client state in: Louis, R., Ends of British Imperialism, (New York, 
2006), pp.503-527. 
4 The BMA was originally known as the British Military Government, the name change occurring on 10 
March 1943. See: War Office to Mideast for Political Affairs, 10 January 1943, London, The National 
Archives, TNA FO 371/35660/ J647/77/66.  
5 P. Gifford, Libya: The creation of a client state, in: Louis, R., Ends of British Imperialism, (New York, 
2006), pp.503-527. 
6 A. Pargeter, Anglo-Libyan relations and the Suez crisis, 5(2), Journal of North African Studies, (2000), 
pp.41-58.  
7 See L. D. Turner, The Impact of Western Education on the African’s Way of Life, in Haines (ed), Africa 
Today (New York, 1968), pp.148-4. 
8 S. Alakad, Modern Libya, (Cairo, 1970), p.55. 
9 M. Taylor, Community development and the state, in: G. Craig and M. Mayo (eds), Community 
Empowerment: A Reader in Participation and Development (London, 1995), p.99. 
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period in Libya serves as a fascinating case study of how disparate groups of people can 
be encouraged unite to achieve a common political goal and the role that educational 
policy, the press and associational life can play in the creation of a national identity. 
1.3 Aim And Objectives Of This Research 
This study seeks to fill a gap in the research about the impact of the BMA in Libya, and 
how Libyan communities and the state itself were built by this transitional 
administration, whose policies helped to create a stable environment where socio-
cultural organisations and nationalism flourished. Historians who have written about 
Libyan history have largely overlooked the period of the British occupation. Indeed, this 
era does not feature in Libya’s own history curriculum, even at more advanced stages,10 
which largely focuses on the Ottoman Empire and the Italian occupation. As a result, 
Libyan students know nothing about this eight-year period of Libyan history under the 
BMA. Moreover, Libyan libraries carry few resources relating to it.11  
This research, then, aims to contribute to the literature by bridging this gap in Libya’s 
history, setting the BMA into the context of the other powers under which Libyans lived, 
namely, the Ottoman and Italian Empires. It seeks to understand the potential 
consequences (direct and indirect) of the socio-cultural developments during this period 
of national and political consciousness-raising that eventually led to Libya gaining its 
independence. It will highlight the ways in which the British occupation was entirely 
different from the previous regimes and will focus on how the Libyan people reacted to 
this new form of governance, which allowed them to pursue their own activities. These 
activities included forming voluntary organisations, many of which later developed into 
Libya’s first political parties.12 
The purpose of this research is to carry out a comparative, interpretive analysis of data 
concerning the BMA in Libya in 1943-1951. It compares the British perspective on this 
period with the views of Arab historians as a method of establishing possible 
                                                 
10 Telecommunication with M. Khalifa, 30 January 2016. 
11 Ibid 
12 H. Charles, Civil Society. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/civil-society, accessed 18/3/2016 
notes that the establishment of new democratic states following the fall of numerous dictatorships in 
recent  times has produced “renewed interest in popular engagement in political life and everything else 
that relates to the way that political cultures or basic values and beliefs affect the way a state is 
governed”. This has been accompanied by “growing interest in how strengthening civil society can 
contribute to conflict resolution”.  
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similarities and differences between these two perspectives. 
This research focuses on the role of the British in developing social, cultural and 
political activities in Libya during the period of their rule in the region, with particular 
emphasis on the educational and journalistic dimensions of this issue. Libya was never a 
part of the British Empire nor was it a colony; rather it was an occupied territory as a 
result of WW2. The main aim of this thesis is to explore the style of governance that 
emerged in Libya under the British during WW2 and immediately after this conflict, 
and the types of cultural activities and associational life that emerged during this period 
and the BMA’s attempts to strike a balance between promoting Libyan culture and 
upholding best governance practices. It will also examine how the Libyans came to 
know about their rights and the impact that liberation had upon the lives of the people 
who were struggling for independence within their homeland and in exile abroad. In 
addition, it will focus in particular on the effects of these cultural activities and how 
they were channelled into organisations, including voluntary political associations. 
Finally, it will identify those factors that helped to influence the emergence of a 
distinctive Libyan cultural identity. 
Accordingly, the aim of this thesis is to determine the extent to which the BMA 
supported the social and political evolution of Libyan society by encouraging Libyans 
to form associations in order to promote cultural and social activities. This aim is related 
to the following objectives: 
1. To identify those developments that affected the lives of Libyans in Libya 
during the years of the BMA.  
2. To trace the changing status of education in Libya during this period, examining 
the role which the BMA played in formulating educational policies and 
addressing the problems faced by the national education system. 
3. To analyse the role of the official press in Libyan social life during this 
historical period, determining the extent to which its emergence and 
establishment influenced the development of a distinctive Libyan cultural 
identity.  
4. To examine the socio-cultural, political and voluntary associations which were 
formed during the years of the BMA and consider the nature of the contribution 
that they made to enriching cultural life for the Libyan population. 
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In order to investigate how the BMA contributed to the development of culture and 
social life in Libya, four key areas are investigated, beginning with education. This is 
followed by an examination of the press, and then cultural clubs and libraries in Libya. 
Finally, this thesis considers political associations. All four of these areas were 
interrelated and made an equal contribution to learning, understanding and cooperation 
amongst Libyans. Cultural activities may initially have brought people together, but 
these associations then gave rise to both educational and political activities. The press 
functioned not only as a mouthpiece for such organisations but also promoted social and 
cultural activities and informed the population about new ideas and developments both 
in Libya and elsewhere in the Arab world. 
1.4 Original Contribution To Knowledge Of This Research  
As the historiography section illustrates, to date very little academic attention has been 
devoted to the history of Libya, especially that of the BMA period, which saw a series 
of important developments in the domains of education and the press together with the 
emergence of large numbers of social and cultural organisations and political 
movements in this North African country. This research draws on a broad range of 
English and Arabic primary and secondary sources, thus bringing new perspectives on 
existing academic knowledge regarding the demise of Italy’s influence in its African 
colonies,13 a subject which has also received limited coverage to date has received little 
attention from historians Although a small number of studies in Arabic have focused on 
Libyans’ experience of social and cultural life during this period, no work in English 
has focused to any significant degree on education and social change in Libya under the 
BMA. Work on the emergence and growth of nationalist movements in other colonial 
contexts in general and in Libya specifically, has failed to explore the role played by 
educational policy, the press, associational life and the development of political and 
national identity.14  
Moreover, this study addresses the day-to-day reality of the issues faced by the Libyan 
state under colonialism, closing the gaps in knowledge by using a broad range of 
sources, including oral history. It draws on material from interviews with Libyan 
scholars and with those who were involved directly in the social associations and the 
                                                 
13 G. H. Becker, The Disposition of the Italian Colonies, 1941-1951 (Geneva, 1952), p.231. 
14 R. Gonem, The Development of Education in Libya in Recent Times, p.12. 
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education system in Libya. In seeking to provide a more balanced view of history, this 
study has made a significant and original contribution to existing literature, providing a 
foundation and framework for future researchers who are hoping to focus on social, 
cultural and educational developments in Libya during the BMA period. 
1.5 Nationalism and National Identity  
This section provides a brief overview of some key concepts relating to nationalism and 
considers work on the links between education, the press and associational culture and 
nationality in the colonial context. 
In Imagined Communities, Anderson suggests that the concept of so-called ‘official’ 
nationalism emerged following the formation of popular movements in Europe in the 
1820s, considered models by American and French historians.15 He further argues that 
historically nations arose during transitions, in which a fundamental cultural shift of 
some kind occurred. radically altering people’s perceptions and frame of reference. In 
Western Europe, social change, scientific inventions and technological innovations and 
the rapid spread of ideas brought about the slow decline of old certainties.16 Smith 
views nationalism is a function of modernity and the process of modernisation, in which 
education, technologies of communication and bureaucracy create the structure of the 
modern state.17 Khleif argues that the origins of nationalism in European history are 
linked to the elimination of feudalism and the emergence of a new class order.18 
Several authors have postulated that nationalist movements in developing countries 
were essentially anti-imperialist/anti-colonial in character, formed to challenge foreign 
rule and to demand the right to independence and self-governance.19 As a result, as 
Hobsbawm recognised, many post-colonial states collapsed into chaos and disorder 
once often disparate tribal groups or ethnic communities no longer had a common 
enemy to fight in the form of a European oppressor.20  
                                                 
15 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.86. 
16 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.36. 
17 A. Smith, Nationalism theory, ideology, history (Cambridge, 2001), p.74. 
18 B. Khleif, Language, Ethnicity and Education in Wales (Bath, 1980), p.11. 
19 A. H. Birch, Nationalism and National Integration (London, 1989), p.4.J. Mayall, Nationalism and 
International Society (Cambridge, 1990), p113; D. Norbu, Cultural and the Politics of Third World 
Nationalism (London, 1992), p.23. 
20 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, 1991), p.164. 
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While many writers agree that nationalism is a relatively modern concept, there is much 
less agreement about what nationalism is and what constitutes a nation or national 
identity. 
According to Billig, nationalism involves the creation of the sense of a national identity 
for those who are said to inhabit or believe they deserve to inhabit their own nation 
state.21 For Hobsbawm, nationalism involves demands for autonomy or independence in 
relation to a defined territorial area.22 However, Guibernau notes that minorities within a 
state can maintain their language and culture, even if they do not have a separate, 
independent state.23 Miller points to the example of the Kurds who are still considered a 
nation but have no national territory of their own, instead being scattered across many 
countries, such as Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Roeder also argues that nationalism is more 
than an entitlement for a people to govern themselves in their own territory. It also 
relates to the uniqueness of a specific people and the different elements involved in the 
process of the making of a nation state.24  
Anderson regards nationalism as the most powerful civic motivator in the modern 
world, created by problems of insecurity within the socio-economic and political 
environment.25 Within a state, an appointed representative governs the people under the 
broader concept of nationalism.26 National interests bind the population to apply and 
practise given norms in their daily lives. The state gives rights to its people to make 
them a society. 27  The nationality of an individual within a state provides welfare 
through enhanced cultural and economic well-being and, in return, the state expects 
individuals to be loyal.28 
Social and cultural identities can be categorised as either ‘granted’ or ‘gained’. 
Nationality is a ‘granted’ identity meaning that it is not a natural, spontaneous identifier 
but something which is actively created within the socialisation process. 29  Social 
interactions amongst the people within a state provide them with a sense of 
                                                 
21 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p.24. 
22 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, 1991), p.6. 
23 M. Guibernau, The Nation State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. (Cambridge, 1996), pp.69-
71. 
24 P. G. Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism 
(Princeton, 2007) Available at: https://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8553.pdf. Accessed on 7/10/2016. 
25 J. Anderson, The Rise of the Modern State (London, 1986), p.115. 
26 E. Kedourie, Nationalism (London, 1966), p.9. 
27 E. Kedourie, Nationalism, (Malden, 2000), p.1. 
28 H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (New York, 1967), p.16. 
29 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, 1991), pp.44-45. 
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identification.30 A sense of community emerges as a result of a combination of ideology 
and practice; this establishes further links amongst individuals and groups and 
ultimately creates a national identity.  
Language, belief and culture are interwoven in arguments concerning nationalism 
because a common language, belief and culture can bind individuals together in a way 
that causes them to consider themselves to be a nation, regardless of ethnicity.  
Billig observes that social scientists consider that social interaction amongst people who 
communicate in the same language can help to develop the framework of nationalism as 
they often seek to find their own identity politically.31 However, he also notes that states 
can be monoglot, like Iceland, with its relative social and semantic homogeneity, or 
polyglot like India, with its vast diversity of languages, religions and cultures. Kedourie 
illustrates the different inter-linkages that may exist between language, culture and 
nation.32 Thus, creation of the USA as a nation was based on a language (English) rather 
than religion.33 In Switzerland, on the other hand, a sense of Swiss nationality holds 
together a multilingual state that does not threaten to fragment along linguistic lines.34 
Sometimes, language is recognised as a symbol of nationalist aspirations, as is French in 
Quebec, sometimes it is not. 
Nations do not necessarily emerge from ethnic communities but common characteristics 
of ethnicity, such as culture, can be an enduring source of national identities. 35 
Religious belief can have a key role to play in shaping nations and nationalism because 
of its close links to cultural practices and ethnicity. Sometimes, particular religious 
groups are involved in nationalist struggles, as in the case of Northern Ireland; 
sometimes, the same groups have no role to play, as in Scotland. The linkage between 
religion, language and national identity can change. Thus, when the Belgian state was 
founded in 1830, religious affinities seemed stronger than linguistic differences; more 
recently, however, the position has been reversed.36 
                                                 
30 B. William, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge, 1990), p.52. 
31 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p.13. 
32 M. Stephen, Language and Minority Rights (London, 2012), p.61. 
33 A. Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (London, 2004), 
p.76.  
34 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p.23. 
35 D. Miller, On Nationalism (Oxford, 1999), pp.19-20. 
36 Ibid, p.4. 
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Anderson’s highly influential Imagined Communities emphasises that one of the means 
by which national imagination is created and maintained involves rituals. Rituals, 
including everyday rituals (what Billig refers to as ‘banal nationalism’), create a shared 
imagination, which subsequently develops into nationalism. Rituals of any type develop 
the population’s thinking about the ongoing issues that a nation faces across all levels. 
Moreover, external threats and challenges further motivate people to maintain these 
rituals thus reinforcing the development of feelings of nationalism. Smith argues that 
ceremonial and symbolic characteristics play a decisive role in the success and 
durability of national identity.37  
Nationalists prescribe rituals and ceremonies, including the adoption of parades, 
remembrance ceremonies, anniversary celebrations, coinage, flags, tributes to heroes 
and memorials dedicated to historical events because signs of this kind serve to recall 
cultural bonds and endorse shared identity and national unity. Anderson notes that 
Hegel had previously commented on how the reading of morning newspapers engage 
the majority of readers in a nation in routines, similar to those followed by people who 
say morning prayers.38 Rituals and ceremonies bring people closer to one another and 
cultural bonds further strengthen identity.  
1.5.1 Education And The Creation Of National Identity 
Given the close links between national identity and socialisation, many authors have 
made connections between nationalism and education. According to Guibernau, from 
the nineteenth century onwards the spread of education played a key role in the creation 
of nationalism in Europe, due to its link with culture and identity. It was used in 
campaigns to develop national awareness and embed this ideology within 
communities.39 Both Hobsbawm40 and Gellner believe that certain political, technical, 
administrative and economic conditions are necessary for the emergence of a nation, 
including a modern educational infrastructure which helps people to adapt to rapid 
change.41 For Billig, this rise in nationalism can also be linked to the emergence of 
industrialisation which brought with it a demand for standardised skills which was best 
dealt with by means of a centralised system of education which in turn helped to create 
                                                 
37 A. Smith, National Identity (London, 1991), p.162. 
38 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.36. 
39 M. Guibernau, The Nation State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. (Cambridge, 1996), p.69. 
40 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, 1991), pp.44-45. 
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and reinforce the idea of a homogeneous nation state. 42  This education which is 
designed to foster development within a nation can take the form of provision of 
schooling for children and mass literacy campaigns aimed at adults.43 
Feinberg asserted that education is linked more generally to the growth of nationalism 
because it gives individuals to means to understand concepts such as power and 
identity.44  Educational policies can also be specifically framed to promote ideas of 
citizenship amongst a nation’s children.45  
Other authors have highlighted the key role that universities and higher education can 
play in the creation of nationalism. Bechhofer and McCrone note that students become 
more aware of Nationalist Theory and other nationalist movements, producing leaders 
who can inspire. Higher education also helps to create a professional cadre who are 
capable of designing the national agendas for those countries facing nationalist 
tensions.46  
There is ample evidence of the importance of education in the rise of the twentieth 
century anti-colonial nationalist movements. Woddis maintains that education led 
increasing numbers of Indians to rebel against some of the norms and traditions of 
Indian life, and to develop an interest in political change.47 This Westernised elite went 
on to play a leading role in the rise of Indian nationalism.48  
Khapoya notes that the introduction of formal education in many parts of Africa has 
been recognised as having helped to broaden support for the nationalists’ search for 
freedom.49 Political activists who challenged the presence of colonial states and called 
for African independence demanded flexibility in the colonial education system that 
utilised political and moral nationalist thoughts established in Western teaching.50  
                                                 
42 Billig, p.22 
43 A. Smith, Nationalism theory, ideology, history (Cambridge, 2001), p.74. 
44 W. Feinberg, Common Schools /Uncommon Identities, National and Cultural Difference. (New York, 
1998), p.49. 
45 U. Ozkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (Macmillan, 2010), pp.12-13. 
46 F. Bechhofer and D. McCrone, National Identity, Nationalism and Constitutional Change. (Macmillan, 
2009), pp.20-21.  
47 J. Woddis, An Introduction to Neo-Colonialism. (New York, 1967), p.15. 
48 J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd edn (Manchester, 1993), p.157. 
49 Khapoya Colonialism and the African Experience, Journal of Pan African Studies, 3 (2010). 
50 Khapoya, Colonialism and the African Experience, Journal of Pan African Studies, 3 (2010).pp.135-
136. 
11 
 
Initially, in the nineteenth century, British churches sent Christian missionaries to Sierra 
Leone, where they helped with the settlement of liberated African slaves, known as the 
Recaptives.51 These missionaries also established schools in almost every village that 
taught English. Large numbers took advantage of this opportunity to learn, with some 
becoming the Western-educated elites who went on to establish the framework for 
further development in African countries. The mass education system, together with this 
educated elite, provided fertile ground for the development of indigenous ideas about 
African emancipation and the future development of the continent.52  
The colonial education system helped many Africans to develop social organisations, 
particularly in the late 1920s, when many educated Africans joined nationalist 
associations in East, West and South Africa.53 After WW2, as nationalist sentiments 
spread, peoples throughout the African continent who had benefited from education 
during colonial rule demanded autonomy, with their leaders giving voice to these 
desires.54 
Examining British educational policy in its overseas territories, Cleveland criticised this 
on the grounds that although it brought many material advantages to locals, it was 
designed primarily to serve British imperial and financial interests. Cleveland cites as 
evidence Lord Cromer’s55 educational policy in Egypt, which had been shaped by his 
experience in India. He believed that the growth of Western-style educational 
institutions—especially universities—would create groups of Egyptian intellectuals 
imbued with nationalist ideals and a sense of frustration over their inferior status.56 
Therefore, he implemented restrictive educational policies intended to confine 
Westernised graduates to studies in vocational institutes. However, this did not prevent 
the development of a cadre of Western-educated Egyptian intellectuals who 
subsequently led their fellow citizens to seek independence from Britain.  
                                                 
51 The Recaptives, also known as Liberated Africans, were Africans who had been rescued from slave 
ships by the British Royal Navy on the high seas after Britain abolished the slave trade. They were then 
taken back to Freetown (now the capital of Sierra Leone) where they were resettled. 
52 D. van den Bersselaar, In Search of Igbo Identity. Language, Culture and Politics in Nigeria, 1900-
1966 (Leiden, 1998). Available at: http://pcwww.liv.ac.uk/~dvdb/isoii.htm 
53 J. O. Sagay and D. A. Wilson, Africa, a Modern History: 1800-1975 (London, 1978), p.370. 
54 P. Cammack, D. Pool, and W. Tordoff, Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction (London, 
1988), p.24. 
55 Lord Cromer was the colonial administrator in Egypt (1882-1914) and had worked in India for several 
years. W. L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Oxford, 1994). 
56 W. L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Oxford, 1994), p.101 
12 
 
1.5.2 The Press And The Creation Of National Identity 
Both Anderson and Billig agree that printing changed the appearance and condition of 
the world and accordingly attribute the rise of nation-state to the importance of 
printing.57 Hobsbawm notes that most modern scholars hold the view that standard 
national languages—whether spoken or written—cannot emerge as such until printing, 
mass literacy and mass schooling exist.58  
Anderson claims that prior to the age of print, the Roman Catholic Church easily won 
every war against heresy in Western Europe due to the fact that it always had better 
internal lines of communication than its challengers. 59  By the end of the fifteenth 
century, however, the major centres of Europe had developed printing presses. The 
function of these presses was to print books on various subjects of importance, 
including law, medicine and science.60 These publications also helped to spread new 
cultural and political ideas amongst intellectuals which contributed to growing debates 
about the rise of national consciousness. The development of newspapers followed later 
and these “made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about 
themselves, and relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways”.61Eventually 
educated native elites increasingly began to challenge their domination by foreign 
powers and to resist occupation. This educated elite was able to take the lead, using the 
press to call for the expulsion of foreigners or to call for support for nascent liberation 
movements.62  
Anderson and other authors have argued that printed materials and the media not only 
disseminate ideas about nationalism but also the idea of a nation itself in various ways, 
some direct, some indirect. The synchronous reading of daily or weekly newspapers can 
create the sense of a simultaneous national experience for people as they are made 
aware of events occurring in their own nation and elsewhere. When many citizens read 
the same thing about world affairs, such as financial crises, wars and alliances between 
different countries, essentially disparate occurrences can thus be bound together as 
                                                 
57 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.37. M. Billig, Banal nationalism, p.22. 
58 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, 1991), p.10. 
59 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.39. 
60 M. Guibernau, The Nation State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1996), p.66. 
61 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.36. 
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national experiences. 63  As Khleif notes, newspapers can influence people’s minds 
through their writing, projecting themes of national interests, 64  developing and 
strengthening these ideas in successive articles. In this way, citizens come to understand 
different scenarios, framing them into their minds in national perspectives.65  
Billig argues that editorial writers, feature-columnists and even reporters on business 
pages in newspapers often use the deictic ‘we’ as a means of referring to their readers. 
Sometimes, however, this also implies an overtly national ‘us’,66 by highlighting the 
issues of national cultural interest.67 There are other routine forms of homeland-making 
discourse used in newspapers. Billig highlights that the press contribute to the creation 
of nationalism by publishing the homeland news in its pages. 68  This presents the 
national home of readers as the context of utterance and places it at the centre of the 
universe.69  
The intellectuals and the press play an important role in helping to promote discussion 
about national issues and in raising national awareness, adding their voices to the calls 
for complete, independent self-governance and the rejection of foreign powers. 
Examples can be found from other colonial contexts in which the press has specifically 
been linked to a rise in national consciousness. According to Cleveland, for the most 
part Egyptians expressed their political opinions via the press and, in what may seem a 
paradox, journalism and the press flourished throughout the period of the British 
administration in Egypt. Most newspapers openly addressed the question of Egypt’s 
relationship with Britain and also served as a discussion forum for the major cultural 
and social issues of the day.70 
In Nigeria, the opinions of Ogbalu71 were published in nationalist newspapers, one of 
which was owned by Azikiwe. 72  In one article in Nigerian Spokesman, the editor 
                                                 
63 Ibid 
64 B. Khleif, Language, Ethnicity and Education in Wales (Bath, 1980), p.28 
65 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.36. 
66 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p.114. 
67 F. Bechhofer and D. McCrone (eds), National Identity, Nationalism and Constitutional Change 
(London, 2009). Available at: http://www.institute-of-
governance.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/35939/chap1_intro.pdf.  
68 M. Billig, Banal nationalism. p.119. 
69 Ibid, pp.115-116. 
70 Cleveland, History of the Modern Middle East, pp.102-103. 
71 F. Chidozie Ogbalu (1927-1990). In the late 1940s the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons 
(NCNC) led protests against British rule. Ogbalu was an NCNC supporter and an advocate of Nigerian 
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accused the British of adopting an approach designed to eradicate the Igbo language in 
favour of English. In this editorial, he adopted the aggressive language then common 
amongst nationalists,73 using this medium to defend Igbo which was considered to be an 
intrinsic part of national identity.  
Nehru claimed that the advent and use of the printing press also gave a great stimulus to 
the development of indigenous Indian literature and languages.74 
1.5.3 Associational Life And The Creation Of National Identity 
It was frequently the case that associations originally formed for social or cultural 
reasons became the precursors for political parties with a nationalist slant. This was the 
case in Egypt during the first decade of the twentieth century.75 The Umma party, 
founded in September 1907, had a moderate programme calling for co-operation with 
the British.76 The Egyptian Reform Party, Hizb al-Islah, was founded next, followed by 
the nationalist party, in an effort to smooth the way for the British departure from 
Egypt.77  
The anti-colonial British Indian Association was established in Calcutta, chiefly as a 
means of raising grievances with the government. It was also concerned with increasing 
political consciousness across India which led to widespread agitation in 1852.78 This 
was one of the factors leading to the creation of the first pan-Indian national 
organisation—the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885.79 During the 1920s and 
1930s, British attitudes towards India began to shift, partly as a result of Gandhi’s 
protests and the work of other nationalist leaders, such as Jawaharlal Nehru.80  The 
Indian National Congress, headed by Nehru, became the focus of a campaign for 
Indians who wanted to see the end of British rule. After Britain gave self-rule to the 
                                                                                                                                               
independence from Britain. See: D. van den Bersselaar, In Search of Igbo Identity. Language, Culture 
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72 Azikiwe was very actively involved in the development of Igbo ethnic identity. See: Van den 
Bersselaar, In Search of Igbo Identity. 
73 Ibid.  
74 J. Nehru, The Discovery of India. (New Delhi, 2004), p.346. 
75 A. Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism (London, 1989), pp.71-72. 
76 P. M. Holt, Political and Social Change in Egypt: from Ottoman conquest to the United Arab Republic 
(London, 1968), p.321. 
77Adu Boahen, African Perspectives, pp.71-72. 
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Irish Free State in 1921, it became even more difficult to deny self-rule to India.81 
Subsequently, a range of measures was introduced that afforded India with increasing 
independence.  
Similar societies, associations and political parties were formed in other parts of Africa, 
leading to campaigns against the colonial system.  
1.5.4 Arab Nationalism 
Breuilly contends that Arab nationalism can be understood as a kind of modern anti-
colonial nationalism that originated as a separatist movement during the Ottoman 
Empire, viewing it as a unification movement that was anti-colonial in nature and a 
product of the encroachment of the industrial world into the Ottoman Empire. The 
interaction between Arab-Islamic ideas and Western thought in the nineteenth century 
during the Ottoman Empire, gave rise to thinking about religious reform and Arab 
nationalism in the Empire’s eastern provinces.82 Gellner also highlights the close links 
between Islamic reformism and Arab nationalism.83 In contrast, Smith argues that there 
was little evidence of development of Arab nationalism across Arab territories, prior to 
World War I.  
Similar to what occurred in many other non-Western nationalist movements, Arab 
intellectuals paved the way to unity and independence on the basis of a common 
cultural identity with Arab states sharing a common language and, to a large extent, a 
particular socio-political and religious legacy. 84  Drawing on Breuilly, Dawisha 
highlights the role of education in raising political consciousness among young Arabs 
and in the subsequent development of Arab nationalism. Intellectuals rather than 
politicians remained at the forefront of these movements which were initially inspired 
by European scholars and then transformed into a distinctive form of Arab 
nationalism.85 These Arab intellectuals produced ideas that helped to bridge short-term 
differences among different Arab tribes. The prominent role of intellectuals was also 
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evident in the policies that they devised, targeting education, culture and other areas 
focusing on Arab nationalism.  
Some of the key figures testify to the importance of intellectuals in Arab nationalism.86 
Michel Aflaq’s87 ideas played a significant role in the development of Ba'athist thought 
and its political movement, the Baathist Party; his intellectual aspirations dominated 
Syrian and Iraqi politics for many decades. Sati al-Husri,88 the Arab Fichte, designed an 
educational system that was intended to inculcate nationalist values in Arab youth in 
Iraq and Egypt before and after the Second World War.  
According to Breuilly, in comparison with pan-Africanism, pan-Arab nationalism 
appears to be a powerful, coherent movement. He contends that one explanation may be 
that the Arabs are a nation bound together by language and, to some degree, religion, a 
fact that makes the intellectual basis of Arab nationalism more plausible than that of 
pan-Africanism.89 Smith however maintains that both Islam as a religion and Arabic as 
a language have proved incapable of identifying a clear direction on the basis of ethnic 
or territorial norms of nationhood. 90  He argues that Arab nationalism remains a 
problematic concept due to the fact that in the Arab context the understanding of the 
term ‘nation’ varies demographically, geographically, historically and politically.  
Aflaq like some other Arab nationalist scholars considered religion, specifically Islam, 
to be central to arguments about nationalism, arguing that in principle this religion and 
Arab nationalism are linked, although this may not be followed in practice.91 Others, 
however, consider religion as subordinate to Arabism.92 Bazzaz, for example, maintains 
that Islam is not a necessary element in the creation of Arab nationalism, pointing to the 
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fact that Arab Christians make up nearly one fifth of the total populations of Syria, 
Jordan and Sudan, and half the population of Lebanon. The Arab League itself asserted 
that accepting the theory that Islam is an essential element in defining Arab nationalism 
would disqualify millions of non-Muslim Arabs from standing under this banner. 
Moreover, Islam as a message has been spread to all people. It is therefore not an 
exclusively Arab or eastern religion, but universal. If every Muslim in Asia, Africa, and 
Europe is to be considered a brother to the Arab Muslim in the religious sense, this 
means that all of them share the same nationality, suggesting a further lack of 
understanding of nationalism.93 Al-Housri goes further, arguing that “neither religion 
nor the state nor a shared economic life are the basic elements of a nation, and nor is 
common territory.”94  
This relationship between Islam and nationalism as a general concept was one of the 
key issues to which the state ideology in Libya paid a great deal of attention, especially 
under the regime of former Libyan leader, Gaddafi. He considered Islam to be the most 
significant political and cultural weapon against imperialism and Western intellectual 
domination but as Bruce stresses he vacillated between considering Islam as a global 
religion and viewing it as the national religion of the Arabs alone, seeing Arab and 
Islamic identities as being intrinsically linked. 
1.5.5 The Emergence of Libyan Nationalism 
Belhaj notes that outsiders have long helped to transmit the new ideas and knowledge 
which have influenced cultural developments in Libya, even more so when they decided 
to settle in Libya.95 As early as the thirteenth century, the Egyptian scholar, Issael Al-
Biyatti, taught in Tripoli and Cyrenaica in addition to numerous other itinerant scholars 
from Tunisia, Morocco, and Syria who had travelled to Libya to share their knowledge, 
education, and culture, disseminating ideas of freedom and Ummah.96 These foreign 
visitors included scholars such as Fakih Abu Al-Hassan and Muhammad Bin Ibrahim 
Al-Kadaloussi. The latter passed through Libya returning from Haj (pilgrimage) in 
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96 Scholars who came to Libya from other Arab countries include the Fakihs Abu Muhammad Abdullah 
Bin Abdelkarim-Elramari, Abu Alabbaset Jajami, and Abu Abdullah bin Ibrahim Abimuslim Alkabbassi. 
See: A. M. Tijani, ،يناجتلا ةلحر[The Travels of Tijani] (Tunis, 1958), p.157. 
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Mecca, settled in Tripoli and became a judge there.97  
However, according to Omar, the Ottomans ruled Libya with a heavy hand, paying no 
attention to education, social organization or cultural development.98 This meant that 
signs of cultural renaissance were not seen until the late nineteenth century, when the 
Libyan writer Abdulaziz Al-Issawi was the first to establish close ties with other writers 
and intellectuals outside Libya, acting as a representative of al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, who 
was the leader of the Sanusiyya movement at that time.99 
Khadduri argues that the occupation by the Western Powers made a major contribution 
to the creation of Arab nationalism in Libya. As was the case in other Arab countries in 
North Africa, the Ottomans supported North African national religious movements. 
Therefore, religion was one of the most potent factors contributing to the rise and spread 
of nationalism in North Africa and the principles of Libyan nationalism were 
intrinsically linked to religious organisations. Unlike Arab nationalism in the Eastern 
Arab world, Libyan nationalism supported the leading Muslim power and accepted 
Islam as the basis of state building.100  
Moussa contends that the cultural and religious similarities created by Islamic 
civilisation in North Africa helped to forge close links amongst Arab Muslims. These 
affinities, produced by a core cultural and religious unity, led them to defend each other 
as a single community (a concept known as Ummah) against any foreign intervention.101 
Altalise argues that the Middle East in general, and Egypt in particular, acted as the 
centre for exchanging new cultural developments and intellectual activity amongst the 
Ummah and it is not surprising that Libya was affected by what was happening in these 
neighbouring countries. 102  According to Alshaibane, the Libyan students who had 
studied in Egypt and Tunisia played a key role in transferring new culture and 
intellectual trends to Libyan society.103  
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The reformist movement in Libya was led by intellectuals and educated people. It was a 
progressive movement that was influenced by the demands of the Arab nationalist 
movements which had emerged in the Middle East and gained a foothold in Tripoli 
through magazines and newspapers. According to Shukri, these periodicals included Al-
Manar [The Beacon], a newspaper launched by Muhammad Rashid Rida in March 1898 
in Egypt, and the journal Al-Muayide [The Supporter], written by one of the leading 
religious figures of Al-Nadha (the Arab awakening), Muhammad Abduh. Both focused 
mainly on the reformist approach of Al-Afghani104 on religious issues and published 
coverage of social and political problems in the region. Therefore, the emergence of 
nationalism was closely linked to the fact that Libyans read such articles regularly.  
Almasrati argues that other intellectuals were influenced by the reformers Abduh and 
Al-Afghani, included Ibrahim Seraj al-Din, Ali Ezakouzi, Ahmed Bin Ouyidane, 
Hassan Ouyidane and Muhammad Alboussiri. These men emerged as the leading 
intellectuals in Tripoli and were featured in the press calling for legal and economic 
reform, urging Arabs to accept capitalism.105 
According to Brocin, Tripoli offered fertile soil for the development of the reformist 
movement, as it was one of Libya’s most developed cities, both socially and 
economically. 106  One of the key aspects of this movement was its opposition to 
traditional Islamic laws in the light of the growth of capitalism within Arab societies. 
This movement was opposed by feudalists and tribal leaders due to their own self-
interests.107  
Whilst Abduh and Al-Afghani advocated modernisation, the Sanusiyya movement 
wanted a return to the fundamentals of Islam and rejected the influence of Western 
culture in Libya. Due to this crucial difference in approach, the Sanusiyya did not accept 
the reformists. They believed that modernisation came at the cost of adherence to 
traditional Islamic laws, and would have been likely to withdraw their support for the 
reformist movement; hence it said little about modernisation and capitalism. 
The nationalist movement was less strong in Cyrenaica, where it faced pressure from 
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other influences. 108  The first underground organisation with political aims was 
established in Tripoli in 1883 by Ahmed Al-Nab Ansari, Hamza Dafer, and Ibrahim 
Serajal-Din. Following the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, and the British 
occupation of Egypt in 1882, its goal was to push for reforms which would prepare 
Libya for the threat of a similar European occupation, especially given the problems 
being faced by the Ottoman Empire. Henceforth, despite its lack of radical inclination, 
this organisation was to reject the centuries-old link between Arab countries and the 
Ottoman Empire.109 
When Libya fell under Italian occupation in 1911, despite their best efforts, the Italian 
authorities were unable to prevent the circulation of magazines such as Al-Resala [The 
Message], Al-Hilal [The Crescent Moon] and others, which informed Libyans about 
current intellectual trends and helped them to understand and read about events in 
neighbouring Arab countries.110 Libyan intellectuals were eager to gain access to these 
publications, even more so when the nationalists asserted that their Italian colonisers 
planned to cut off all links between Libya and other Arab countries. When the Italian 
authorities imposed strict new laws affecting all printed matter, Libyan intellectuals 
were forced to seek other means of communication.  
The editor-in-chief of Majaltlibya, Omar Fakhri Al-Mhishi, distributed magazines and 
newspapers from other Arab countries, especially Egypt, secretly through his contacts in 
Libya. Muhammad Bourkssis, owner of a nationalist bookshop in Benghazi in 1929, 
also imported books and periodicals from Egypt. These publications were full of articles 
on Arab history and nationalism, the idea of Pan-Arab unity and the Arab struggle 
against imperialism.111 When the Italians banned anti-fascist books and publications, he 
continued to circulate these clandestinely. This suppression of cultural activities and the 
press continued from 1928 until the Italians were defeated in WW2. It was not until 
Libyans were allowed to publish their own newspapers in the period following this 
conflict that it became clear to what extent they had succeeded in staying abreast of 
cultural and intellectual developments, despite the difficult conditions that the country 
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had endured.112 
It is clear that the press and publications that came to Libya from neighbouring 
countries played a significant role in the rise of nationalism. These publications reported 
events in neighbouring countries and elsewhere in the world, especially news about 
liberation movements that called for the expulsion of colonialists and the replacement of 
the foreign power by a national government and an independent state with its own flag 
and anthem. This increased awareness of nationalism among Libyans and helped to 
develop nationalist sentiments among the Libyans. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This research investigating the BMA in Libya uses a qualitative approach which 
includes a case study, systematic analysis, and oral history to achieve the aim and 
objectives of this thesis. The researcher used data from a range of primary and 
secondary sources for each of the aspects of this study, combining data from oral 
testimony gathered by interviews, Arabic newspapers printed during the period under 
study and archival collections. Earlier historical accounts from primary and secondary 
sources were compared with sources that have been recently released and critically 
assessed. Most of the published material on Libyan culture, press and politics and the 
role of the BMA was written in Arabic rather than English. These Arabic materials were 
translated into English by the researcher himself.  
1.6.1 Primary Sources  
The main archival sources accessed by the researcher are housed in the Libyan Centre 
for Archives and Historical Studies which is based at Tripoli University. 113  It was 
established in 1977 with the aim of collecting material related to the Libyan struggle 
against Italian colonization and carrying out research on this historical period. The 
Centre possesses over one million items, including 70,000 images, over 15,000 
historical documents and oral history recordings.114 The Tripoli archive holds records 
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and files which also contained many letters, appeals and communications from Libyans 
to the administrative officials (British and Libyans) about matters of local interest.  
The researcher also made use of the National Library in Benghazi. Established in 1972, 
it houses Libya’s main collection of academic publications (some 150,000 volumes), 
theses and local periodicals. It also contains rare books, several decades of reports 
issued by the Libyan authorities and official correspondence between Libyan political 
leaders about political activities. Unfortunately, many of the documents that were 
previously stored in the archive were lost during the 2011 Revolution and its aftermath, 
or as a result of negligence by officials. 
In addition to this official correspondence in the Libyan archives, there were many 
items of personal correspondence between Libyan politicians and intellectuals. Often 
these were more informal expressions of individual opinions, particularly on the issue of 
independence and on negotiations intended to settle disputes between political parties in 
Tripoli and Cyrenaica. Although much of this correspondence dealt with the issue of 
national unity, it also provided insights into developments in education and the media 
under the BMA. 
Information from the Libyan archives was supplemented by material from the National 
Archives at Kew, London. These included Cabinet Office (CAB) minutes, files and 
reports concerning the working party delegation sent to Libya by the War Office (WO). 
The Records of the Colonial Office (CO) were also consulted, in particular the Chief 
Administrator’s Annual Reports concerning the future of Italian colonies. These reports 
were usually concerned with social, cultural, political and economic developments in 
Libya especially with the activities of local political actors. Foreign Office (FO) 
documents and reports were also useful, including the Report on the Libyan Press 
Delegation to London, and correspondence between BMA officials and the FO 
regarding civil service matters in occupied territory.  
Other valuable sources of information were the reports on political activities in Libya, 
the Annual Reports produced by the Chief Administrator of the BMA of Cyrenaica and 
Tripolitania, correspondence between the Civil Affairs Agency in Cairo and its Tripoli 
branch, as well as the monthly political intelligence reports. These documents, written 
by UK government officials and civil servants, provide further evidence on British 
perspectives on official policy during the BMA period in Libya. Clearly, primary 
resources of this kind “are not written with a view to inform historians or political 
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scientists” but “are facts in themselves not merely the representation of facts”.115 
Newspapers published in Libya during the BMA period were also considered to be a 
useful primary source. Most of these are now available in digital format while original 
hard copies can be found in the Libyan Centre for Archives and Historical Studies. 
Two types of newspapers were considered: those published under the aegis of the 
BMA, such as Tarablus Al-Gharb [West Tripoli], and those published locally by 
Libyans such as Al Akbar [The News]. These provided British and Libyan perspectives 
on the period under study.  
Although periodicals constitute an important source in this research, Thompson notes 
that a number of factors can undermine the validity of newspaper accounts as historical 
evidence. First-hand accounts cited by historians may be inaccurate at source since they 
are based on the personal perceptions of events by eyewitnesses reported by 
journalists. 116  This process of re-presentation of events may involve, for example, 
unintentional misinterpretation of the original account by a reporter or deliberate 
journalistic bias for political purposes or to appeal to the tastes of local readers. 
Furthermore, editors may choose to deliberately omit or play down the political or 
cultural significance of events or even report events that never happened, particularly if 
they are subjected to personal intimidation.117  
1.6.2 Secondary Sources  
The secondary material used in this study largely took the form of books and journal 
articles written in both English and Arabic by Arab researchers (Libyans, Tunisians and 
Egyptians) who discussed the BMA period in Libya from various perspectives. The 
major emphasis of these publications was on BMA policy towards Libyans and the 
impact that the British administration had on cultural, social and political life in Libya at 
the time. Most of these secondary sources were accessed in the UK at the libraries of 
Bangor University, Newcastle University, and Northumbria University, and in Libya at 
the Universities of Tripoli and Sabha and the UNESCO Library.  
1.6.3 Oral Testimony from Interviews 
Thompson argues that historians examining oral evidence are able to draw on the 
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experience of scholars from other disciplines including economics, politics, and 
sociology. Social scientists in particular have developed methods of using oral evidence 
from interviews to supplement other sources.118 Abrams argues that oral history exists 
in four forms: the original interview, the recorded version of this, the written transcript, 
and the historian’s interpretation of the interview material.119  
Thompson points to the fact that many historians still generally feel happier citing a 
published document rather than a taped interview. This preference has been formed in 
part from their knowledge that as far back as WW2, taped and filmed evidence have 
been faked, and that new digital technology provides even greater opportunities for 
distortion. 120  However, according to Samuel and Thompson, oral history can be a 
powerful means of constructing people’s story, showing how memories are not only a 
means of representing the past but also understanding their continuing historical force in 
the present.121 Oral history can provide the means to give voice to underprivileged 
minorities and bring recognition to spoken cultures.122 As such it can offer new avenues 
of understanding of a research topic.  
However, oral history has its own specific limitations and weaknesses as a primary 
source, and can present some practical and methodological difficulties. Abrams 
emphasises that individual memories recovered through oral history are not wholly 
reliable but some of the details they provide reconnect with the reality of the history of 
communities through the recounting of events. 123  Thompson suggested that oral 
testimony evidence needed to be validated in the same way as other historical 
documents by ensuring its authenticity, and considering its provenance and the identity 
of the author and his role in society.124 Furthermore, the sample of interviewees may not 
have been representative of opinions and experiences during 1943-1951 and it is 
possible that other informants with more relevant experiences were not located. For 
these reasons, information from the interviews was cross-referenced with copies of 
correspondence, and published materials to gain insights into the impact of BMA policy 
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and how this was perceived at the time by Libyans. 125   
The researcher approached participants with the assistance of a number of lecturers 
from Tripoli University who suggested potentially useful informants from different 
backgrounds who had been involved in education or taken an active part in establishing 
social and political organisations in the period 1943-1951. Following Samuel and 
Thompson’s suggestion that interviews should focus, first and foremost, on the 
participant’s role as eyewitness, exploring their particular experiences and personal 
perceptions of the times in which s/he lived,126 the researcher conducted interviews with 
a number of Libyan participants to obtain information about the events that happened 
during the period of study (1943–1951). These included Mukhtar Alasoud,127 Mahfoud 
Alturke, 128  Ahmed Ali, Hamad Alsalme, Mohammed Saeed Alakecat, 129  Salaam 
Mubarak130 and Mohamed Khalifa.131 Ali Mustafa Misrati, who had been a member of 
Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi (the National Congress Party) in Tripoli in 1948, 
was unavailable to participate in the interview due to poor health. The former Minister 
of Information and Culture (1964–1967), Khalifa Al-Tlesi, who would have been a 
useful source of information, unfortunately died in 2010, just before this study started. 
All interviews were conducted in Arabic (the first language of both the researcher 
himself and all participants).  
Thompson emphasises that the oral historian must prepare adequately before conducting 
an interview.132 Thus, in this study, a semi-structured interview approach was used, with 
the researcher devising an interview guide consisting of a series of prepared opening 
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questions concerning the informant’s (interviewee’s) role in encouraging social, cultural 
and political activities during the time they were students, teachers or young parents, 
and their opinions or views on the BMA’s policies. 133  These questions were then 
followed by a freer discussion with each interviewee and leading questions were 
avoided,134 with participants being encouraged to talk freely about their recollections of 
events that happened during the BMA era in Libya, while the researcher focused on 
taking notes. 
Conducting the interviews proved to be both challenging and time-consuming. Firstly, it 
was necessary to travel to Tripoli and Benghazi and some of more remote areas of 
Libya. Also, accessing information from older interviewees may be difficult, as 
memories may fade with age. According to Thompson, after the age of 30, an 
individual’s immediate memory begins to show a progressive decline.135 This can be 
exacerbated by the fact that the past event may no longer be relevant to “the needs and 
the interests of the living people which normally stimulate remembering and 
recalling”.136 This was reflected in the fact that it took many hours to obtain the relevant 
information from the participants. The interviews were sometimes carried out in 
piecemeal fashion, allowing informants time for breaks, meaning that sometimes two 
visits were required to complete the interview.  
The greatest problem encountered by the researcher came from the Arab Spring events 
in 2011 which profoundly affected the research process, effectively bringing this project 
to a standstill for a long time. The original intention was to conduct more interviews and 
access additional archival material in libraries in various Libyan cities, especially 
Benghazi University. However, the seriousness of the security situation in Libya, over 
which the researcher had no control, meant that it was simply not feasible to travel in 
order to conduct further interviews or consult extra material.  
The study also benefitted from discussions focusing on the BMA period with Libyan 
academics in their university offices or public places, such as Nadi-Tthad (Tripoli 
Union Sports and Social Club). Interviewees included Dr Mohamed Almahde (Sabha 
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University); Dr Fasel Mousa (Sabha University and the Centre for African Studies); Dr 
Mohamed Ali (Head of Arabic and Cultural Department, Sabha University). 
1.6.4 Data Analysis  
King argues that archival research as a technique has lost much “of its privileged 
position as a taken-for-granted historical method” 137  and that it is critical while 
analysing this material to draw on other alternative forms of evidence and to 
consciously deploy these to determine its potential and limitations. 138  This need to 
access and evaluate diverse and often contradictory interpretations of events is now of 
central importance to the disciplinary identity of history. Therefore, this research adopts 
a comparative triangulated approach to data collection. Archival investigation served as 
the main source of information, with recently released and newly discovered sources 
being compared with existing archive material. However, the researcher did not rely 
solely on the reports and correspondence written by British or local staff affiliated with 
the BMA, or on the Libyan archive sources since it is assumed that all these sources 
reflected a particular local perspective that would produce a particular bias, affecting 
their objectivity.  
In order to arrive at a more reliable and valid interpretation of available sources, data 
from archival sources has been supplemented by other forms of information from 
Libyan and non-Libyan primary and secondary sources relating to the British 
Administration in Libya, including oral testimony from semi-structured interviews, to 
help ensure the validity of the interpretations of various archival documents and 
accounts. It is acknowledged that oral testimony has its own inherent problems, as 
previously noted.  
1.7 Historiography  
There is a general lack of historiography of Libyan history, and as Bravo, Davite and 
Jalla note, this is particularly true of the country’s fate under Italian colonialism and 
particularly during the 1940s because “so far only scattered fragments have been 
available” and “many experts find it difficult to put their expertise into writing, let alone 
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write a book or organise an adequate circulation of what they had written”.139 Kelly 
confirms the paucity of published studies concerning the demise of the Italian 
colonies.140 Lemselaty also points to the lack of work concentrating on socio-cultural 
developments in Libya in the twentieth century generally, and specifically during the 
period being examined in this study.141 This research aims to address these gaps by 
exploring the impact of the BMA in Libya from 1943-1951 and focusing on the role 
played by the development of education, press, and socio-cultural and political 
associations during that period. 
Although a number of Arab and Western sources were identified that address these 
themes, none attempts to cover more than one of them. In addition, none have chosen to 
focus exclusively on the links between Libya’s socio-cultural and political life and the 
project of nation-building, solely discussing this in a fragmentary and secondary 
manner. 
The vast majority of western historiography considers the resistance in Libya, 
particularly that in Cyrenaica, as a ‘nationalist’ struggle, having been influenced by 
Edward Evan Pritchard’s work. Pritchard served as a political officer in the BMA of 
Libya in 1942, taking part in discussions concerning the future of Libyan independence 
and the role to be played by the leader of the Sanusiyya, Idris Al-Sanusi.142 Pritchard’s 
work reflects the British position vis-à-vis this movement, stressing that during the 
Ottoman period the tribes in Cyrenaica had seen themselves as a nation as a result of the 
Sanusiyya while the anti-colonial struggle during the Italian period highlighted the 
political features of the religious order.143  
Anyone wishing to evaluate the effect of nationalism on the establishment of the Libyan 
state cannot do so without consulting four key works, the first being Majid Khadduri’s 
book, Modern Libya: A Study in Political Development, which is still considered to be 
the only organic work on Libyan nationalism. While it remains an invaluable reference 
work, it mainly analyses the international political evolution of independent Libya 
during its first decade of existence and pays little attention to the period of Italian 
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occupation prior to WW2.144 
Lisa Anderson acknowledges that her work is mainly a comparative study from the 
perspective of a social scientist rather than a historian, the emphasis of which is on “the 
structures of social and political organization” in Libya.145 Her study constitutes a useful 
starting point for work on the formation of nationalism and state building in Libya as it 
combines literature from both Italian and Libyan perspectives. Anderson claims that 
state formation in Libya began in the second half of the eighteenth century, as a result of 
the reforms undertaken by the Ottoman government. This led to the formation of a new 
state bureaucracy and the weakening of the traditional social organisation, which had 
been based on the tribe.146 She views the Ottomans’ role as a positive one, maintaining 
that the Italian colonial administration destroyed Ottoman institutions while failing to 
develop its own bureaucracy. As a result of this, she argues, kinship regained 
prominence as the political frame of reference after independence in 1951.  
Ali Abdullatid focuses mainly on Libya’s social transformation in the nineteen century, 
prior to the Italian occupation, but also analyses resistance to and collaboration with the 
Italian occupation from 1911 to the end of armed resistance against the Italian regime 
with the death of the resistance leader Omar Al-Mukhtar147 in 1931. He viewed this as 
the period in which national identity emerged. Abdullatid argues that the Sanusiyya 
movement progressively gained political substance and developed the infrastructure of 
the Libyan state. However, he claims that this politicisation was not simply a post-war 
development and traces its beginning to the fact that the founder of the Sanusiyya order 
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had focused on the need for good education as a means of resisting the invasion of 
North Africa by foreigners especially Europeans.148 
Dirk Vandewalle examines the formation of modern Libya from its independence until 
the military coup in 1969. He also analyses relations between Libya and the West, 
particularly the United States, during this period until Libya re-joined the international 
community in December 2003 by agreeing to put a halt to its efforts to obtain weapons 
of mass destruction.149 Although the foreign interventions in Libya were more intrusive 
in the pre-independence era, Vandewalle views these as being instrumental in the 
development of the Libyan state and concludes that their impact has been mixed but 
overall more negative than positive. However, he focuses more directly on economic 
development rather than socio-cultural themes.  
In addition to these four key works, Scott L. Bills’ book, The Libyan Arena, examines 
Anglo-American plans for North African decolonisation following WW2. 150  The 
disposition of Italy’s former colonies, Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia, became the 
responsibility of the Council of Foreign Ministers, a body of representatives from the 
four major powers with a vested interest in the region, namely, Britain, France, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States. Bills focuses on the events preceding the UN 
discussions that led to the creation of the modern Libyan state, making it a useful source 
on this period specifically. He argues that the four Allied powers ultimately played a 
positive role in securing Libyan independence but fails to analyse in any depth how they 
helped to prepare Libyans to administer their independent state.  
As its title suggests, Al-Zawi’s book-length study, The Libyans’ Jihad in Exile: 1924-
1952, focuses on the experiences of Libyan émigrés, particularly those who went to 
Egypt. As a result of the Italian occupation, many Libyans were forced to leave their 
homeland, preferring to live in the neighbouring countries of Chad, Syria, Tunisia, 
Sudan and Egypt where the respective authorities provided assistance. After the Italians 
were expelled by the British forces, this allowed the Libyan exiles to return. The British 
were clearly interested in using the skills, abilities and capabilities of Libyan refugees 
who had been educated for the good of their fellow Libyans and the BMA employed 
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many in jobs in administration.151 This study sheds light on the major role that these 
exiles played in establishing social, cultural and political organisations and involving 
their fellow Libyans in these activities during the time of BMA. Al-Zawi agrees with 
Khadduri’s opinion that Libyans, especially those who joined and participated in 
political groups across the various parts of Libya, made great efforts to achieve national 
unity after WW2.152  
Another book by the same author, Jihad of Heroes in Tripoli, was originally published 
in Cairo in 1944, where he lived in exile for many years. This is considered to be the 
most detailed source concerning the Libyan resistance against the Italians, an anti-
colonial struggle which Al-Zawi frames in nationalist terms, claiming it was fought for 
Alwatan (the nation). However, the book’s accuracy has been questioned by some 
Libyan historians since Al-Zawi was living in Egypt when he wrote this work, meaning 
he could not have been an eyewitness to the events he describes. Nonetheless, this work 
is still used as the main local reference by anyone writing about Libyan anti-colonial 
resistance. 153  Both of Al-Zawi’s books view foreign interference in Libya’s 
development in largely negative terms, with some exceptions for those cases where 
foreign states played a role in securing independence from the Italians.  
In relation to the development of the education system in Libya, Fuad Shukri’s book 
The Sanusiyya, Religion and State focuses specifically on the Sanusiyya zawiya and its 
links to Sufi lodges and Islamic education.154 His work explores the Islamic influence 
on Libyan education from the establishment of this movement in the eighteenth century 
by the founder, Imam Muhammad ibn Ali Al-Sanusi in 1787, to the defeat of Italy in 
Libya in 1943 during WW2. He posits that Islamic teaching, and in particular Sufism, 
had a positive impact on encouraging and then shaping the development of educational 
institutions and practices in Libya. Islam is seen by Shukri as a domestic, Libyan force 
that is also inherently linked to and shaped by external actors. Shukri maintained close 
links with Libya where he had strong connections with Sanusiyya elements, when he 
was Director of Education in Egypt, and later became advisor to the Libyan politician 
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Bashir al-Sadawi.155 In 1949, Shukri joined the Libyan Liberation Committee,156 and 
was a member of the Tripoli delegation to the United Nations.157  
Shukri’s book remains the most important reference work in Arabic on the Sanusiyya 
movement and its struggle under Italian colonialism. He argued that the Sanusiyya 
formed a nucleus of resistance to the Italian colonial regime. As the nationalism fostered 
by unified resistance to the Italians gained adherents, however, the religious fervour of 
devotion to the movement began to wane, particularly after the Italians destroyed Sanusi 
religious and educational centres during the 1930s. Nonetheless, King Idris, 158  the 
monarch of independent Libya, was the grandson of the founder of the Sanusiyya 
movement, and this status gave him the unique ability to command respect from the 
disparate parts of his kingdom.159  
Shukri’s other book, The Birth of the Modern State of Libya, also focuses on Sanusiyya 
and the pro-Libyan independence activities in which the author was engaged prior to the 
Libyan cause being taken up by the United Nations. This activity focused on cultural 
and social aspects, especially education in Quranic schools, as a first step, and then went 
into making schools available to children. He also participated in the negotiations 
between Libyans in Tripoli and Cyrenaica concerning the unification of these separate 
provinces, giving him an insider viewpoint.160  Pelt describes Shukri as the primary 
author of the Tripoli Memorandum concerning constitutional development that was 
addressed to Idris Al-Sanusi. According to Pelt, the document was clearly the product of 
an astute political mind and although it was presented on behalf of Tripoli it was largely 
inclusive enough to accept the Cyrenaican claims.161 
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As its title suggests, Omar’s book, The History of Cultural Activity and Education in 
Libya, from the Beginning of the Islamic Conquest to the Ottoman Era, offers a general 
survey of culture and education in Libya since Ancient Greek times, through to the 
advent of Islam, and later the Ottoman and Italian regimes, ending with the BMA. Omar 
agrees with Shukri in that that the Sanusiyya movement played a major role in 
spreading education in Libya, especially religious education in its early stages. Some 
other subjects were later included, such as mathematics and science. He also confirms 
that the Sanusiyya was a religious movement and played a prominent role in the Libyan 
resistance, with most of its leaders being members of the Sanusiyya, including Ahmad 
al-Sharif and Omar al-Mukhtar. Omar’s work provides a panoramic overview of socio-
cultural and educational trends, but, due to the scope of the work, he is unable to offer 
any detailed historical analysis of these topics. Though Omar does not discuss the 
education polices implanted by BMA and their impact in depth, he mentions in passing 
the growth of Libyan education at that time and role played by Libyan intellectuals in 
independence.162  
Said’s 2004 doctoral thesis on Cultural Life in Libya specifically explores the history of 
cultural activities in Libya but is largely dependent on Arabic material and adopts an 
Arab perspective. Said shares the views of Omar and Shukri, highlighting the role 
played by the Sanusiyya movement in introducing religious education throughout 
Libya. He also notes its major impact on the Libyan resistance against the Italians. 
However, he does not provide a balanced judgement of the historical facts, seeing the 
BMA as a foreign occupying force, ignoring the fact that its policies supported Libyans 
to actively develop socio-cultural organisations. Said also places significant emphasis 
on the role of the returning Libyan émigrés.163 Although he acknowledges the existence 
of the schools introduced by the BMA, he does not discuss the longer term impact of 
their educational policies and their crucial importance in preparing Libya’s youth to 
occupy administrative positions when power was finally transferred. He does not 
include any detailed discussion of the role that the press played in disseminating ideas 
and policies.  
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The second key theme that emerges in the historiography of related literature is the 
development of the press in Libya, with two works being of particular note. Ali Mustafa 
Almasrati’s,164 Fifty Years of the Press in Libya: An Analytical Study is considered one 
of the very few publications to have dealt with the history and development of the 
Libyan press. His book traces the history of the Libyan press from its emergence in 
1866 during the Ottoman era, through the ups and downs of the Italian colonial phase, 
starting in 1911, until the end of the Second World War and the beginnings of literary 
journalism in Libya. Mustafa argues that the Italian occupation represented the worst 
time in Libya’s press history since only Italian publications were allowed. He also 
highlights that, under the BMA, more liberal attitudes not only allowed the press to 
flourish but free expression. For the first time in Libya, the newspapers were involved 
in political events and they provide details about political activities including the 
establishment of political parties.165  
Louba’s work, The Libyan Press: Political Affiliations and Economic and Social Trends 
addresses the development of local newspapers in Libya and their political affiliations 
and the role they played in spreading public awareness among citizens. While Mustafa 
described the whole period under the BMA as the Golden Age of the Libyan press, 
Louba argues that the BMA’s policies with regard to press freedom initially followed 
similar lines to those of the Italians, in that they deprived Libyans of the right to develop 
their own publications. He concludes, however, that the BMA was the only foreign 
power that gave Libyan citizens the right to publish newspapers, and pays tribute to the 
large number of publications which appeared during the eight years of their rule. 166  
Louba’s study confirms the fact that the quantity and quality of Libyan newspapers was 
the result of the BMA’s policies because it responded to citizens’ demands for the right 
to publish their own newspapers. Even though the BMA temporarily suspended 
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publication of some newspapers such as Al-Watan during the transition period, fearing 
that Libyans might rebel against their policies, suspensions of this type were usually 
short-lived and newspapers were allowed to resume publication.  
Karfa is one of the very few researchers to have dealt with the history of the Libyan 
labour movement as a form of political association in The Labour Movement in Libya, 
1943-1969. Again, this theme is explored against the backdrop of foreign intervention 
or interference, with Karfa arguing that the Americans, French and British were actively 
involved in the distribution of publications on trade union affairs in the colonies, where 
they helped to create unions annexed to the Federation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels 
in 1949. There is no doubt that the quest to establish workers’ movements in Libya was 
intended to strengthen the free Union, 167 rather than advocating for workers’ interests 
and improving their living conditions. Despite this rather selfish motivation, an 
environment was created in which the labour movement in Libya was able to flourish.  
This study focuses largely on how the activities of the labour organisations created 
opportunities to educate the labouring class in Libya. The movement was founded by 
Bashir bin Hamza, in Tripoli in 1947, and initially its membership included large 
numbers of port, transport and workshop workers, before it quickly expanded its base 
into the broader population in the 1950s. The organisations provided possibilities for 
learning and development in the evening. The pre-eminent strength of the labour 
organisations gave labourers an education that was on a par with that found in other 
walks of life. The book does not examine those policies that were implemented to 
establish these activities.  
1.8 Overview of the Thesis 
Following this introductor chapter one that provides a general road map of the study and 
establishes the organising principles of this work, this thesis is divided into the 
following chapters.  
Chapter Two traces the political history of Libya, providing the context for the work 
on the BMA period. It also briefly addresses the social, economic and political 
consequences of WW2 on Libyans. The chapter goes on to outline the history of 
education and the role of the education provided by religious institutions, in particular 
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the masjid (mosque), and zawiya, in addition to the history and role of the press and 
social and political organisations pre-1943. This chapter thus provides a historical 
context for the main areas focused on in this thesis, namely, education, the press, and 
social and political organisations during 1943-51.  
Chapter Three focuses on education under the BMA (1943-1951). Education plays a 
pivotal role in society and its development given that exposure to systematic teaching 
allows individuals to achieve their potential in life and society. Education also aims to 
pass on values about cultural heritage and instil ethical human behaviour. The 
educational process must also fulfil the needs of the community, as it is linked to 
economic development and civic education. This chapter traces the educational policies 
implemented by the British during this period, and how they focused on education as a 
tool to achieve significant development in Libya. It also assesses the impact of these 
educational policies on the various communities in Libyan territory. The concluding 
section discusses the different types of educational institutions in Libya during the 
BMA and the provision which they offered, highlighting the cultural effects of political 
education in Libya and the difficulties faced by the national education system, and how 
these were overcome.  
Chapter Four analyses the press in Libya under British rule (1943-1951), exploring the 
extent to which the BMA years in Libya stimulated the development of newspaper 
journalism and the ways in which this impacted on cultural and political affairs in 
Libya. It also examines the BMA’s attitudes towards the press in Libya, the types of 
censorship and regulation to which this was subjected and the degree of freedom it was 
allowed, offering a close analysis of the key newspapers, both Libyan- and BMA-
owned, which emerged and their links with cultural and political organisations.  
Chapter Five examines the growth of voluntary associations in Libya during British 
rule (1943-1951), discussing how cultural centres, voluntary organisations and literary 
and sporting clubs formed part of the community development process designed to 
build a strong civil society. Special attention is paid to the Omar Al-Mukhtar 
Association, which was the first of these organisations established in Benghazi with an 
overtly political agenda. This chapter also examines the importance of cultural and 
sports clubs in the provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and the growth in popularity of 
the various associations aimed at improving the lot of Libyan working men, including 
the Workers’ Club. The chapter also explores the BMA’s policies towards these non-
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political organisations and the extent to which these hindered or encouraged their 
growth within Libya. It concludes by considering libraries, another community cultural 
resource, and the role which they played in promoting literacy. 
Chapter Six considers the emergence of political parties in Libya during the period 
1943-1951, charting how cultural organisations gained an increasingly political focus, 
and the reaction of the BMA to this shift. The main political parties in Cyrenaica and 
Tripoli, Libya’s two principal regions, are discussed together with their ideological 
stance and the role which they played in the struggle for Libyan unity and the country’s 
eventual independence. Chapter Seven reflects on the impact of the BMA’s stay in the 
occupied territory of Libya, reviewing the evidence concerning the extent to which this 
affected participation by Libyans in education and cultural life, as well as politics, and 
analyses the approach to governance that was adopted by the BMA. 
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2.  CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL HISTORY 
2.1 Introduction  
Although a number of researchers have discussed particular issues regarding the 
liberation of Libya from the Italians, to date there has been no comprehensive 
investigation regarding how Libya became a state. The socio-political and cultural 
renaissance that Libya witnessed under the British rule did not grow arbitrarily but was 
the result of a range of different contributory changes in the broader evolution of its 
social and cultural life.  
For the society and culture of a nation is always affected and influenced by other factors 
of a political and economic nature and Libya was no exception to that rule.168 Amongst 
the many different developments that helped to shape a new and modern way of life in 
Libya were a series of political changes, which helped to create new systems and 
opened the gates to civil and political freedom. 169  Economic developments led to 
increased prosperity in the Libyan economy, growth in local businesses and flourishing 
agricultural, trade and craft activity. This, in turn, meant increasing incomes for Libyans 
and the creation of entrepreneurs and merchants brought skilled and unskilled jobs to 
the local population. Libyans aspired to a modern lifestyle, acquiring education and 
training by integrating these businesses into the local community.  
This economic recovery wrought tremendous changes in the lives of the Libyan people 
including the promotion of activities within communities such as debates about the 
political situation in Libya and other Arab countries, sports activities and social clubs.170 
The members of a society strongly believe that their contributions can make a difference 
because of participatory culture.171 The aims of this chapter are to provide the context 
for the ‘real’ work on the BMA period. The chapter will deal firstly with the 
background and the political history of Libya from the time of the Ottoman Empire until 
the beginning of WW2 military operations in Libya. The focus then shifts to the impact 
of this conflict on Libya, politically, economically and socially. The chapter will then 
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outline the history of education in Libya and will briefly discuss the development of 
zawiyas in Libya and how their role was expanded with the emergence of the Sanusiyya 
zawiyas.172 It will then discuss education, press, and social and political organisations 
pre-1943. The key theme of this chapter will be the impact of these areas on Libyans 
themselves prior to 1943. The chapter will also provide a clear picture of the political, 
social, and cultural background to Libyan history, prior to its occupation by the British 
Military Administration (BMA). 
2.2 The Political History of Libya Pre-WW2 
Libya was part of the Ottoman Empire173 (after Tripoli was taken from the Knights of St. 
John of Malta174) from 1551. In the period 1711 to 1835, it was controlled by the 
Qaramanli dynasties but then came under the control of the Ottoman Empire once more 
until 1911, when the Italians invaded. Initially, under Ottoman control, administration 
was dealt with by a few senior officers and army commanders but soon local assistance 
was needed to deal with the administration. The Ottomans attempted to develop Libya 
and increase connections with the other sections of the Empire.175 
Between 1876 and 1909 Libya was on the receiving end of a number of both internal 
and external political changes, which caused numerous difficulties. With regard to the 
external situation, it was difficult for the Ottoman Empire to protect Libya from the 
advance of the European empires. Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the 
Mediterranean gained in significance to the European powers, because it represented the 
shortest sea route to India.176 This led to Egypt becoming a British protectorate in 1882, 
Algeria falling to the French in 1830 followed by Tunisia in 1881 and Chad in 1900, 
together with the Italians advancing from the north.177 This European influence, rather 
than Ottoman domination, was to play a key role in the formation of Libyan nationalism 
and the other North African countries.  
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Like other European states, Italy wanted to build an empire outside European,178 with 
the result that it entered a new era of expansionism,179 resulting in the occupation of 
Eritrea in 1890, followed by Somaliland in 1905.180 Initially, Italy was interested in 
Tunisia, which was closer, had more money and already had a large Italian 
population.181 However, following France’s capture of the country, the two European 
states agreed in secret that Italy would be allowed to capture Libya instead.182  
Italy declared war on the Ottoman Turks on 29 September 1911 and Italian warships 
attacked and subsequently took control of the coastal cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, Derna, 
Homs, and Tobruk which became part of the Italian Empire in 1911 on the 11 October 
1911.183  However, the attempt at imperialist expansion was more difficult than the 
Italians had expected. It took them over thirteen years to expand their power beyond the 
coastal cities because of Italy’s involvement in WW1 after 1915.184  
In the period from 1911 to 1922, when Mussolini rose to power, the Republic of 
Tripolitania was established on 16 November 16 1918 due to the considerable influence 
of General Maitland Wilson (who became popular after WW1).185 Sulayman Al-Baruni 
(previously a member of the Ottoman parliament born in Jabal Nafusa) became head of 
the Republic, accompanied by Ramadan Al-Suwayhli (of Misrata), Tahir Al-Merayid 
(of Tarhuna), and Abdu Al-Nabi Bilkhayr (of Warfalla). Italy and its allies were 
informed about the creation of the Republic186 but despite being victorious in WW1, 
Italy was facing extremely serious problems politically, economically and socially on 
the domestic front187 and could not send any reinforcements to enable it to control 
Libya.188 As a result, it had to sign the Swani Ben Adam Accord with the Tripolitania 
leaders in 1919,189 which brought an end to the Tripolitanian conflict between the Arabs 
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and Italians, formally recognising the sovereignty of King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy 
over Tripolitania. A local parliament was established and the Italians agreed to share the 
governance of Libya with the native authorities.190  
On 31 October 1919, Cyrenaica received a constitution like that of Tripolitania and in 
April 1921, its parliament held its first meeting with Sayyid Safi al-Din as president. 
Tribal sheikhs formed the elected members of parliament which met five times before 
being closed down in March 1923.191 Following this, Muhammad Idris Al-Mahdi Al-
Sanusi, the leader of the Sanusi, signed the Al-Rajma Agreement on 25 October 1920, 
being granted the status of Emir and the honorific title of “Highness” by the Italians. He 
became leader of the autonomous administration of the interior of Cyrenaica, which 
comprised the inland oasis of Jaghbub, and the towns of Awjila, Jalu, and Kufra. He 
was also given the right to treat Ajdabiya as his residence. 192  However, problems 
emerged when Al-Sanusi wanted to include Tripolitania in his Emirate and during a 
meeting of Tripolitanian and Cyrenaican representatives in late 1922 in Sirt, he was 
offered all Libya as his Emirate.193  
Libyan dreams of independence under Al-Sanusi’s leadership ended when Mussolini 
changed the conciliatory policy for one of pacification by military might.194 He ordered 
Libya’s new governor, General Luigi Bongiovanni, to re-take Tripolitania, Fezzan and 
then Cyrenaica by force. Operations began in March 1923 in Tripolitania due to the 
continuing tribal warfare between the Tripolitanian leaders195 but it was to take a further 
decade before the total occupation of Cyrenaica due to domestic security problems in 
Italy.196 After Al-Sanusi was informed of this change in policy, war broke out again 
across all of Libya197 and stating that he was suffering from ill health, he left for Egypt 
and did not return until late 1944. 
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A number of key tribal chiefs followed suit but other began a resistance movement.198 
One of these was Omar Al-Mukhtar, who led bands of Bedouin guerrillas against the 
Italians. His effectiveness with this small but highly mobile force made the Italians 
pursue him for nearly a decade.199 However, the Sanusi resistance was brought to an end 
by his execution on 16 September 1931 and things then began to stabilize. Other leaders 
and their followers were either captured or exiled to neighbouring countries, including 
Egypt, Tunis, Chad, and Sudan. Some went to Syria, waiting to return to Libya. Most of 
these Libyan émigrés settled in Egypt where there were some 14,000 in 1939200 but 
eventually they became too concerned with earning a living to become involved in 
political activities. In his book entitled Popski’s Private Army, Vladimir Peniakoff201 
described these Libyan exiles as ‘destitute and nearly without cattle. They were semi-
nomadic and very miserable’.202  A few maintained the fight against the Italians.203 
Egypt gave in to Italy’s demands, urging Libyan émigrés to restrict their political 
involvement, which proved disappointing to a large number of them.204  
Despite this, several committees were set up, one later becoming the Tripolitanian 
Committee under the leadership of Ahmed Al-Suwayhli,205 who worked alongside the 
Tripolitanian-Cyrenaican Defence Committee, created in 1928 in Damascus by Bashir 
Al-Sadawi and Omar Shinnib. These two men found that the Italians had committed 
atrocities in Libya and subsequently published their findings in newspapers exposing 
the brutality of the Italian regime to the world.206  
When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, this damaged relations between Mussolini’s state 
and Great Britain207 and prompted Libyans, both inside and outside Libya, to see this as 
a chance to regain their rights, denied to them for over thirty years. When WW2 seemed 
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imminent and it appeared that Italy would fight alongside Germany against Britain208, 
this further encouraged Libyan émigrés to consider how best to take advantage of this 
situation and free Libya from Italian control. Therefore, soon after the start of WW2 in 
September 1939, the leaders of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica put aside their differences 
and joined together to achieve liberation for Libya, organising a conference at which 
they could discuss any possibilities for independence occasioned by this international 
conflict.209  
After Italy entered WW2 on 10 June 1940, although the leaders of Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica had agreed to work together at the Alexandria conference, they were unable 
to reach an agreement regarding a policy to help Britain’s war efforts. 210  The 
Tripolitanian leaders were convinced that the Axis Powers would be victorious and 
feared upsetting Italy. 211  Later they realised that they had made a mistake. The 
Cyrenaican leaders however were keen to make a stand against Italy. As Al-Sanusi 
noted:  
This opportunity was regarded as our chance to shoot the last arrow against our 
country’s enemy. If we succeeded, the country would be recovered; if we failed, 
nothing would have been lost, since our country was already in the hands of the 
enemy.212  
The British military authorities based in Egypt had thought about getting the support of 
Libyan émigrés and asked Al-Sanusi to raise ‘The Sanusi/Libyan Arab Force’ from 
Libyans in exile in Egypt and neighbouring countries.213 After consulting with Colonel 
Bromilow, Al-Sanusi invited the leaders of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania to a meeting in 
Cairo on 8 August 1940 to discuss helping the British forces.  
Tripolitania’s two main leaders, Ahmed Al-Suwayhli and Tahir Al-Merayid, arrived 
late to a pre-meeting on 7 August 1940, not long after General Maitland Wilson had 
finished speaking. They declined to take part in the talks, signing a declaration that Al-
Sanusi was the Emir of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.214 Before agreeing to fight for the 
Allies, they demanded a concrete commitment from Great Britain that Libya would be 
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granted independence in the future.215 All the other assembled Libyans (Aoun Souf, 
Abulqasem Al-Baruni,216 and Al-Tahir Al-Zawi), together with AbdulRahman Azzam 
Pasha (first Secretary-general of the Arab League 1945-52) agreed that they did not 
want to simply replace one occupying force for another, and wanted this condition in 
place.217  
The attendees put their trust in the British Government, as this stated that it wanted to 
see the Libyans fighting alongside the British Army under the Sanusi Emirate banner 
and to see their country liberated from its Italian colonisers. 218  The Sanusi Force 
expected to be funded by the British authorities219  and asked for the creation of a 
provisional government under the control of the Al-Sanusi Emirate to manage Libyan 
affairs with Al-Sanusi dealing directly with the British Government concerning political, 
financial, and military affairs.220 Although Al-Sanusi was verbally assured of Libyan 
independence, he did receive any official written guarantee from the British authorities 
of full independence post-WW2, and the statement from Prime Minister Eden did not 
include any promise that this territory would no longer be under Italian control, leading 
to criticism from the peoples of both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 221  One further 
criticism was the implication that Al-Sanusi’s leadership was supported by the British 
government.222  
The Tripolitanian émigrés found out that only the Cyrenaican leaders had taken up the 
offer, and worried that Al-Sanusi was taking decisions without consulting the Joint 
Advisory Committee,223 the Tripolitanians split into two camps regarding this matter. 
Opposition to Al-Sanusi’s leading the whole of Libya came from a group headed by Al-
Suwayhli and Al-Merayid who refused to join an army under Al-Sanusi’s leadership. A 
second group, mainly made up of eastern Tripolitanian émigrés, trusted Al-Sanusi and 
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consequently became part of ‘the Libyan Arab Force’. 224  In October, 1943, the 
Tripolitanian Committee was formed from opposition groups located in Egypt and 
included Al-Suwayhli, Al-Merayid, Souf, Al-Baruni Mohamed Tewfik Al-Ghiryani, 
and Mohamed Al-A’essawi Abu Khanger.225 
According to Al-Zawi, the Committee was officially named in October 1943, but the 
Committee posted a letter to the British Authorities at the General Headquarters in 
Cairo almost a year earlier on 15 November 1942, offering congratulations on their 
recent success in the Western Desert. In also offered them help ‘in clearing away our 
enemy from Tripolitania’226 suggesting that some of the Tripolitanian prisoners of war 
who had learned to use Italian weaponry during their Italian army service should be 
given arms that had been taken from the Italians, and then dispatched to Tripolitania 
under the leadership of the British. This would expand the forces along all of southern 
Tripolitania, with the British forces operating in the coastal flat lands. Moreover, would 
not create a huge financial burden for the British.227 Brigadier George Davy objected to 
this proposal228 not only because precious time would be needed to put in place much 
needed elements such as transportation, but also because he questioned whether capable 
leaders could be found from the tribes.229 After carefully considering the Tripolitanian 
Committee’s proposal, the Middle East Commander-in-Chief, General H.R. Alexander, 
rejected it.230 Davy’s reasons for rejecting the proposal were as follows:  
1-It would take around two or three months for the proposal to be effectively put 
into operation and this would mean that it was not in enough time for it to be of 
any substantial value. 2- It was not possible to deal with the transportation 
problems. 3-The plans already in place were aimed at effectively clearing up the 
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location in question. 4- Causing a revolt could not be justified when one took 
into account the likely post occupational and post-war repercussions.231 
It can be argued that there were other reasons for the proposal being rejected, given that 
the Tripolitanians had previously declined to help the Allies when the African situation 
looked less favourable in 1940.232 Sheikh Al-Zawi claimed that the British Authorities 
had contacted the Tripolitanians before the Libyan Arab Force was created under Al-
Sanusi but they had declined to offer help unless the British would give an official 
pledge to restore Libyan independence. They responded that their offer consisted of 
solely giving soldiers a salary233 and the Tripolitanians rejected this.  
In order to minimise the Committee’s disappointment at not being able to participate 
actively involved in the ousting of the Italians, Lord Glenconner suggested to the Eighth 
Army that the Libyan Arab Force should be utilised to control inhabited areas and stop 
any looting resulting from the withdrawal of the Axis Forces from Tripolitania.234 
Brigadier Davy made it clear that although the British Government would be happy for 
this assistance, unlike Cyrenaica, Tripolitania would be strictly viewed as occupied 
enemy territory and tasked the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration to implement 
this policy.235  
2.2.1 The Beginning of WW2 Military Operations 
After Italy formally became involved in WW2 on 10 June 1940 and France capitulated 
on 17 June, British interests took a different focus regarding the Mediterranean and the 
situation there. The same was true for British interests in the Middle East and East 
Africa, particularly since Britain’s lines of communication with the Far East via the 
Suez Canal were already under threat. The British had to change the route of their 
merchant ships from the Mediterranean towards the Cape of Good Hope. After the 
threat against Tunisia and Algeria had vanished from the western boundaries, Italian 
troops, which had massed in Libya and Ethiopia, then threatened Egypt, British Somalia 
and Sudan.236 However, the principal objective of the Italian forces based in Libya 
                                                 
231 G. Davy to Lord Glenconner, 22 November 1942, TNA, WO 201/428/M. O/3197. 
232 De Candole. The Life and Times of King Idris, p.67. 
233 Al-Zawi, The Libyan Heroic Jihad in Exile, p.131. 
234 Lord Glenconner to G. Davey, 26 November 1942, TNA, WO 201/428/G/TR/229. 
235 G. Davy to Lord Glenconner, 27 November 1942, TNA, WO 201/428/MO/3197. 
236 S. M. Nadim, 1940-1943 ةيلامشلا ايقيرفا برح [the North Africa war 1940-1943] (Bagdad, 1974), pp.18-9. 
47 
 
(estimated by British intelligence to be about 215,000237 in summer 1940) was to take 
British positions in the Western Desert of Egypt, and eventually the Suez Canal.238  
Marshal Rodolfo Graziani asked for postponement of the operation due to 
administrative problems and an insufficient water supply but Mussolini forced him to 
move the Italian Army. He did so, moving eastwards across the Egyptian frontier on the 
10 September 1940. On 13 September, the Italians took up a position 60 miles past the 
frontier post of Sollum; four days later they encamped at Sidi Barrani, enabling the 
British to make up the time they needed so badly.239 
General Wavell, the Commander of British Forces in the Middle East, launched a 
counter-attack on 9 December in Egypt, making the most of the Italian troops being 
stationary and within two months Cyrenaica fell into British hands for the first time. By 
nightfall of 10 December, Sidi Barrani had been captured by the Army of the Nile. 
Bardai, the first inhabited place in Cyrenaica, was captured on 5 January 1941, followed 
by Tobruk sixteen days later, then Derna before 30 January and Benghazi the following 
month, on 6 February 1941.240 
The military operations in Europe had a significant impact on the British war in 
Cyrenaica. After Greece fell to the Italians on 28 October 1940, this not only threatened 
Allied positions in the Middle East, but also put extra strain on Britain when it decided 
to mobilise troops to help its ally.241 Wavell halted military operation in Cyrenaica so 
that British Forces would be fully prepared for transfer to Greece and the order was 
given for troops who were veterans of the Sahara war to be withdrawn. Wavell had been 
given reassurance that there was no longer a threat to the British Forces in Egypt.242  
Following the withdrawal of these units to the Greek campaign on 6 February 1941, 
General Erwin Rommel received orders to assist the Italians in Libya by commanding a 
campaign there and immediately set about attacking the British forces on 31 March 
1941.243 Consequently, the British forces were overrun, leading to the loss of Benghazi 
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in the first week of April. Shortly afterwards, all of Cyrenaica, except for Tobruk, was 
evacuated.244  
This failure to retain Cyrenaica led the Imperial General Staff to make changes to the 
Army command and on 5 July 1941, General Sir Claude Auchinleck took over from 
Wavell. He quickly made significant changes that had a considerable impact in the 
following months. The Nile Army was unified with the Western Desert force, becoming 
the Eighth Army.245 On 18 November 1941, Auchinleck led these troops against the 
German Afrika Corps across the Egyptian border. On 9 December, the British reached 
Derna and subsequently re-took Benghazi on 24 December, reaching Agedabia by 10 
January 1942. With new reinforcements Rommel was able to reach Tripoli, retreat to 
El-Agheila, and later capture Antelat. The British quickly withdrew, evacuating 
Benghazi on 21 January and by 4 February 1942 a line had been drawn up at Gazala.246  
On June 29, Rommel advanced to El-Alamein in Egypt against the Eighth Army, with 
the two forces attacking and counter-attacking each other for two months. That August, 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill247 visited the British forces in the Middle East and 
ordered new commanders to be appointed. These were Generals Harold Alexander and 
Bernard Law Montgomery.248 
Montgomery put his own plans in place to destroy the Axis Forces and remove them for 
once and for all from North Africa. To meet this target, he made changes to his military 
command and created a comprehensive training programme enabling night time attacks 
in minefields. He also trained combat pilots, held meetings and got to know his troops 
while stockpiling weapons, equipment and supplies.249  
On the 23/24 October, the Eighth Army began its offensive at El-Alamein and by 2 
November, the Afrika Corps had been destroyed and Britain was pursuing the Axis 
forces. Mersa Matruh was occupied with no resistance on 8 November, and three days 
later, Axis forces were totally evacuated from Egypt. Tobruk was then captured on 13 
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November, Derna two days later, and Benghazi, then Corps headquarters, fell to British 
forces on 20 November 1942.250  
The victory was aided by a number of factors, including both the planning of British 
military command and the contribution of the Libyans, who worked silently behind 
enemy lines helping both pilots and soldiers, and even smuggling them into the British 
camps. Al-Zawi notes that the British commander, Major Vladimir Peniakoff, 
commented: ‘if it had not been for the Libyan tribes of Cyrenaica, victory would not 
have been this easy, and all the members of the British Eighth Army owe their lives to 
the Arabs of Cyrenaica’.251  
The main responsibility for administration of the countries conquered by the Allies was 
taken by the Allied governments.252  Thus Cyrenaica came under the control of the 
British Military Government. On 10 March 1943, this became the ‘British Military 
Administration’ (BMA), with the assurance that Cyrenaica would no longer be under 
Italian domination.253 The British Government stated that its policy was not one of 
imposing government on people unwilling to be under its rule.254 Despite this, General 
Montgomery stated on 11 November 1942 that until the end of WW2, Cyrenaica would 
be under the administration of the British forces. However, although a peace treaty was 
concluded between the warring powers, this did not mean an end to the hostilities in 
North Africa.255 A warning was given to the military government to avoid any debate 
about the political future of the North African territories and not to make any 
declarations with regard to this matter256 but to be firm, just and considerate of the 
interests of the Libyan population when ruling. Moreover, Libyans were requested to 
follow the BMA’s orders, behave in an orderly fashion and take advantage of the peace 
that they had not enjoyed for many years.257  
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The BMA attempted to resurrect the traditional tribal authority and use tribal leaders to 
resolve disputes, 258  which did not please the better-educated younger generation. 
However, Cyrenaica did gain some benefits, as its people were not only liberated but 
land was restored to its former tenants. Moreover, fears that the Italian government 
would annihilate the local Libyan population so that Italian settlers could live were 
removed.259 The Italians who had settled in Tripolitania were evacuated by the Fascists 
before the British arrived. 260  Before military operations ended in Tripolitania, 
Montgomery (who was based in Ajdabiya) announced the British Military Government 
and clarified that the terms ‘Tripolitania’ or ‘territory’ included the previously Italian 
domains of Misrata and Tripoli, in addition to the four Western subdivisions of Murzuq, 
Brak, Houn and Ghat.261  
All citizens living in this territory were warned not to disturb the peace, put the safety of 
British government forces or their Allies in jeopardy, or to aid the enemy, following the 
orders they were given. As with Cyrenaica, the existing laws, customs, rights, and 
properties were to be completely respected in accordance with International Law, as far 
as war allowed. Additionally, all official were to remain in post and perform their duties 
faithfully.262  
Montgomery formally entered Tripoli at the head of the Eighth Army on 23 January 
1943 following the surrender of the province by the Italian vice-governor of Libya, the 
Prefect of Tripolitania, and the Mayor of Tripoli. After the defeat of the Axis forces in 
North Africa, all conquered areas were to be administered by the Allied countries.263 
Montgomery confirmed that hostilities against the German and Italian armies were over, 
and that Libyan civilians should live a normal life. At the same time, he banned the 
carrying of arms in Tripoli.  
Tripolitania then became the centre of the BMA, and the province was administered as 
though it was still an occupied enemy territory under martial law.264 The British had 
gained experience from their successful campaigns in Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, 
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Madagascar, and Cyrenaica and, consequently, 80 well-trained officers from the 
Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, with expert knowledge of Tripolitania’s 
geography, history, its system of government and its agricultural and mineral resources, 
were sent to Tripoli. The changeover, led by M.S. Lush, the deputy chief political 
officer, occurred without any problems.265  
The British administration, as is usually the case for an occupying power, abided by and 
applied the existing Italian law, making any changes deemed necessary for needs of the 
military or inhabitants. 266  Unlike their counterparts in Cyrenaica, the Italian civil 
servants in Tripolitania who had remained after the Italian troops had withdrawn, served 
alongside the British Authorities.267  
Although the Libyans were grateful for the end to 30 years of Italian tyranny and 
oppression, they were upset by the British policy as they had expected an Arab 
administration.268 In August 1943, during a demonstration in Tripoli City a petition was 
given to Brigadier T.R. Blackley asking that Italian officials who were still being 
employed to deal with local matters should be replaced by local official working for the 
same wages. 269  The British administration was also concerned about the farms in 
Tripolitania that had been run by Italian colonists270 however, local peasants continued 
to work this land271 and to produce much needed food for the region.  
Following the conflict, economic and social conditions were negatively affected in 
Libya. However, Tripolitania had suffered relatively little damage and destruction 
during the war272 and was in better condition than Cyrenaica.273 On 15 December 1942, 
Montgomery declared that under the British Military Authority an exchange rate of 480 
lire against the pound sterling would operate.274 On 14 August 1943, this exchange rate 
was then decreased to 455 lire.275  
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2.2.2 The Consequences of WW2 for the Libyan People 
Libya’s enforced entry into WW2 had a number of negative political, economic and 
social consequences for the country’s civilian population.  
As mentioned previously, Italy’s defeat ended more than thirty years of political 
domination of Libya in 1943 and the whole of the northern area of Libya initially came 
under British command.276 After WW2, however, Libya’s fate was discussed on an 
international stage since in addition to Britain and Italy, both France and the US also 
had interests in Libya.  
France then had other regional possessions in Africa, and wanted control of southern 
Libya which bordered these African colonies. Mindful of the strategic importance of 
Libya, the US Government also wanted to increase its military presence in Libya, by 
setting up military bases there. In 1947, the report of the Four Powers Committee of 
Investigation concluded said that: establishing an ‘American Air Base in Mellaha on the 
soil of a previous Italian colony under Temporary British Administration was in 
complete violation of the Italian Peace treaty and the joint declaration of the 
Governments of the USSR, UK, USA, and therefore this agreement cannot have the 
force of law’.277 On 17 May 1945, Mellaha became Wheelus Air Base which remained 
its name until 1951, when the US government agreed to rent the air base for a 20 year 
period from the government of Libya.278 
On 8 May 1949, the Bevin-Sforza Plan was agreed between the Foreign Ministers of 
Britain and Italy, Ernest Bevin and Count Carlo Sforza, and this was intended to give 
Libya its independence after 10 years. During this time, Tripolitania was to be placed 
under Italian trusteeship, Cyrenaica under British and Fezzan under French.279 Libya’s 
strategic position had become clear to the European powers. Britain saw Libya as a 
critically important line of defence for protecting the Suez Canal: Italy’s defeat had 
stopped Graziani from getting to the Suez Canal, which could have ended the British 
Empire. This was confirmed by Ernest Bevin in a statement he gave to the Foreign 
Ministers Conference on 14 May 1946, when he stated: ‘the British Empire considers 
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the special strategic interests related to the security of the communications vital interests 
and must safeguard against any attack that might come from the western desert’.280 
As previously noted, the south of Libyan territory, Fezzan, represented an important 
base for France, so that it could strengthen its military presence and strengthen its 
control over its African colonies. Italy was also trying to regain its lost position and 
argued that it had a legitimate right in Tripolitania which formed an indivisible element 
of the Italian Empire. As La Quarta Sponda (the Fourth Shore), Tripolitania formed the 
fourth side of an Italian quadrilateral, the other three sides being Bari, Trisete and 
Durazzo on the Adriatic coast.281  These conflicting interests led to a bitter conflict 
between the colonial powers, each of which was determined to maintain access to and 
utilise Libyan land for support positions.  
During WW2, there had been ever-growing differences between Cyrenaica’s and 
Tripolitania’s leaders which led to formation of two opposing camps: the Cyrenaica 
group, which was in favour of an Emirate under Al-Sanusi; and the Tripolitania group, 
which wanted independence and unity prior to any involvement in the question of how 
the country would be governed.  
Libya finally came under British administration until the United Nations General 
Assembly awarded Libya its independence in 1951.282 However, the effects of WW2 
did not impact upon the Libyans’ moral strength; in fact, the opposite happened, and it 
seemed to re-energise Libyans. They became more open-minded and more aware of 
important realities that were the foundations for coalitions. They also became members 
of political parties and demanded national rights. The Tripolitania Committee, 
established in October 1943, stood for absolute independence for a unified Libya, free 
from foreign interference in its affairs.283 
The conflict between the Axis and Allied powers for control of the Suez Canal and oil 
in the Middle East caused significant damage in parts of Libya. It badly affected 
Libyans’ livelihoods, especially in Cyrenaica, although there are few exact statistics to 
evidence this. The backbone of the Libyan economy was agriculture and livestock, both 
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of which were heavily affected by the military operations – during the conflict, 
agricultural land was burned, water wells destroyed and farmers fled their land which 
was not fit to live on. Some 60% of the olive and almond trees were destroyed and 
considerable numbers of livestock had died.284  
Al-Janzouri described the economic effects caused by the conflict: 
It nearly completely destroyed the way of live, with decreased demands for the 
agricultural products, which were the main source of the livings of the people in 
the villages as well as farmers. The handicraft industry in the city ran out of raw 
material, particularly the textile industry. Those who obtained raw material from 
the black market would not make enough income to cover the needs to support 
their families; the markets were depressed even for other, less needy workers, 
such as shoemakers and loaders.285 
Light industries were also very badly affected, and the tools industry was completely 
destroyed in Cyrenaica. This damage was twofold: firstly, the war destroyed any 
possibility of modern technical industrial development being introduced to Libya and; 
secondly, unemployment became an everyday occurrence, with jobless people walking 
the streets.  
Libya’s harbours also suffered considerable damage and the lack of shipping operations 
meant there were no imports or exports.286 Privately owned buildings were destroyed in 
air raids in addition to schools and hospitals.287 Eighty-five per cent of the buildings in 
Tobruk were destroyed and the same fate met 60% of those in Benghazi.288 This level of 
destruction meant many people became homeless and ill as a result of exposure to the 
elements and there were few schools to teach children. The administration tried to deal 
with this crisis by issuing proclamation 349,289 which meant that war damages had to be 
paid to estates and to landlords’ destroyed buildings. The British Military 
Administration in Tripolitania spent £62,000 alone in 1944–45.290  
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One of the few positive impacts was that some classic handicraft and domestic 
industries flourished once their Italian competitors had left. In addition, it is testament to 
the entrepreneurial spirit of the Libyans that they learnt how to take apart destroyed 
tanks and sell their parts, creating a trader class that dealt in military equipment. 
The minefields created by both armies had a very negative impact upon the Libyan 
economy and its people and some are still in existence today. Some 10,000 square 
meters mainly in the towns of Al-Boweirat, Al-Qadahiyyah and Abu-Njeim (about 27% 
of the cultivated land area there) was mined.291 This caused a loss of 125,000 livestock 
animals, in addition to damaging Libya’s ability to be involved in geological surveys 
concerning potential oil fields, thwarting plans for future development.292 In terms of 
the human cost, over 500 lives had been lost by the end of 1945, as well as 700 
individuals disabled.293 This had a powerful impact on Libya’s manpower, meaning that 
individuals who would otherwise have been able to contribute to Libya’s economy 
became dependent upon it.  
When the Allies withdrew from Cyrenaica the locals who had fought against the Axis 
forces were persecuted. Some 300 Libyans were executed by the Italians in the town of 
Al-Marj in March 1942. 294  Meanwhile, around 17,000 Libyans who had fought 
alongside the Italian army surrendered to the Allied forces and had to spend four years 
in British jails in Egypt as prisoners of war, inflicting suffering on their families. 
Civilians suffered psychological effects and the lack of security led to the looting of 
both public and private belongings.295 
One further impact of WW2 was the level of civilian displacement with a mass exodus 
of inhabitants from Cyrenaica to Egypt, while others moved to the south of Libya to 
seek refuge: 
At the start of the war, a number of Maltese and Jews were shipped by the Royal 
Navy Fleet to Alexandria, the nomads who wanted to leave with the 
withdrawing British forces were transferred by road, the Administration 
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arranged for their stay in Cairo. They were settled in Burj Al-Arab near 
Alexandria, some of them joined Libyan Arab Force.296  
2.3 Education under the Ottoman Empire 
Prior to Ottoman rule, the traditional Islamic method of education had prevailed in 
Libya, carried out in religious schools (known as zawiya or kotab),297 some of which 
were attached to mosques. Pre-elementary education had been established in Libyan 
cities to teach young children to read, write and understand recited Qur’anic or Classical 
Arabic.298 Ottoman schools (madrassah) were founded as early as 1553, shortly after 
the Ottoman forces had taken Tripoli. In the larger mosques, groups of boys would be 
taught to read Classical Arabic and memorise the Qur’an.299 Older students focused on 
Islamic studies, which included Qur’anic interpretation (tafsir), jurisprudence (fiqh), 
Sunnah300 and Arabic grammar, as well as other subjects such as Sufi mysticism, poetry, 
astronomy, history, arithmetic and algebra. 301  The educational methods varied in 
accordance with the instructions of the supervising sheikh but typically included small 
seminar discussions or tutoring on a one-to-one basis. 302  These schools spread 
throughout North Africa, with a high concentration specifically in Tunisia. The earliest 
recorded example in Libya was Al-Montaseria madrassah in Tripoli. The successful 
graduates from these schools could proceed to complete their studies at Al-Azhar in 
Egypt, Al-Zaytouna in Tunis, Al-Qarawīyīn303 in Morocco, or at secondary schools in 
Syria.304 
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The French occupation of Algeria in 1830,305 Tunisia in 1881 and Chad in 1900,306 
which was seen as a direct threat to the Ottoman regime.307 The effectiveness of the 
French educational system in the neighbouring countries of Algeria and Tunisia, 
highlighted the defects of the educational systems implemented in Libya by the 
Ottomans, causing the authorities to introduce some changes. 308  Governor Amin 
Basha309 encouraged all the residents of Tripoli to obtain an education, arguing that the 
religious education offered in zawiyas did not fulfil the needs of Libyan peoples.310 
As far as educational structures are concerned, administrative offices and schools were 
mandatorily established in 1859 in every Libyan village or town.311 However, the costs 
for this were not borne by the state; rather, citizens themselves were responsible for 
generating sufficient funding to operate schools.312 Study at primary school lasted three 
years, with an extra year if required.313 The subjects included in the curriculum were 
Arabic, principles of mathematics, writing and reading.314 Academies (al-roshdia)315 
were established to provide a secondary stage of education lasting a further three years, 
and these reflected a new approach to learning modern sciences and Turkish, the 
language of Ottoman administration. These were founded and directly supervised by the 
Ottoman military administration. Each academy had two sections: one taught a civilian 
curriculum, the other a military curriculum but both followed the same teaching 
methods. Students who met entry standards were admitted to the section of their choice. 
Admission to an academy depended on fluency in Turkish, the social status of the 
child’s parents, physical fitness and successful completion of primary education.316 
Five academies were established in Libya situated in Tripoli (1895), Cyrenaica (1895), 
Khoms, Murzuq (the capital of Fezzan) (1887) and Darnah. All of the teachers were 
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Turkish nationals, and the language of instruction was Turkish. 317  Students studied 
history, Turkish and Arabic as well as geography and Islamic studies.318 In general, the 
academies failed to achieve their goals, largely due to staffing problems since many of 
the military officials employed as teachers failed to attend to teach students.319 
The Ottomans introduced Turkish and made it compulsory in Libya instead of Arabic, 
bringing teachers from Turkey to teach the language. This was a key reason why the 
Libyans remained alienated under the Ottoman Empire, meaning that even when the 
Italians invaded Libya, there was little support for the Ottoman cause amongst the 
general masses. It is surprising that the Ottomans, being Muslim, should have chosen to 
ignore the fact that Arabic, as the language of the Qur’an, could have served as a 
binding force between the Turks and Arabs. 
In 1843, Muhammad Bin Ali Sanusi established the Zawiya Al-bayda (White Zawiya) 
in the area of Libya known as Al-Jabal Al-Akdhar (the Green Mountain), which was to 
be the first step of the Sufi Islamic revival movement that emerged in Libya during the 
second half of the nineteenth century when the Sanusiyya zawiyas flourished there.320 
Libya became one of the three main areas within the Arab world where religious 
reformist orders evolved. These included the Wahabiyya order in the Arabian Peninsula, 
the Mahdiyya movement in Sudan, and the Sanusiyya order in Libya.321 The emergence 
of al-Sanusiyya has been described as "an Islamic phenomenon, religious in its 
fundamentals, social in its effects, and political in its consequences”.322 Its principles 
were based on the idea that every Muslim must obey Allah, the Prophet Muhammad and 
the ulama (clergy); the Qur'an and the Sunnah alone are the basis for the believer's 
life.323 Politically, the Sanusiyya called for an imama [a supreme Islamic governing 
body] and jihad [holy war]. The Sanusiyya established a substantial number of zawayas 
in Equatorial Africa during the late nineteenth century. These were used to resist the 
French. This resistance movement was focused on the Lake Chad region while in Libya 
the Sanusiyya fuelled the resistance movement against the Italians. 
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Although it is difficult to find exact numbers, according to Shukhri, eighty-nine zawiyas 
were spread throughout Libya, with forty-nine of these being situated in the province of 
Cyrenaica. 324  The most famous of these zawiyas were established in Al-Bayda, 
Benghazi, Al-Kassrine, Al-Aryane, Anajila-Oujla and Aolad-Mssous. Of the ten 
zawiyas established in the province of Tripoli, the most famous of them, namely 
Etrourate, Boumahdi, Elamamira, and Abu-Rafa, gained a reputation for delivering 
quality education to students who later made significant contributions in the field of 
education.325 The twenty-two zawiyas founded in Fezzan extended from Jaghbub to 
Ghat and from Ghadamis to Kufrah, the most important Sanusiyya Zawiya being in 
Ghadamis and Mezda.326 
The zawiyas differed in their teaching methods, for example, the Zawiya established by 
Muhammad Bin Ali Sanusi in 1856 in the desert oasis of Jaghbub became known as a 
centre of excellence327 where in addition to the traditional Qur’anic education which 
places heavy emphasis on memorising Islamic scriptures by heart, humanities and 
sciences were taught.328 At a time when the vast majority of the Libyan population were 
illiterate, the fact that eighty students from a single tribe graduated as Qur’anic reciters 
within one year was seen as a highly significant achievement.329 In addition, alumni of 
the Jaghbub zawiya went on to become scientists, poets, and writers.330 
Although Kufrah became the main base for the Sanusiyya in 1894, Jaghbub maintained 
its reputation as a centre for spiritual development but it is important to see the zawiya 
there also as a hub of cultural and educational activity. Its library included some eight 
thousand volumes of manuscripts relating to religion and the sciences331 which had been 
imported from Egypt, Hejaz (Saudi Arabia), Tunis and Marrakech, and it was open for 
consultation by anyone wishing to study. 332  Social and cultural activities included 
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seminars on poetry and other types of artistic endeavours.333 
The religious teaching in the zawiyas contributed not only to the Islamic revival in 
Libya but also led to a renaissance in social and cultural life and political activities in 
the country, as the following examples show. Having learnt the Qur’an by heart in his 
own home in Ghadamis, sheikh334 Muhammad Azzedine then travelled to Tunis to 
continue his studies at Al-Zaytouna mosque.335 After qualifying to teach Arabic, he then 
travelled to Egypt where he made contact with scholars at Al-Azhar University.336 After 
returning to Libya, he became a teacher,337 giving lessons in mosques and teaching the 
most advanced students in his own home, where he also amassed a library of significant 
numbers of manuscripts and volumes about Islamic history.338 
Other Libyan graduates from Al-Azhar University included sheikh Abdel Jawad who 
became a clerk in the Court at Darnah during Italian rule, later working as a teacher and 
journalist, and sheikh Abdel Karim-Azouz who was appointed as a judge in Darnah in 
1929. One of his students, the poet Ibrahim Usta Omar,339 went on to become a leading 
intellectual in the cultural movement in Libya under the BMA. 340  However, the 
education provided in some religious centres, particularly in the zawiyas, created 
barriers between the Bedouin tribes341 and other civilizations, especially those of Europe 
which the Sanusiyya leaders saw as a threat and rejected.342 However, they maintained 
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close contact with other Islamic countries which were not anti-European.343 
The first Libyan underground organization was created in Tripoli in 1883, clearly 
indicating that the nationalist leaders there had been influenced by the principles and 
tendencies of the leading figures of the Arab renaissance including Jamal Uddin 
Afghani,344 Muhammad Abduh345 and Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi.346 The aims of this 
organization were solidarity with the nationalist movements in making radical reforms 
to address the challenges posed by the European threat. These were intended to improve 
all aspects and levels of cultural and economic life, by spreading education and progress 
amongst the tribes of the Sahara in the province of Tripoli.347 
By 1902 the number of zawiyas in Cyrenaica had risen rapidly to forty-four and when 
the Italians invaded Libya in 1911, the majority of the people living in this region joined 
the Sanusiyya Zawiya movement against the invasion, led by the resistance leader Omar 
Al-Mukhtar.348 Although this movement was characterised by a number of negative 
aspects, one of its positive points was its emphasis on education which was intended to 
influence cultural life in Libya. For many Libyan people, poetry remained the sole 
means of expressing their wishes and aspirations of the in the period from the end of the 
nineteenth century until the 1950s.349 The zawiyas that flourished in Libya in the period 
1843-1858 formed the beginning of education programmes for adults in rural Libya. 
UNESCO experts confirmed this opinion, noting that the beginning of the adult 
education movement in Libya did not start in 1953, when the UNESCO project was 
established in Fezzan, or in 1951350 when the independence of Libya was declared, but 
in 1843, when the first zawiya was founded in Al-Bayda. An interest in education 
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amongst older people convinced UNESCO experts to return to Libya in 1953.351 
The zawiya of Ahmed Al-Zarok in Misrata is one of the oldest seats of learning in 
Libya, and attracted students who had already studied the Qur’an elsewhere.352 The 
library there included many manuscripts related to different branches of knowledge, 
either compiled by Al-Zarok himself or brought back from his travels abroad, in 
addition to the books written by the fakihs (scholars) or those who were taught there 
including Ahmed Bin Galbon and Sheikh Ramadan Abu Turqi. 353  The Alasmari 
Zawiya, founded in Zliten in the fifteenth century, had boarding facilities for students 
and gained a very good reputation for its educational activities. It still exists today as 
Asmari University and has maintained its reputation for producing religious scholars 
and social scientists in Libya.354 The zawiyas situated throughout Tripoli played a key 
role in preserving Libya’s Arab Islamic identity when this was under threat from other 
cultures such as the Italian occupation. 355  Even when the physical structure of the 
zawiya was not present, its spirit as a centre for disseminating; knowledge remained 
alive, for example, one former student of the Alasmari Zawiya, sheikh Muhammad Al-
Siferani, opened up his own home in Benghazi as a school for students and scholars of 
Islam in 1936.356 It can be seen that that the zawiyas played a crucial role in preserving 
Libya’s religious heritage as well as disseminating ideas and learning and served as a 
catalyst for cultural renaissance and for reflection on Libya’s cultural heritage.  
2.4 Education under Italian Rule (1912–1939) 
The Treaty of Lausanne, signed at Ouchy on 18 October 1912, ended the Italo-Turkish 
War and also brought an end to the Ottoman Empire’s rule over Libya,357 leaving the 
Italian forces to continue their invasion. Given the delay which Italy experienced in 
pacifying Libya, it was some time before a full Italian education system was 
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implemented.358 Initially the Italians sought control of strategic locations or places of 
commercial importance.359 However, Italian schools had already been established in 
Libya during the Ottoman reign, with the help of Italian Catholic missionaries.360 The 
continuous efforts by these missionaries, including their educational efforts, helped the 
Italians to expand their colonisation of Libya.361 Christians who had settled in Tripoli in 
1864 opened a mixed elementary school for Christian children, who were few in 
number at that time.362 The first school for boys opened in 1881, where the languages of 
instruction were Italian and French. The Italian government supported this school 
financially, through its consulate in Tripoli, and student numbers began to rapidly 
increase. In 1888, the school was placed under the direct supervision of the Italian 
government. 363  Another elementary school for boys followed in Benghazi in 1888, 
providing a curriculum and syllabus similar to those of the Italian schools.364 In 1890, a 
third elementary school was established in Khoms by the Italian community; this was 
also placed under Italian government supervision in 1902.  
Italian education consisted of three different stages: kindergarten, elementary and 
secondary. The Italian system of education was considered to be far superior to Ottoman 
education, as it offered different specializations and granted admission to both 
genders.365 Even though the Ottoman State objected to the Italian education system, 
Turkish officers preferred to send their sons to Italian schools.366 The increase in the 
number of Italian schools reflected the growing numbers of Italian immigrants arriving 
in Libya, having been encouraged to move there by their government as part of its plans 
for colonisation. Schools were largely confined to areas of commercial influence, until 
Italian forces entered Libya in 1911.367 
Prior to the military invasion, Italy had already been taking steps to achieve its aim of 
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controlling Libya. It had established free schools in Tripoli and Benghazi to attract 
young Libyans in an attempt to positively influence their attitudes towards Italian 
culture. With the initiation of the occupation, the Italian government continued to 
encourage mass immigration of Italian citizens to Libya and implemented a programme 
of Europeanization of culture and education.  
2.4.1 Italian Education Policy in Libya 
The education policy adopted by Italian regime set clear limits for educational priorities. 
This entailed neglecting higher education in particular, meaning that there was no 
chance for Libyans to enter higher education unless they went to Egypt or Tunisia.368 In 
1914, a law came into force establishing Italian schools for Arabs which offered pre-
elementary education and were supervised by Italian government inspectors. Libyans 
became increasingly concerned that the Italians’ promise to bring new education system 
to Libya as a replacement for the failing Ottoman education system would not be 
fulfilled. 369  In addition, educational efforts were targeted on what were viewed as 
strategically important urban areas, with the result that some regions such as Fezzan, 
witnessed no establishment of schools, except in the last decades of Italian rule.370 This 
policy of neglect was even more strictly enforced under Mussolini in 1922.371 
The other important element of educational policy during this era was the adoption in 
all Libyan schools of the same curriculum that was taught in Italy, which meant that 
Libyan boys learnt Italian language, history and geography before they learnt their 
own.372  
The school curriculum and the contents of textbooks played a vital role in the overall 
process of Italianization. For example, one book began: 
Italy offers you a great deal, it protects men, property and religion. Rome ruled 
the world in the old ages, Libya flourished under Roman rule. God give me 
increasing love to Italy, my second home [...] I love Italy, great love, long live 
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Italy, let us salute the beautiful Italian flag which is our flag too. Long live the 
Duce of Italy Benito Mussolini.373 
It became clear that education was being used as part of the colonial agenda by 
attempting to impose Italian cultural on the local inhabitants, a cultural invasion 
following the military invasion. The main aim of education was to serve colonial 
interests, without any consideration for the wishes of the Libyan citizens or of the 
developmental needs of their occupied country.374 Perhaps not surprisingly, the most 
distinctive characteristic of education during the first period of Italian rule (1911–1922) 
was instability, with local citizens openly rejecting what was being offered due to the 
lack of trust in the new administration.  
Instead of providing educational programme, the Italians were interested in other 
sectors,375 causing the press to remind them about their promises to the Libyans. As the 
newspaper Al-Liwa Al-Tarablusi [Tripoli flag] commented, since the heralds of 
modernisation (i.e. the Italians) claimed they had come to help Libyans and educate 
their children, they should have done as they promised, teaching them according to the 
values of their own traditions and religion.376 The implication was clear: they had failed 
to introduce an education system suited to the Libyans.377 Changes were later made to 
the method of delivering elementary education and secondary education was split into 
two stages, one lasting three years, the other, two. Two types were introduced, technical 
and general, with the latter serving as the qualification for entering higher education. 
Just six Libyan students were enrolled in secondary schools during the academic year 
1921–1922 while the total number of non-Arab students was 232.378  By 1939, the 
number of Libyan students enrolled had risen to 134.379 
By early 1922-1923, the number of schools across Libya had reached 88, with 66 
Qur’anic schools and 14 elementary schools, secondary and technical schools 
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accounting for the remainder.380 The total number of students in all schools and stages 
in Libya was 645 in 1911-1912; by 1921-1922, this number had reached 3,559 students 
including all Libyans (Muslims and Jews)381 and Italians in preparatory, secondary and 
technical schools, indicating a five-fold rise in the number of students within a decade. 
Whilst the numbers of Arab students enrolled in elementary school had rapidly 
increased, there had not been any corresponding increase in their numbers at secondary 
school. By contrast, the number of Italian students in secondary and technical schools 
had risen sharply, suggesting that the colonial authorities did not intend to allow Arab 
students to compete for the jobs in civil administration.  
Table 2.1: Number of students enrolled in educational establishments (Libya 1911–
1921) 
1921 1920 1918 1914 1911 School  
2,363 2,319 2,066 1,947 373 Italian Elementary  
611 571 779 725 99 Arabic Elementary  
243 215 179 124 119 Technical and Trade  
342 342 289 226 54 Secondary  
3,559 3,447 3,273 3,022 645 Total of students  
Source: Steele-Greig, History of Education in Tripoli, p. 81. 
Table 2.1 demonstrates the growing numbers of students in Libya being educated 
through the medium of Italian and following an Italian syllabus over the course of the 
first decade of occupation, showing how serious the Italian authorities were about 
promoting their own language and culture in the occupied territory.382 Having to learn 
through the medium of another language obviously disadvantaged the Arabic-speaking 
local population who, in addition, were presented with a curriculum which focused on a 
culture which was largely alien to their Arab Islamic heritage. The Italians had no 
interest in providing an education which might have served to heighten the national 
consciousness of the Libyan people.  
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During the second stage of the Italian occupation (1922–1943), shortly after Mussolini’s 
fascism regime383 came to power in Italy, attempts were made to speed up Libya’s 
cultural integration into Italian national territory.384 The collapse of liberal government 
in Italy and the emergence of Italian fascism affected the situation in Libya. As a result, 
colonial policy towards Libyan citizens became openly hostile to their Arab Islamic 
culture.385 All centres of Islamic instruction were closed, including the Jaghabub zawiya, 
and these properties were confiscated for use by the Italian authorities. They refused to 
license centres of Islamic instruction and Qur’anic schools, thus removing them from 
the educational system. This closure of all schools run by the local Libyan community, 
except for the elementary schools and the colleges teaching traditional Arab 
handicrafts386 in Tripoli and Benghazi, meant that graduates previously employed as 
teachers there were forced to seek menial jobs.387 
In 1936, there were 54 primary schools using Arabic as the medium of instruction, and 
no secondary schools; 388  only three Jewish schools remained, 389  while 44 schools 
representing all stages and specialisations followed the same curriculum as that taught 
in Italian schools. New equipment and furniture went to the Italian schools while the 
schools for Arabs were totally neglected, leaving them without the means or facilities to 
offer an adequate education to students. 390  In 1939, under anti-Semitic laws, 
Mussolini’s Fascist government banned all Jewish teachers from working in 
government-funded schools in the country and prevented the teaching of Hebrew, even 
in Jewish schools.391 
Mukhtar Alasoud392 was able to give an insight into the degree of control the Italian 
school management exerted over Arab teachers working in Italian schools. His teacher 
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stopped wearing libs arabiya [traditional Arab dress]393 in favour of Italian clothes at 
work after being instructed by the Italian inspector of education to do so. Arab teachers 
were also monitored in the classroom by Italian supervisors to ensure they cooperated in 
implementing Italian policy which also required both staff and pupils to perform the 
Fascist salute.394 However Mr Alasoud also remembered that there was resistance on the 
part of teachers and a form of collaboration between them and their pupils in subverting 
the system: 
Our teacher was asked to praise the Italian regime during the lessons to the 
Libyan pupils. [He] took the whole class of pupils into his confidence and asked 
one of the trustworthy students to stand near the door and shout if the school 
supervisor appeared to check on the teachers. This would warn [him] to change 
the subject of the lesson by erasing what was on the blackboard and writing one 
of the topics on the official curriculum.395 
Since the Italian government needed to provide secondary education which would allow 
the sons of its officials, whether civilian or military, to continue their studies in Libya, 
education during this period was designed to reflect the interests and intentions of the 
Italians residing in Libya.396 This period witnessed a substantial growth in numbers of 
Italian schools, while provision of schools for the indigenous Arab population expanded 
more slowly. This type of educational policy had commonly been implemented by 
colonial powers who deliberately limited educational opportunities for citizens as a 
means of controlling their development, all the while exploiting the colony’s resources. 
In this respect, the Italians were not exceptional, but it could be argued that they applied 
this policy more stringently than other colonisers.397 
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Table 2.2: Percentages of Arab and Foreign Students in Education (Libya 1921-1939) 
Total Percentage Foreigners Percentage Arabs 
Academic 
year 
4,066 81% 3,249 19% 767 1921-1922 
7,558 64% 5,732 36% 1,826 1925-1926 
10,323 58% 5,936 42% 4,387 1930-1931 
18,771 66% 12,389 34% 6,382 1934-1935 
20,335 63% 12,811 37% 7,524 1938-1939 
Source: Adapted from Said, Cultural Life in Libya. 
The number of Italian students enrolled in state schools had reached 3,000 by 1924, and 
by 1939, this figure had quadrupled. In contrast, the Arab student population numbered 
6,010.398 Above table provides a clear idea of the ratio of Arab to foreign students 
enrolled in educational institutions in Libya for the period covering 1921 to 1939, 
highlighting the great disparity between the distribution of indigenous Libyans and 
foreigners within the educational system. Although there were more Libyans in the 
population, as table 2.2 demonstrates, the numbers of students decreased over the years 
whilst the numbers of non-Libyans increased. Moreover, the costs of this education 
were being covered by taxes paid by the Libyan citizens. Education was directly 
overseen by the Italian Ministry in Rome; its policies being implemented in Libya by 
Italian administrators who effectively controlled every aspect of the education system. 
There was no evidence of policies aimed at spreading scientific knowledge and 
technical expertise, or raising levels of literacy amongst the indigenous population, both 
of which were needed if Libya was to have a chance of development. Education can 
thus be viewed as part of a concerted campaign to assimilate Libyan citizens, depriving 
them of their cultural identity as Arab Muslims and transforming them into subjects of 
the Italian Empire.399 This policy can be compared with that which was practised by the 
Italian administration in Somalia which took a different approach to education. Since 
Christian missionaries were responsible for education there, the Italian rulers did not 
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interfere in their educational activities.400 
2.5 The Libyan Press Pre-1943 
One of the traditional functions of the press has been to inform citizens about what is 
happening within in the local community, the nation as a whole or elsewhere in the 
world. In addition to its information function, the press can also play a political function, 
either criticizing or supporting the actions of those in power.  
The first newspaper, or perhaps it would be more accurate to refer to it as a news-sheet, 
appeared in Libya in 1860 during the Ottoman era. Al-Munakb (The Prospector) was 
essentially a hand-written information sheet, produced by foreign consuls in French, 
which at the time served as a lingua franca for diplomats and European traders in 
Tripoli.401 It was distributed to a small number of individuals, and focused on world 
affairs and the political activities of diplomats. Since it was not subject to any 
interference from the Ottoman regime, it served as a means for the members of the 
European community to share information which was of value and interest to them.402 
The first recognizably new print newspaper to be published regularly in Libya was the 
weekly Tarablus Al-Gharb [West Tripoli] that was launched on 20 September 1866 and 
was written in both Arabic and Turkish. This was the second Arabic language 
newspaper to appear in the Arab world and only the fourth newspaper within the whole 
Ottoman Empire.403 It was not until 26 August 1897 that the next Arabic newspaper 
appeared, a political broadsheet entitled Al-Tarake [The Morning Star].404 Majalt Al-
Adab [The Arts Magazine], the first monthly non-political magazine, appeared one year 
later in 1898, each issue consisting of over 20 pages of articles written in Arabic about 
aspects of agriculture, geography and nature.405 Thus, there were some small numbers of 
newspapers and magazines aimed at different readerships available by the end of the 
Ottoman era in Libya. 
In addition, the Italian community had started to publish its own newspapers in Tripoli 
in order to defend their own interests, rights and future political ambitions in Libya. A 
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twice-weekly Italian-language four-page newspaper Il Giornale di Tripoli [The Journal 
of Tripoli] was launched by the Italian journalist, Luigi Genazzi, in 1908. A year later, a 
similar newspaper called L’Eco di Tripoli [Tripoli Echo] was first published by 
proprietor and journalist Gustave Arbib in 1909 but then closed down in 1912 by the 
Italian government. The Banco di Roma was responsible for the financing and creation 
of L’economista [The Economist], another four-page, weekly broadsheet, printed in 
Italian which launched in 1910. As the title suggests, it focussed on news relating to 
economics, finance, commerce, banking, railways and investment. This, along with two 
other publications entitled La Stella D’Oriente [Star of the Orient] (1910) and Il 
Progresso [Progress] (1910), was closed down in 1911.406 All these newspapers were 
aimed only at the Italian community and catered for merchants and traders, indicating 
that the Italians already had major business and commercial interests in Libya.  
During periods of relative stability in Libya, cultural activities such as the publication of 
newspapers and involvement in cultural and voluntary organizations flourished. The 
first of these periods lasted from 1908 when the new Ottoman Constitution allowed 
those in the countries of the Ottoman Empire to engage in social activities until the 
Italian invasion of 1911.407 The second began in 1919 with the start of the truce between 
the Italians and the Libyans and lasted until the Fascists came to power in Italy under 
Mussolini in 1922.408 The third period stretched from the mid-1930s to WW2. During 
each of these three periods, both the press and cultural associations played a vital role in 
encouraging cultural activity.409 
Although education and cultural activities were available for Libyans in the zawiyas and 
elsewhere within the community, the existence of these opportunities needed to be made 
known and the ideas which were discussed there needed to be more widely circulated 
and publicly debated, with the press providing the most reliable channel for this to take 
place. However, cultural events can only be promoted if piece exists in society. 
Beginning with the press, a number of newspapers were launched in Libya during the 
aforementioned periods under Ottoman Empire. The first of these factors related to the 
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numbers of students returning from Al-Azhar University and Al-Zaytouna Mosque who, 
after completing their education there, took the initiative to set up newspapers in Libya, 
drawing on their experience of the Egyptian Press.410 In addition, there was the impact 
of the deportees who had been expelled by Sultan Abdul Hamid II. 411  During his 
sultanate, many military officers and staff had been exiled to Africa due to his growing 
fear about their political activities and those who came to Libya played a significant role 
in establishing the Press.412  They had experience of writing newspaper reports and 
Libyan publications took these individuals on as journalists. By 1908, a number of 
publications had been established in Libya including The State newspaper in Tripoli, the 
Arts Journal, the Islamic Trades Journal and other publications which offered good 
quality articles about Libya and the Italian rulers, written by scholars and 
intellectuals.413 
Another group who contributed to the growth in the press were the self-taught 
intellectuals, who had acquired their cultural knowledge by reading books from private 
libraries owned by Libyans who would allow local people access to these collections to 
improve their knowledge.414 This was the case of Ahmed Al-Nab Ansari415 in Tripoli 
whose son, Muhammad, started to publish a newspaper entitled Al-Kashaf (Searchlight) 
in early September 1908. Ansari’s library played an important role at that time and still 
exists today.416 
Libyans would go to the libraries in Tripoli, Zleitin, Misrata and Benghazi city to find 
out about developments taking place in the country. These libraries contained not only 
books and manuscripts but also magazines and newspapers, published in other Arab 
countries such as Egypt and Syria.417 Literary journals were also imported into Libya 
and reading this high quality critical writing which was published very regularly had a 
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good effect on younger scholars, who themselves went on to contribute to professional 
journalism.418 The declaration of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908 was a key factor in 
encouraging the press since the government no longer imposed any kind of censorship 
which motivated writers and critics to play their role in contributing to newspapers. The 
best example was Al-Tarake, a journal,419 which became a cultural forum for authors 
and critics.420 Newspapers were also concerned about social issues, in particular about 
the problems of those unable to earn a living. 421  It also published articles on low 
standards of morality and raised the problem of the damage caused by alcoholism.422 
Following the Italian invasion in 1911, censorship was imposed on the newspapers that 
had been publishing during the Ottoman regime and Arab newspapers printed in Tunisia 
and Egypt were banned from Libya.423 As previously noted, in 1917, a truce was called 
between Libya and Italy,424 followed by two separate agreements, namely, the Swani 
Ben Adam Accord signed in Tripoli (1919), and the Accord of Al-Rajma signed in 
Cyrenaica (1920),425 and the declaration of a government of national unity under the 
supervision of Italy helped to restore stability in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.426 This paved 
the way for the emergence of new newspapers such as Al-Liwa Al-Tarablusi [Tripoli 
flag] which was launched on 9 October 1919 as the mouthpiece of national 
reconciliation.427 
The Italians agreed to constitute Arab assemblies, and blamed the delay in 
implementing this on the Libyans themselves.428 In Tripoli, most journals followed the 
same path as Al-Tarake during the periods of political reform.429 The most dominant 
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aspect of these press articles was their hostility to Italian policy and while most articles 
were simply edited, sometimes whole pages were withdrawn by the censors.430 The 
Italians administration was controlling the newspapers, and the people (Italians and 
interpreters) who were the employees of censor committee or board, their job was to 
read and check the publications prior to publish. The censors used their power 
effectively to ban those newspapers who were not responding with the rules and laws of 
censors. 
The editors of any newspapers which published articles targeting those in the Italian 
administration were initially prosecuted and if they failed to make changes, their 
publication was banned.431 However, this did not stop other journals from appearing. 
Awad Bou Nakhila launched Al-Watan [The Homeland] in Benghazi in 1920, giving 
indications of the growth of nationalist sentiments. In addition to carrying news articles, 
the magazine carried pieces by and about poets and authors432 which reflected different 
opinions on Libyan identity, making it clear that the press was independent.433 The 
newspapers presses were located in Tripoli and Benghazi, the published newspapers 
used to reach everywhere in whole Libya (Fezzan, Tripoli and Cyrenaica) respectively. 
All the Libyans were the audiences for published newspapers.  
The editor-in-chief of Majalt Libya (the Libyan Magazine), Omar Fakhri Al-Mhishi, 
held overtly nationalist attitudes, and worked indirectly to reflect broader Arab opinion 
about the cause of Libya, channelling this to Libyans through his own magazine. After 
the Italian authorities banned books entering Libya from other Arab countries in 1928, 
Al-Mhishi regularly published articles in other Arabic language magazines and 
newspapers condemning this policy434 but maintained a balance when writing articles in 
his own journal to avoid harassment from the Italian authorities. Majalt Libya also acted 
as a bridge between Libyan readers and Western culture, and some of the contributors 
who had been influenced by Italian culture, such as Mahdi Albouri, made attempts to 
introduce aspects of Western culture to Arab readers. Albouri published a series of 
articles focusing in particular on the history of Italian art, introducing readers to this 
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through the medium of Arabic.435 In addition, Majalt Libya became a forum for the 
exchange of ideas and opinions, with Libyan critics expressing their opinions about 
articles which had appeared, correcting mistakes and offering alternative viewpoints. 
One example regards an article penned by Suliman Al-Hadad, entitled “The origin of 
the tribes in Darnah”.436 Abdelkarim Jabril responded with another article which stirred 
up controversy among critics regarding the origins of the Al-Abbidat tribe, and leading 
to a flurry of replies from readers.437 
Majalt Libya represented the intellectual renaissance and the sense of shared cultural 
identity in the provinces of Libya. Even though it was published in Benghazi, its 
journalists and correspondents came from many different Libyan cities including 
Darnah and Tobruk, as well as the rural areas, and the provinces of Tripoli and 
Fezzan. 438  A number of female journalists and authors also published articles and 
worked in the magazine, with the writing of Hameda Tarkhan, Khadija El-Jahmi, Huria 
Ahmed and Fawzia Othman making frequent appearances during the period 1936-
1940.439  By the start of WW2, the following daily newspapers were available: the 
Italian-language Corriere di Tripoli [Tripoli Post] and the Arabic-language Barid 
Cyrenaica (Cyrenaica Post).440 
2.6 Associational Life in Libya Pre-1943. 
The Libyans were not aware about cultural associations because of continuous 
suppression by those who had ruled them. During their long rule, the Ottomans limited 
cultural activities in Libya and did not make and significant contribution towards their 
development. When the Italians took the control of Libya in 1911, harsh steps were 
taken to control the people and hence the Libyans were unable to establish cultural 
associations unless the respective authorities gave their permission. Some Libyans put 
forward requests to establish social and cultural association but these were declined, 
particularly during the rule of the Fascists. The Italians effectively sabotaged any 
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attempts to allow activities which involved the formation of clubs or cultural 
associations until signing of the Swani Ben Adam Accord (1919) which allowed 
Libyans to start working in government offices with the Italians. For the first time, the 
leaders of the national movement were also free to establish national and cultural 
organizations under the provisions of this agreement.441 
Ahmed Hassan Al-Faqih 442  founded Al-Nadi Al-Adabi Tripoli Literary Society in 
1920443 with an initial membership of five and became its first elected Chairman.444 The 
society put on seminars concerning history, art and cultural subjects445 and its stated 
aims were such as to support writers; to publish books about art and culture; to sell 
these books to generate revenue, and finally to establish small educational centres with 
libraries for older people who were unable to join learning classes during day time or 
who missed the opportunity to joining schools or learning class before 1943.446 
The society was unable to achieve all its objectives due to a lack of resources but did set 
up a night school where volunteers offered lessons to illiterate adults 447  while 
youngsters were given the opportunity to learn in schools or zawiyas instead of joining 
night time library clubs. 
Those who were involved in writing in newspapers, articles or books played a 
tremendous role in the growth of cultural activities, which was to pave the way for 
future development of the cultural infrastructure of the Libyan community. In addition 
to the Literary Society, the Reform Club played a major role in targeting people who 
were interested in learning to read and write basic Arabic.448 Like the Literary Society, 
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the Reform Club also had volunteer teachers who played a similar role.449 
However, all cultural associations were banned during Mussolini’s regime (1922-1943) 
and Libyans were once again excluded from both political social and cultural 
activities.450 Libyan writers and intellectuals were not permitted to promote the Arab 
way of life in their works which significantly affected cultural development among the 
Libyans.451 However, their volunteers continued to teach in spite of the warnings issued 
by the Italian authorities.452 
The attitude and conduct of the Italians led many Libyans to migrate from 1923 
onwards to Tunisia, Syria and especially Egypt.453 Many émigrés settled in the capital 
and they were welcomed and supported there by representatives of the British 
government who maintained a positive approach towards these Libyan exiles. The 
centre of Libyan social, cultural and religious activities effectively shifted to Cairo 
where Libyan émigrés not only created cultural associations which brought Libyan 
exiles together for certain activities but they also engaged in anti-Italian propaganda.454 
A large number also attended University in Egypt, and when they later returned to 
Libya, they made a significant contribution to establishing cultural organisations 
there.455 
Italian harassment of those involved in cultural activities continued until the period of 
relative stability started in the mid-1930s, when colonial authorities started to overlook 
the cultural activities that had emerged in Libya. As a result of this policy, two 
volunteer teachers, Ibrahim Usta Omar and Muhammad Jebril, founded a Literary 
Society in Darnah in 1934.456 The city’s judge, Abdelkarim Azouz, joined the other 
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members of the thriving Society in late 1934.457  Two other members, Abdel Hafid 
Bugrara and Yunis Buswik, were the wealthiest merchants in Darnah and put their 
libraries at the disposal of Society members, and increasing numbers of members turned 
the Society into a forum for intellectuals in Darnah.458 
2.7 Political Organisations Pre-1943 
The Committee of Union and Progress459 was established in Tripolitania in 1908, and 
this liberal reform movement attracted some Libyans in Tripolitania who were calling 
for democratization and reforms. 460  The Committee operated as an underground 
organization which called for citizens to reform society along more democratic lines.461 
Although it was established mainly to achieve political ideas, it also had an educational 
function, since it placed great emphasis on disseminating ideas circulating elsewhere in 
the Ottoman Empire concerning political and social reform. It can be viewed of part of a 
broader movement in Tripolitania which was interested in new scientific and cultural 
developments, with a keen interest in trying to understand the world around them.462 
However, it only found partial acceptance within the province of Cyrenaica, because the 
influence of the Sanusiyya movement effectively prevented all of its activities.463 Due to 
its attitudes, this organization was accused of attempting to convert Libyan Arabs into 
becoming Ottoman citizens. This prompted Sanusiyya supporters to respond by creating 
their own organization in Benghazi in 1910 called Al-Hizb Al-Arabe [the Arab Party]. 
This was opposed to the agenda of the Committee of Union and Progress.464 
During Italian Rule, Hizb Al-Asslah Al-Watani [the National Reform Party] appeared 
soon after new national legislation was promulgated in Tripolitania in 1919. This party 
aimed to protect the rights of citizens as stated in the legislation, and argued for the 
implementation of these laws, specifically to usher in the reforms needed in the country. 
They launched a newspaper called Al-Liwa Al-Tarablusi [Flag of Tripoli] which was 
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used to publicise its views and to criticise Italian policy. It was subsequently prohibited 
by the Italian authorities.465 The Fascist party rapidly dissolved all the agreements that 
had been drawn up between Libyans and first Italian regime in Libya. This forced the 
Libyans to shift their centre of political and cultural activities to Egypt. However, the 
British, who were then the rulers of Egypt, accepted Libyan émigrés in Egypt, allowing 
them to carry on with their political activities.466 This group would eventually return to 
their homeland to start a cultural renaissance and work to build an independent unified 
nation known as Libya. 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the political and cultural history of Libya in the decades 
preceding WW2 in order to set the scene for the detailed analysis of the BMA period 
which constitutes the major emphasis of this thesis. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, over the course of its history Libya has been 
colonised by numerous foreign powers due to the value of its geographical location. 
After centuries of Ottoman rule, the Italians occupied Libya in 1911 as part of their 
imperialist ambitions, an occupation which lasted for almost three decades. A campaign 
of resistance led to the Italian government revisiting their policy concerning Libya and 
Mussolini made all possible efforts to assimilate the Libyans. 467  However, despite 
concerted attempts by these colonial powers to eliminate Libyan cultural identity, 
through various means over the course of the decades dedicated individuals and 
inspiring movements succeeded in maintaining Libya’s cultural traditions and its Arab 
Islamic characteristics. The suppression of their culture by the Italian colonizers made 
Libyans place added emphasis on the importance of education to ensure this heritage 
was not forgotten, and Sanussiyah zawiyas helped to fill a gap, serving not only as 
places of Qur’anic instruction but also a social and cultural resource for the entire local 
community. In addition, the press and associational life all played a key role in ensuring 
the continuity of Libyan culture. 
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As Europe prepared for war, Libyans at home and in exile perceived that the best 
chance for liberation from colonial domination lay in Italy's defeat in a larger conflict 
and opted to fight alongside the British army against the Axis powers. North Africa 
turned into a major theatre of operations and the deadly conflict left its mark socially, 
economically and politically on Libya. Even though the country remained occupied 
territory under the BMA, the Allied victory in January 1943 was seen as a turning point 
in Libya’s fortunes. Against a backdrop of growing demands by other Arab countries 
for independence post-1943,468 nationalist sentiments grew among Libyans and calls 
increased for self-determination and independence.469  
At the start of the twentieth century, a generation emerged which was able to contribute 
in various way to promoting cultural movements within the country in the wake of 
WW2.  
Although initially the activities of these individuals were relatively small scale, their 
longer term effects were considerable as they sowed the seeds for more widespread 
cultural activities and more sophisticated artistic achievements in Libya in the pre-
Independence era.470 While celebrating the cultural identity of Libya, these clubs and 
societies also provided a space in which it was possible to foster the deeper and more 
politically oriented sentiments of nationalism which underpinned the demands for 
independence. 
The chapter which follows will focus on education in Libya during the BMA. 
Undoubtedly education is of key importance culturally and in preparing individuals to 
contribute to creating a modern and egalitarian society. The educational process must be 
compatible with the goals of the community with educational programmes being 
derived from the cultural identity of a nation. The education system in any society is 
directly linked with the socio-economic and political system. This is due to the potential 
of education to act as an instrument of support for the political system, although history 
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has also shown examples where the education system has helped to nurture a counter-
culture to the prevailing ethos of the ruling regime. Chapter Two will examine how the 
BMA focused on education as a tool for creating significant development in Libya. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: EDUCATION IN LIBYA UNDER THE 
BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted some key developments in social-cultural activities 
that occurred under various administrations in Libya. It also explored those factors that 
helped the Libyans to preserve these activities during times of conflict and colonization, 
both within their local communities and in exile abroad. This chapter will focus on the 
educational reforms introduced in Libya under the BMA and evaluate the effect these 
had on Libyan society.  
Education is considered to lie at the heart of a nation’s life,471 and has been referred as 
“the first and most urgent issue of our time”,472 since the quality of an educational 
system has a direct influence on the cultural level of its citizens.473 The role of education 
in knowledge creation is firmly established, and it must be encouraged in order to 
promote the individual’s drive for independent thinking, creativity, sustainability and 
self-initiative. 474  It is highly influential in promoting the cultural life that helps to 
establish social cohesion among groups.475  
According to Kedouri, 476  the purpose of education is not to transmit knowledge, 
traditional wisdom, and the ways devised by a society for attending to common 
concerns; rather, its purpose is wholly political as it serves to bend the will of the young 
to the will of the nation. Schools are instruments of state policy, like the armed forces, 
the police, and the Exchequer. As is the case in other societies, Libya’s educational 
system has always reflected the ideology of the ruling political regime. As Libya moved 
towards independence, the contribution of education and its social role also increased in 
importance because of its external aims.477 
In the developed world, the growth of industry and the widening of democracy during 
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the nineteenth century necessitated a major reorganisation of elementary, secondary and 
higher education, with changes in the types of institution and the styles of education 
being offered. This also led to a debate about the purposes of education that focused on 
two issues: “the idea of education for all, and the definition of a liberal education”.478 
As this chapter will document, this debate occurred much later in Libya, due to its lack 
of development.  
This chapter will examine the approaches adopted by the BMA towards education in 
Libya, considering in particular the provision of training for teachers both within Libya 
and abroad and the strategies adopted to increase literacy levels throughout Libyan 
territory. It will also assess the impact of the BMA’s educational policies on improving 
educational opportunities and developing community cohesion. 
3.2 Education under the BMA (1943–1951) 
The BMA’s first step was to sub-divide Libya into smaller administrative units. 
Tripolitania was divided into three, named the Western District (with Tripoli as capital); 
the Eastern District (Misrata)479  and the Middle District (Gerian).480  Cyrenaica was 
similarly divided into Benghazi, Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar [the Green Mountain] and 
Darnah.481 British Army officers were then selected to run departments and appointed to 
judicial and administrative posts 482  with support from local staff. 483  BMA general 
headquarters consisted of five departments (Finance, Income and Accounts; Commerce 
and Provisions; Jurisdiction and Legislation; Police; and Health), all of which were 
headed by British officers.484  
Reilly’s report noted that there were differences between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. 
The population of the latter region was three times larger than that of neighbouring 
Cyrenaica, with Tripoli alone having nearly 120,000 inhabitants, making it two and a 
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half times the size of the population of the Cyrenaican capital, Benghazi. He 
acknowledged, however, that both these Libyan regions had suffered equally at the 
hands of the brutal Italian occupation. Although they had claimed to be bringing a new 
civilised administrative system to Libya to replace Ottoman rule, in truth, the Italians 
were only interested in their own people and not the indigenous population who they 
viewed as uneducated. They confiscated the fertile lands of the Arabs 485  and 
Mussolini’s government threatened that it was going to eradicate the indigenous 
population in order to make room for more Italian settlers.486  
During WW2, the Cyrenaicans had played a much more significant role in assisting the 
Allies and the region had suffered major damage during the conflict while Tripolitania 
had remained largely unscathed. The Times noted that most of the Italian settlers in 
Cyrenaica had been evacuated by the Fascists prior to the arrival of the British army 
which was not the case in Tripolitania.487 Khadduri claimed that the people of Cyrenaica 
not only gained their freedom from Italian rule but their land was also restored to its 
former Libyan tenants. 488 
The Foreign Office originally argued that the Italian civil servants working in 
administrative posts needed to be retained for a certain period as direct employees of 
BMA to assist with the transition489 so that it could manage the ongoing details of the 
projects and other matters of common interest. In 1947 the Libyan newspaper Al-Watan 
[the homeland] criticised the BMA for continuing to employ Italian civil servants in 
administrative jobs. 490 Civilian employees consisted of Libyan Arabs, Italians, and 
expatriates. However, it realised that Libyans would need to be trained so that in time 
they could take responsibility for their own affairs as an independent state. 
As part of this policy of training Libyan Arabs during the transition period to prepare 
for greater administrative responsibility, initially, at least, the BMA treated the two 
regions differently and began to appoint Libyan nationals to administrative posts in 
Cyrenaica first. Individuals were encouraged to fill positions with well-defined 
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responsibilities such as directors and judges491 and to take up high positions in the 
government offices. 492  A civil service staffed by the indigenous population was 
originally instituted in Cyrenaica and then in Tripoli a year later.493 Although the new 
laws promulgated by the BMA gave Libyans access to administrative posts previously 
denied them by former rulers494, this led to bitter division within the occupied territory 
and claims by the people of Tripolitania about BMA favouritism towards Cyrenaica.495 
Later, memories of this were one of the factors that caused Tripolitanians to lack faith in 
Al-Sanusi’s leadership.496.  
Initially about 350 Libyans took up administrative posts in the regions and a further 100 
in the towns but this number increased year on year until it accounted for 80 percent of 
the posts in 1951 and increased dramatically after young men returned home from 
studying in Egypt and Britain.497  
Both Italian and BMA policies were aimed at uniting the regions to form one country. 
However, unlike the Italians, the BMA revived the former tribal system, restoring the 
authority of the tribal sheikhs,498 making them responsible for settling disputes among 
the people under their authority.499  
Libyans (both Arabs and Jews) represented on the advisory bodies set up by the BMA 
in 1943, began to demand the establishment of schools to educate the people of 
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Tripolitania in order that they might govern themselves. 500  The BMA grasped the 
urgency of addressing the weaknesses of the existing education system by implementing 
a policy of community education which developed new ways and means to educate 
Libyans. This proved to be an important factor in bridging the gaps between general 
Libyan population and BMA governance. It can be argued that whilst the BMA 
managed the schools in Libya, it created a long-term education policy intended to allow 
everyone access to education for their children. 
The BMA initially identified key educational issues in Libya and prioritised these when 
developing the education system. The following subsections evaluate the importance of 
this policy which was intended to tap into the potential of Libyan children. It led to an 
increase in the number of schools in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, making education more 
accessible to children and proving attractive to Libyans. The BMA’s reputation was 
further enhanced when it developed opportunities for female education in Libya for the 
first time. Baumeister argues that introducing female education was seen as a vitally 
important step to help females to develop their full potential and their capacity for 
rational thought and judgment. Education was also viewed by feminist campaigners as 
an important step towards extending the vote to women. By enabling women to develop 
their rational faculties, education would give them a foundation for autonomous action, 
and once rationality and autonomy had been obtained, they could not be denied the 
vote.501  
3.2.1 Dealing with the Aftermath of the Conflict 
The BMA commenced its educational efforts soon after warfare in Libya ceased in 
January 1943, and the schools prepared to resume their activities. Initially, the British 
faced many problems, such as a shortage of schools, scarcity of trained staff and a lack 
of suitable buildings to start their education campaign.502 Mr Ali recounted that many 
schools had been damaged during the conflict; others had been originally 
commandeered for accommodation for British troops and then used to house Italian and 
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German prisoners of war. Still others had been ransacked by locals who stole doors, 
windows, and other miscellaneous items to try to rebuild what was left of their homes 
before British troops entered Tripoli. 503  The Annual Report 1947 by the Chief 
Administrator promised that the BMA would provide funds to construct schools and 
begin to attract back greater numbers of students.504 During the 1943/1944 academic 
year, some 50 schools opened their doors in Tripolitania and 20 in Cyrenaica, taking in 
students from diverse educational backgrounds, whose schooling had been interrupted 
by the war.505  
In 1943, BMA appointed an education officer and made him responsible for conducting 
a comprehensive survey of the schools and equipment in the territory. The report 
recorded a total of 106 schools (54 Italian and 52 Arab) open throughout all the 
provinces of Libya.506 Most of the former Italian teaching staff had left, especially those 
who were pro-Fascist. Those who remained were appointed by the BMA to work in 
education and other fields. There were also some 8 brothers and 22 nuns from Catholic 
missionary orders.507 In order to fill vacancies, many teachers were recruited from other 
professions, including architecture, law, industry and commerce, and after undergoing 
training, they proved to be as skilled as those who had been teaching. The report also 
claimed that the first year’s timetable for studies had been successful, that the students 
had been enthusiastic and that the teachers had remained committed and worked with 
the students. The BMA realised that even greater challenges lay ahead.508 
3.2.2 Preparing for Change 
In order to ensure that Libyans would be ready to adequately fill the necessary positions 
in an independent country, the BMA took a number of measures to facilitate this. Firstly, 
it attempted to fill the gaps in educational qualifications, providing young Libyans with 
the opportunity to study and obtain certificates for different categories of education. In 
addition, the BMA offered jobs to those Libyans who had appropriate qualifications, 
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training them to be able to take over administrative jobs and avert threats in the future. 
In short, the BMA made efforts to fulfil the promises it had made to the Libyans.  
The BMA paid particular attention to education in Libya, realising its potential to play a 
major cultural, economic and political role in the region. It also recognised that a new 
policy was required to rectify the defects and shortages created under the previous 
regimes if Libya was to produce the home-grown talent needed to transform the country. 
The British recognised there was an urgent need to ensure that Libya could produce a 
cohort of citizens who were adequately qualified to take responsibility for 
administration in the commercial and agricultural sectors.509 The Annual Report by the 
Department of Education in Libya for 1944 noted that many Libyans had benefited from 
training that enabled them to take over civil service posts left vacant in different 
departments due to the departure of Italians and other nationalities. 510  In addition, 
individuals were needed who would be able to fulfil the requirements for developing 
Libya’s physical infrastructure and ensuring its national advancement. An entirely new 
and innovative education system was required which would produce results rapidly, 
efficiently and in the most cost-effective manner.511 It was also acknowledged that this 
system needed to be one which would be appropriate to the Libyan context. As noted 
previously, this focus on education, and the BMA’s active participation in educational 
affairs, represented a significant shift from the approach taken by previous regimes.  
From the outset, the BMA sought all possible means to promote education. This is 
because the Colonial Office in London was committed to regarding education as an 
important element. In addition, British liberal values can be said to have played a role in 
guaranteeing that the BMA kept its promises towards the Libyans.512 Moreover, it was 
under the guidance of a British government which was firmly committed to a policy of 
free compulsory liberal education in its administrative territories and the BMA was 
obliged to act accordingly.513 Lord Rennell of Rodd considered two possible scenarios 
for the education system. Given the geographical position of Tripolitania and its 
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connections with Europe, it could be based on the European system and include the 
teaching of a second language in addition to Arabic. Alternatively, it could follow the 
traditional Arab school system, enlarging the curriculum to include other subjects such 
as arithmetic.514 
An initial meeting attended by five British officers was convened in Tripoli on 5 June 
1943, with the following agenda:  
(1) To determine the main steps necessary for local people to enter education; 
(2) To specify the number of schools to be re-opened; (3) To estimate the budget 
required for the re-opening of schools; (4) To develop suitable syllabi and 
prescribed study books.515 
The BMA immediately went about applying the conclusions reached by the group, one 
of which was to set up an appropriate administrative structure to enact any changes 
required. Secretariats of Education were created for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
respectively, with similar administrative structures: (A) Elementary Education (to be 
supervised by a Libyan inspector), (B) Financial Affairs, Scholarships and Literacy 
Campaign (to be headed by a British official), (C) Secondary Education (under a British 
official and a Libyan assistant).516 A British consul would be solely responsible for all 
scientific issues, while the director of education, who would be Libyan, was to have 
oversight of financial and administrative affairs. The post of English Language 
Inspector was also established.517 
The group also concluded that a report needed to be commissioned, drawing on British 
and regional expertise, which would assess the current situation and then make 
recommendations regarding the reform of the entire Libyan education system.518 The 
educational commission was headed by A. J. Steele-Greig, who was assisted by sheikh 
Kamal Alhamali, a Libyan national. In additional, regional expertise was added from 
Palestine, since the British had decided that the Palestinian education system might 
serve as an appropriate model, given their experiences there. The commission thus also 
included Ahmed Effendi Khalifa, an inspector of schools in Palestine who had studied 
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in the United Kingdom and obtained a bachelor’s degree from the University of 
London. A delegation of Palestinian teachers also arrived to deliver lectures on learning 
and new developments in teaching methodology to the Libyan school teachers.519 
The commission spent six months finalising the report and recorded its observations for 
the Director of Education at BMA Headquarters.520 In his report, Steele-Grieg noted that, 
wherever possible, students were already attending those schools which had been re-
opened (following the outbreak of war, all schools in Libya had been closed). He also 
observed that morale amongst teaching staff was generally high, but they needed 
guidance and training. The report further highlighted that this was the first time that 
teachers had worked without being supervised by the Italians.521 The Commission also 
highlighted the following priorities: 
 To establish a form of education which would produce well-disciplined 
individuals with good habits, and which was more originated towards practical 
and technical skills, as opposed to concentrating on theoretical information.  
 To develop vocational and technical schools to prepare technicians.  
 To promote schools teaching humanities and literary studies to prepare students 
who could fill posts requiring a high level of fluency in English.  
 To develop primary schools better suited to rural life. 
 To address the problem of the lack of educational provision for girls.522 
The commission recognised the need for a change in emphasis in the reformed system. 
The new policy was to concentrate on literacy skills (writing and reading) and the basics 
of mathematics and to decrease theoretical education, focusing instead on expanding 
industrial, commercial and agricultural education. It was noted that the education 
system was meant to enable individuals to develop their capabilities in order to 
participate actively in the social, cultural and economic life of their country, and it 
concluded that “For some people, vocational or industrial education, with a 
concentration on facts rather than thoughts and conclusions, would be better and more 
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useful than theoretical education”.523 
Other than highlighting the need to introduce the study of English as a foreign language 
as a subject,524 the Commission made few specific suggestions on actual curriculum or 
syllabus content, leaving these to be worked out in detail at a later date. It did however 
recognise that religious education needed to feature in the curriculum and that this it 
would “conform to traditional social values and encourage local traditions, such as 
religious studies and morals, as a large part of the educational programmes”.525 This 
was in clear contrast to the previous enforcement of a Eurocentric Christian ethos in the 
Italian system and a rejection of Libya’s Arab Islamic heritage.526 
The most obvious difference between Italian and British policy is that the latter, unlike 
the former, was centred primarily on the needs of Libyans and of their country, in 
particular the need to train Libyans to participate in administration at various levels with 
the long-term aim of independence. In this respect, although the British carefully 
organised and implemented the Libyan education system, their approach to the occupied 
territory of Libya was not like that adopted elsewhere in Africa by other European 
colonial rulers such as the Belgians in the Congo or the Portuguese in Mozambique, 
Angola and Guinea, 527  where even educated Africans were denied entry to 
administrative posts. The fact that the British policy had been devised to ensure that 
Libyans would be capable of entering administrative posts managed to convince those 
were sceptical about their motives and tribesmen who were initially hostile because of 
their traditions.528 
Educational syllabi will always reflect the philosophy of any ruling regime. However, 
whilst the educational philosophy in the British colonies was still based on a Western 
perspective (as shown in this case, for example, by their concern to ensure educational 
provision for girls),529 due consideration was also given to the inherited culture of the 
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local regions. In practical terms, this meant that, in keeping with the policy they 
followed elsewhere, British staff in Libya were always assisted by a local expert with an 
in-depth understanding of local culture, traditions and history.530 
The Commission also put an emphasis on equal participation in education. Schooling 
was to be made available for children in both urban and rural Libya, and the possibility 
of establishing a boarding school system supervised by adequate staff and management 
was considered as a way to facilitate education for students from outlying districts. The 
Commission also insisted that girls were not to be excluded.531 The development of 
girls’ education was an important aspect of the BMA educational policy and one which 
did not gain the support of the whole of Libyan society, especially in the region of 
Cyrenaica. Initially, the Bedouin there would not accept girls’ schools since it ran 
counter to their traditions and customs. However, the authorities eventually convinced 
them and the issue was successfully resolved, representing a remarkable cultural step 
forward in Libya.532 Female education was a first push to motivate young females in 
Libyan and to instil in them a feeling of confidence and self-reliance. 
Traditionally, women were not considered to be strong and hence were kept within the 
household, as mothers, daughters and wives. In addition, they were regarded being 
temperamental and sensitive and were not deemed capable of carrying the responsibility 
of leadership or decision-making.533 Most importantly, the concept of family honour 
was linked to women who were seen as a potential source of shame. The honour of men 
of the family was viewed as being easily damaged and nearly irreparable, and depended 
on the conduct of their women. Thus, while Libyan men formed a society organized 
into recognizable groupings that operated in the public sphere, women remained at 
home, in the private sphere.534 This situation started to change when the first girls’ 
school were opened in Tripoli in 1946, with others following in Cyrenaica, Benghazi 
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and Darnah. However, girls’ education in Libya initially faced another obstacle, since 
the shortage of women teachers resulted in the introduction of mixed classes, with girls 
up to the age of nine being taught in boys’ schools, which some parents disliked.535  
The Commission reached a number of other conclusions regarding the steps necessary 
to ensure its policy aims would be met. The first of these was that, in the shorter term, in 
order for the new educational policy to be coordinated across Libya as a whole, the 
schools had to be under the direct supervision of the BMA, even if they were not 
supported financially. Hull observes that, once established, Departments of Education in 
British colonies had a large measure of independence from London and, in fact, once 
the reforms had been implemented, the BMA left the operation of most schools to 
private initiative but supervised them by through a system of grants-in-aid and periodic 
inspection. 536  The British government in London, especially the Department of 
Education, encouraged native languages in African schools but also introduced English 
as a language at intermediate school level. The BMA applied a similar approach in 
Libyan occupied territory.537 
In addition, it was agreed that all teachers needed to be trained in modern effective 
teaching methods and that to cope with future demands for higher level teaching, some 
teachers would need to undertake further study themselves. Closely linked to this was 
the fact that to execute this educational policy effectively in the longer run and facilitate 
its future development, staff who were trained in social research methods, management, 
economic modelling and financial methods, and educational theory would be required.  
The proposal was to provide training for practising Arab teachers in the second year of 
the BMA, i.e. 1944. Some 76 participants took part in the first training session, and a 
further 77 in the second. Of the 45 trainees who were sent for training in 1945, only half 
passed the assessment, indicating some of the difficulties to be faced. 538  Some 
secondary school teachers were sent to take a course at the Institute of Education, 
London University; the headmaster of Zavia Secondary School took a vocational course 
in London while a primary school teacher was enrolled in the School of Oriental and 
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African Studies, London University, to assist in the study of the Berber language.539 
In addition to providing training targeted at teachers, the BMA embarked on a mass 
literacy campaign which began in 1945.540 Courses lasted five or six weeks, and nearly 
1,000 people attended, coming not only from Tripoli, but travelling from all over the 
country. This demonstrated the depth of the Libyan people’s commitment to education. 
Those who had attended then motivated others in their community to learn. The 
programme thus not only benefitted many people beyond the original group of trainees 
but was also seen to be a successful part of a broader attempt to encourage political 
engagement amongst Libyans which remained extremely important to the BMA.541 
3.2.3 Minority Communities 
A report issued in 1944 noted the dire shortage of schools, alerting the BMA to the need 
to attempt to remedy this situation as quickly as possible in order not to disappoint the 
Arab parents who had placed their trust in the new administration’s ability to deliver the 
provision it had promised. At the same time, there was a need to accommodate the 
needs of the two other minority communities in Libya, namely the Italians and the 
Jews.542 Both groups had indicated that secondary education was their highest priority; 
hence, provision was made available to meet their demands. School enrolment figures 
for that year overall rose from 4,889 to 15,226, and in comparison, to the previous year 
there were 3,140 more Arab students and 1,913 more Jewish students enrolled. 
However, 164 fewer Italian students enrolled, reflecting the major demographic and 
social shift occurring in the former colony. Exam results for the Italian and Jewish 
students showed that by the end of the year, 85 per cent of students had been promoted 
to higher classes, remarkable results given that they had resumed their education after a 
gap of four years.543 The issue of schooling for the Libyan Jewish community returned 
when the Secretary of the London Committee of Deputies of British Jews wrote to the 
Foreign Office asking permission for the Jewish authorities in Benghazi to open 
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independent schools. 
Schooling for Jewish children in Cyrenaica was conducted in Arabic, where religious 
instruction conducted in Hebrew. However, the Libyan Jewish communities in 
Benghazi and smaller townships wanted to conduct all their education in Hebrew.544 He 
argued that since Arabic had been introduced in the schools in Cyrenaica for Libyan 
Muslims, this established the precedent for Hebrew to be used in Libyan Jewish 
schools.545 A War Office representative rejected this suggestion on the grounds that it 
would be likely to create unrest and noted that the Jewish community was already 
failing to cooperate with BMA’s policy educational policy. He reminded him that “the 
Jewish minority had lived amicably with its Arab neighbours for centuries” and that this 
would be viewed as an “assertion of the Jewish minority’s racial and cultural 
distinctions”.546 It was also pointed out that reasonable opportunities were offered for 
the Libyan Jewish children to receive instruction in Hebrew in the schools attended by 
Arab children.547 In addition, the BMA also offered some separate classes for Jewish 
children in Benghazi with a high percentage of hours of teaching in Hebrew548 but these 
arrangements were refused by the majority of the Jewish community. The War Office 
representative argued that since the Jewish community had declined to take advantage 
of the facilities offered, they had little grounds for their complaint.549  
When Mr Brotman persisted with his request, he was assured a meeting would be 
arranged with Major Reid at the War Office.550 There is no account of this meeting ever 
having taken place and the Libyan Jewish community was soon to have more pressing 
concerns. 
3.2.4 Contentious Tribal Issues 
By 1946, enrolment in government schools had increased by more than one-third, while 
the number of pupils enrolled in Qur’anic schools had more than doubled.551 In the 
region of Cyrenaica, there were 26 schools, all of which were supported by the 
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administration and tribesmen. These schools were intended for children aged four to six 
years, and their aim was to teach writing, reading and Islamic religion. The 
administration had also started to open rural boarding schools, which were intended to 
provide a solution to some of the difficulties which pupils in small villages and isolated 
areas faced when attempting to attend school.552 
Table 3.1: Arab pupils in government and Qur’anic schools, 1938 vs.1946 
Type Italian 1938 BMA 1946 
Arab pupils in government schools 7,524 10,224 
Arab pupils in Qur’anic schools 7,973 16,180 
Total 15,497 26,404 
Source: TNA, WO 230/29, No 11596/113/CA 
Some religious scholars initially urged parents not to send their children to BMA 
schools, largely on the basis of their recent experience with education under Italian 
Occupation.553 They feared that the British system would adopt the same approach as 
the Italians had done before them and would fail to value the study of Arabic and the 
Qur’an, and that consequently, this would weaken the Islamic identity of Libyans. The 
scholars also suspected that the aim of the BMA schools was ultimately, like that of 
their Italian counterparts, to impose a Eurocentric white Christian culture and attempt to 
erase their Arab Islamic cultural heritage. 554  However, the BMA proved all these 
accusations groundless when they not only accepted that Arabic should be taught as 
compulsory language but also recruited well-qualified teachers from Egypt and 
Palestine to teach this subject.555 
Another of the contentious issues which arose in relation to the proposed educational 
reforms was the BMA’s decision to implement two different curricula in Libya. Al-
Qalal notes that in Cyrenaica, the Egyptian syllabus was used, while in Tripolitania, the 
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Palestinian syllabus was introduced when Palestine was under British mandate556 but 
gives no further details about the reason why a unified syllabus was not introduced in 
both territories. Moreover, this differentiation between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was 
not only limited to education system but was also extended to currency. 557  New 
currency notes issued by the BMA had been introduced in Tripolitania in 1943558 while 
the Egyptian currency (the Egyptian pound) was in circulation in Cyrenaica in 1944.559  
Libyan intellectuals and leadership were worried by these developments which they 
perceived to be part of an unstated policy, reflecting doubts about Libya’s future as a 
unitary state. The introduction of separate currencies in particular was viewed as part of 
a plan for the partition of Libyan territory. In particular, they feared the restoration of 
Italian colonial in Tripolitania and the possibility that Cyrenaica would be brought 
under British trusteeship or assimilated into Egypt in return for rights of access in the 
Sudan for the British. British policymakers appeared to be adopting a systematic 
approach that would promote their strategic interests in Cyrenaica in preparation for 
some role there, even if Italy was to be returned to Tripolitania.  
During a visit to London, one of Tripolitania’s leaders, Bashir Sadawi,560 raised this 
issue directly with the Foreign Office and called for the unification of Tripolitanian and 
Cyrenaican currencies, as one of a number of measures that would help to restore the 
dwindling confidence that the Tripolitanian people had in the BMA. The then Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, himself stated that the currency issue was of fundamental 
importance and had to be resolved after the future of the territory itself had been 
determined. In his view, the British government was not in a position to enact such 
fundamental changes as this might be seriously misconstrued internationally.561  
It can be argued that this decision by the BMA reflected a lack of understanding and 
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awareness and needed to have been more carefully thought out before implementation 
since it proved to be divisive, with the population of Tripolitania making their 
discontent known. The Cairo-Tripolitania Committee based in Egypt even circulated a 
pamphlet which accused the BMA of depriving children in Tripoli and the adjoining 
areas of education.562 This effectively represented the first real challenge to the BMA’s 
authority and might almost be interpreted as the Libyans testing the waters to see how 
the British would react. 
As a result of the BMA’s actions concerning currency and education system and its 
attitude when concerns had been voiced about this, the people of Tripoli held 
demonstrations. This provided Libyans with the opportunity to make their voices heard 
but at the same time gave the British a clear indication of the depth of feelings of the 
people in the occupied territory. It can also be argued that British wished to demonstrate 
their strong belief in democracy by responding to the voice of the masses. 
Perhaps sensing the importance of this reaction, the BMA agreed to constitute an 
Advisory Board in 1947 to discuss this issue and resolved to carry out the wishes of the 
Tripolitanian people by implementing the Egyptian curriculum, subject to some 
modifications, in both regions with effect from 1948. 563  The BMA’s conciliatory 
response clearly impressed one of the interviewees, Mahfoud Alturke,564 a teenager 
living in Tripoli at the time this issue arose. He commented:  
The BMA raised the standards of education, and did not force its own agenda in 
education. This is due to the fact that the majority of Libyans demanded their 
own style of education at which they succeeded. The BMA listened to them and 
considered their wishes. 565 
The War Office remained concerned about education in Libya, and continued to 
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564 Mahfoud Alturke was born in Tripoli in 1932, and received his early education in Qur’anic and Italian 
schools. He was interviewed on 1 July 2011. 
565 Ibid. 
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monitor progress there, sending a commission led by Lt. Colonel Bernard Reilly from 
Britain in 1947 to evaluate the teacher training which had been undertaken.566 Those 
teachers who had been trained in 1946 were examined, and those who did well were 
awarded with gifts, such as books. 567  As a result of this visit, a number of 
recommendations to improve educational facilities and training were brought before the 
administration which supported all the proposals submitted. These included: 
 Augmenting numbers of teaching staff with a view to reducing class sizes from 
50 to 40. 
 Employing foreign teachers to deliver secondary education. 
 Implementing a scheme for training apprentices in the various departments of 
the Administration.568 
In Cyrenaica, the War Office Commission praised the BMA for the progress made in 
primary and elementary education as the number of pupils rose to 7,000 in 1946, which 
was twice as many as under the previous Italian regime. This rise in pupil numbers was 
clearly due to the establishment of four boarding schools which accommodated Bedouin 
children. However, the Commission criticised the BMA for some deficiencies, such as:  
 The low standard of teaching and the impossibility of finding qualified teachers 
within the territory 
 The absence of secondary education 
 The absence of technical education  
 The limited extent and quality of female education.569 
During the Italian era, the Libyans had been banned from going beyond primary 
education and the Working Party stressed the need for improvements at secondary 
                                                 
566 The Working Party delegation which visited Cyrenaica was under the aegis of the War Office and led 
by Sir Bernard R. Reilly, the former Governor of Aden. Members of the delegation included J. A. De 
Condole Hamilton, F. C. Newton, and J. S. Crum. See: E. Shinwell, ‘Tripolitania’, 8 March 1949, 
London, The National Archives, CAB 129/33/CP (49) 55. 
567 T. Blackley, ‘Annual report of Tripolitania, for the period 1st January to 31st December 1947’, TNA, 
FO 1015/143/, p.44. 
568 Blackley, ‘Annual report of Tripolitania, for the period 1st January to 31st December 1947’, TNA, FO 
1015/143/, p.9. 
569 Reilly, ‘Report by the War Office Working Party on Cyrenaica’, London, The National Archives, 
TNA, WO 230/222, p.33.  
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level.570 It was further proposed that £26,040 was used to increase adult education, 
providing specialist instruction for Libyans in subjects such as carpentry, electricity, 
plumbing, agriculture, and printing. This training was required to create individuals 
with better technical qualifications.571 An annual subsidy of £6000 was also made to 
Qur’anic schools in Cyrenaica572 together with funding for repairs to school buildings 
and girls’ education. Libya clearly could not pay for all the expenses involved, simply 
because it had no resources to meet this expenditure. The War Office Working Party 
concluded that a long-term policy was needed, since the withdrawal of British 
administrative and financial support at the end of the period of the BMA coupled with 
the granting of immediate independence without extra help and guidance would lead to 
the failure of many governmental services. A form of close tutelage within some form 
of trusteeship was recommended which would be welcomed by both Al-Sanusi and 
large number of Cyrenaicans.573 These reports from the War Office Working Party 
mission provide evidence that education was still one of the major priorities for the 
British administration.  
The Education Advisory Committee selected 100 young male trainees from the many 
applications received on the basis of the criteria of qualifications and interviews by the 
heads of departments. Most of these were from rural districts and under 20, and besides 
learning a trade, they received lessons in English, mathematics and commercial subjects 
which would enable them to fill the vacancies in various departments in the 
administration. They received an honorarium during their training.574 
For the next two years (1947-1948), the administration put greater efforts and resources 
(including materials, books and facilities) into designing new teacher training courses so 
that the Arab teachers could attain higher levels, and train students who would be 
involved in the affairs of future governments.575 
                                                 
570 Reilly, ‘Report by the War Office Working Party on Tripolitania’, TNA, FO 1015/129, p.28.  
571 Reilly, ‘Report by the War Office Working Party on Tripolitania’, TNA, FO 1015/129, p.29.  
572 Reilly, ‘Report by the War Office Working Party on Cyrenaica’, TNA, WO 230/222, p.35.  
573 Reilly, ‘Report by the War Office Working Party on Tripolitania’, TNA, FO 1015/129, p.39.  
574 Blackley, ‘Annual Report 1947’, TNA, FO 1015/143, pp.44-45. 
575 Steele-Greig, History of Education in Tripolitania, p.53. 
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Table 3.2: Primary schools in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, 1943–1951576 
SCHOOL 
YEAR 
NUMBER OF 
SCHOOLS 
NUMBER OF 
STUDENTS 
NUMBER OF 
TEACHERS 
1943–1944 69 6,448 201 
1944–1945 100 10,310 331 
1945–1946 116 12,571 378 
1946–1947 130 15,135 459 
1947–1948 140 17,637 587 
1948–1949 166 24,804 763 
1949–1950 181 27,763 889 
1950–1951 193 32,109 1,024 
Source: Al-Gamati, The Development of Educational Management, p. 42 
Table 3.2 illustrates the growth in numbers of schools, students and teachers in less than 
a decade. The number of schools multiplied by 180 per cent in the space of just eight 
years, whilst student numbers increased five-fold over the same period. Considering the 
distribution of schools, students and teachers between the Cyrenaica and Tripoli regions 
(The number of schools in Tripoli increased by 68 per cent during that period, compared 
to the 83 per cent increase in Cyrenaica. The difference might be due to a policy shift in 
Cyrenaica, or perhaps local reasons, for example, peoples’ acceptance of the education 
system or the fact that the BMA gave equal importance to Arabic which forced them to 
increase enrolment in education. Cyrenaica reached 98 per cent enrolment as opposed to 
80 per cent in Tripoli. This reflects BMA’s approach to the former region of attempting 
to raise the region’s educational and cultural levels after long years of neglect, first by 
the Ottomans and then the Italians. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 not only show the great increase 
in educational provision that occurred during the British rule, in terms of the numbers of 
schools, students and teachers, but give an idea of the increase in funding for education 
which was required to achieve this. 
                                                 
576 According to education policy, students were expected to complete six years of compulsory primary 
stage education. If successful, they then transferred to the elementary stage for three years. This was 
followed by a further 3 years of secondary schools to gain a certificate equivalent to GCSE in the UK 
before moving onto higher education. 
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Table 3.3) as the British administered both, we can see that the policies adopted were 
balanced.  
The number of schools in Tripoli increased by 68 per cent during that period, compared 
to the 83 per cent increase in Cyrenaica. The difference might be due to a policy shift in 
Cyrenaica, or perhaps local reasons, for example, peoples’ acceptance of the education 
system or the fact that the BMA gave equal importance to Arabic which forced them to 
increase enrolment in education. Cyrenaica reached 98 per cent enrolment as opposed to 
80 per cent in Tripoli. This reflects BMA’s approach to the former region of attempting 
to raise the region’s educational and cultural levels after long years of neglect, first by 
the Ottomans and then the Italians. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 not only show the great increase 
in educational provision that occurred during the British rule, in terms of the numbers of 
schools, students and teachers, but give an idea of the increase in funding for education 
which was required to achieve this. 
Table 3.3: Elementary schools in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, 1943–1951577 
SCHOOL 
YEAR 
TEACHERS STUDENTS SCHOOLS 
Cyrenaica Tripolitania Cyrenaica Tripolitania Cyrenaica Tripolitania 
1943–44 48 146 2,300 4,835 20 50 
1944–45 - 256 3,257 8,152 28 79 
1945–46 134 267 4,303 9,104 33 80 
1946–47 193 301 6,690 10,143 38 85 
1947–48 221 335 6,472 11,537 49 85 
1948–49 290 519 7,094 17,379 52 106 
1949–50 350 609 7,408 19,233 57 125 
1950–51 - 694 9,150 23,188 - 134 
Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Report, Libya, pp. 36-41 
In an article entitled, ‘Future of Cyrenaica’, published in October 1948, the British 
newspaper The Times praised the efforts of the BMA in Libya, noting that the 
elementary schools had opened, qualified Egyptian teachers had been recruited and 
selected students were being sent to Egypt and the University of Khartoum578 in Sudan 
                                                 
 
578After Britain gained dominance in Sudan in 1898 as part of a condominium arrangement, Lord 
Kitchener proposed the founding of a college in memory of Gordon, who had been killed in the Battle of 
Khartoum. When the Gordon Memorial College opened in 1902 it only offered primary education. A 
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to obtain university degrees and training in special branches of administration.579 
This approach was meant to service the needs of the future administration, and the 
BMA provided opportunities to strengthen the education system using trained personal 
from the different educational institutions. This also reflects the BMA’s intention to 
develop communities through education enabling them to participate later in activities 
within Libya. 
The annual report of the BMA showed that whilst progress had continued in 1948, this 
was considerably less than the Education department had hoped for. The main problem 
restricting development was the scarcity of trained teachers and lack of school 
equipment with equipment needed for studying science being in particularly short 
supply. In response, the BMA recruited 42 male and 10 female teachers from Egypt, 
and procured school equipment which was not available locally from Egypt. 580 
Furthermore, the BMA continued to take these measures until enough Libyans were 
properly trained as teachers, also bringing in teachers from Palestine and Sudan to make 
up the shortfall.581 
Egypt played an important role in many ways while Libya was recovering from the 
effects of decades of educational neglect. As previously noted, the Egyptian curriculum 
was eventually introduced in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. When Tripoli High 
School, the first BMA secondary school in Libya, re-opened in October 1946, an 
Egyptian committee specially delegated for that purpose was brought in to examine 
students and provide certificates for successful candidates wishing to matriculate.582 
Egypt also remained the most favoured destination for those wishing to pursue further 
studies due to its long-standing reputation for academic excellence, so much so that 
                                                                                                                                               
fully equipped laboratory for bacteriological analysis was added in 1905, with donations from Sir Henry 
Welcome, an American-British pharmaceutical entrepreneur and archaeologist. By 1906, the college was 
offering training courses for assistant engineers, land surveyors and primary school teachers. In 1924, it 
incorporated courses in sharia, engineering, teacher training, clerical work, accounting and science. The 
Kitchener School of Medicine, the first medical school in Sudan, was established, followed by the School 
of Law in 1936. In 1947, the college was affiliated with the University of London as the first overseas 
participant in its ‘special relationship’ scheme, with the first graduates to receive University of London 
degrees completing their courses in 1950. The following year, Gordon Memorial College was formally 
renamed University College Khartoum, which incorporated the Kitchener School of Medicine. See 
http://www.uofk.edu/about-uofk/historical-background. Accessed 17/11/2015 
579 The Times, ‘The Future of Cyrenaica’, 23 October 1948. 
580 T. Blackley, ‘The annual report by the Chief Administrator on the BMA of Tripolitania during 1 
January-31 December 1949’, London, The National Archives, TNA, FO 371/80864, p.30 
581 T. Blackley, ‘The annual report by Chief Administrator on the BMA of Cyrenaica during 1 January-31 
December 1948’, London, The National Archives, TNA, WO 222/215, p.8. 
582 Annual report of the Ministry of Education, Libya, p.48 
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when the local newspapers reported the re-opening of schools in Tripoli under the BMA 
the major point they made was that at 13, students would begin secondary school, and 
after four years, they would be eligible to attend university in Egypt or 
elsewhere. 583 Another local newspaper, Al-Fajr Al-Libye [Libyan Dawn], constantly 
urged the British administration to send more Libyan students abroad to pursue higher 
education.584  
One of the interviewees, Hamad Alsalm, recalled the ‘Egyptianization’ at his secondary 
school which opened in Benghazi in November 1948.585 Although his family lived in 
Al-Bayda, Hamad and his eldest brother went to Benghazi to enrol, staying with 
relatives as there were no boarding facilities. When he started his studies, he discovered 
that: “My Arabic book came from Egypt and so did my maths book. Most of the staff 
who taught me were Egyptian, even my English teacher was Egyptian!” Another 
interviewee remembered that small libraries of Arabic books were imported from Egypt 
and established in most schools.586 
After teachers were brought from Egypt to staff the first secondary school to re-open in 
Tripoli, the Chief Administrator for the province enigmatically commented “Two of the 
previous year’s teachers were not asked to return the following year”.587 Elsewhere, a 
comment on the situation at Zawiya secondary school 588  could be interpreted in a 
number of ways: “The Egyptian teacher who taught English returned after his summer 
holidays”.589 However, since competent English teachers were in very short supply, 
working conditions were difficult and the salaries on offer were low, this is likely to 
suggest that his return meant one less problem for the administration to deal with.590 
Although officially English was meant to be a compulsory subject, due to lack of staff 
expertise and growth in student numbers the administration often turned a blind eye 
when inspectors found that classes in this subject were not being taught, particularly in 
                                                 
583 Tarablus Al-Gharb, 7 November 1944, T. Blackley, ‘Annual report of Tripolitania, for the period 1st 
January to 31st December 1947’, TNA, FO 1015/143/, p.9. 
584 Al-Fajr Al-Libye, 1 April 1948, p.1. 
585 Blackley, ‘Annual report Cyrenaica 1948’, TNA, WO 222/215, pp.7-8. 
586 Interview, Alsalme, 27 June 2011. 
587 Blackley, ‘Annual report Tripolitania 1949’, TNA, FO 371/80864, p.30. 
588 Zawia is a city situated 50 kilometres away from Tripoli. 
589 Blackley, ‘Annual report Tripolitania 1949’, TNA, FO 371/80864, p.31. 
590 Al-Watan published many articles about the financial problems faced by teachers, and demanded that 
the BMA should consider raising their salaries. Al-Watan, 26 December 1948. 
105 
 
rural areas.591 
The rural areas in general continued to be a cause for concern. It was noted that in one 
district only 16 per cent of 300 students had been able to obtain pass marks in the end of 
year examinations. This was often due to extremely poor attendance which had a 
number of causes. Occasionally this was due to a lack of commitment on the part of 
parents and/or pupils but more often it resulted from the distance which pupils needed 
to travel to schools or the fact that children were needed to help with agricultural 
work.592 
3.2.5 Preparing for the Future  
The occupying force can be said to have helped to develop Libyan communities, with 
both officials of the Colonial Office in London and Christian missionaries being 
proponents of community development. The missions in Africa particularly promoted 
education for indigenous communities. The 1944 report clearly emphasised the need for 
training and the British government implemented its recommendations concerning 
community development in the African region.593 
There were far fewer secondary schools than elementary schools in Libya and these 
were centred in the urban areas of the Tripoli and Cyrenaica regions. The secondary 
stage of education (thanawi) lasted for four years or five years and typically students 
started at 13 and finished at 18 years.594 The Annual Report by the Chief Administrator 
mentioned that this was intended to be the stage at which students learned the subjects 
that would give them the skills necessary to qualify for administrative and vocational 
posts. At schools where the teachers were suitably trained, students who were 
successful would be eligible for university studies, usually in Egypt or Tunisia. 595 
Students attending secondary school could learn different subjects and engage in 
various cultural activities, such as drama and social gatherings. Arab teachers also often 
participated in such extracurricular activities, which greatly enhanced the educational 
experience, and had a positive influence on students at what was seen as a critical stage 
of their education. 
                                                 
591 Blackley, ‘Annual report Tripolitania 1949’, TNA, FO 371/80864, p.30. 
592 Ibid. 
593 Midgley, Hall, Hardiman, and Narine, Community Participation, Social Development and the State, 
p.17.  
594 ‘Annual report of the Ministry of Education, Libya’, p.49. 
595 Blackley, ‘Annual Report 1947’, TNA, FO 1015/143, p.45. 
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The BMA also saw competition in sports as an important as part of education. Arab 
pupils showed little interest in swimming but football proved to be an immediate 
success. Inter-school competitions were held between teams from the two provinces and 
a sports meeting held in Tripoli in May 1947 proved to be a huge success for boys, staff, 
and the audience who filled the stadium. Praising the benefits of physical education, the 
Chief Administrator of the BMA remarked: “It created a spirit of rivalry −not 
comparable to the standard of British sporting instinct− but it was hoped this would 
improve over time”.596 
When the first secondary school in Libya, Tripoli High School, was re-opened in 
October 1946, Arab students in Libya had effectively been deprived of education above 
the primary level for more than 30 years under Italian occupation.597 The school was 
established in the same building in the Dahra district of Tripoli where the Supreme 
Islamic School had been in 1936 and given its popularity, morning and evening shifts 
were introduced for classes.598 The Arab teachers were responsible for teaching English 
during the evening shifts. Some of the notable staff at the school included Moses 
Abashoty, Moner Taibi, who later became a presenter on the BBC World Service, and 
Nasr al-Din al-Assad, who was responsible for preparing students to study for higher 
degrees in Arabic language and literature.  
According to Gamati,599 the first cohort of students who graduated from this school 
went on to play a leading role in the political activism that led to Libyan independence. 
Most of these students became members of political parties, such as Al-Kutla Al-
Wataniyya Al-Hurra [the Free National Bloc] or Al-Hizb Al-Watani [the National Party], 
which later united with Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi [the National Congress of 
Tripoli] and was led by Bashir al-Sadawi.600  
On the political stage, major changes were about to occur in Libya. In 1949, Idris Al-
Sanusi proclaimed the independence of Cyrenaica. Blackley noted that this decision was 
taken against the wishes of the Libyan people, especially the students, who had rejected 
                                                 
596 Ibid. 
597 K. A. B. Al-Gamati, ‘Tripoli Secondary School in 1946: The Generation that Built an Independent 
Libya’,http://www.akhbarlibyaonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35194&Itemi
d=55 Accessed 09/11/2010.  
598 Ibid. 
599 Khalil Abdul Bari Gamati was born in Tripoli in 1933; he is now retired and devotes his time to 
researching the history of Libyan education. He was interviewed on 28 June 2011.  
600 Ibid. 
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this decision on the grounds that Libya should be a single entity.601 When Al-Sanusi 
also accepted the position of Emir of Cyrenaica, this set-in motion the process of uniting 
the historic regions and Libyan independence became a real possibility. Establishing a 
local education system remained the priority of BMA602 and became increasingly urgent 
after a United Nations’ resolution in 1951indicated that Libya would become an 
independent country. 
Constant attempts were still being made to encourage enrolment in elementary 
education school despite contending with the usual day-to-day problems. Inspectors 
were failing to conduct the required number of visits to each school due to difficulties 
caused by, for example, weather and transport issues. 603  British Foreign Office 
representatives mandated to monitor the educational facilities during their visit to the 
Libyan territories during the academic year 1949-1950 arrived during the summer 
vacation when the schools were closed. 604  In another initiative to encourage more 
families to send their children to school, in 1950 the Department of Health under the 
BMA organised a number of lectures on health education in schools, and two English 
teachers from Malta came to help with the development of the curriculum.605 Ahmad 
Ali remembers that the schools were also visited by doctors from the BMA to check the 
pupils’ general health and the condition of their teeth. In addition, health visitors 
dispensed vitamins, and checked the pupils’ hair for head lice infestations which were 
very common among the students.606 
In addition, the programme for preparing the next generation of leaders was stepped up. 
When the first cohort of students graduated from Tripoli Secondary School, they were 
subsequently sent by the BMA to Al-Azhar University for higher education. Another 
group of studied at Halwan College in Egypt for another four years before gaining 
admission to one of the country’s universities.607 A further 18 students from various 
secondary schools were sent to attend courses at higher educational institutions in Egypt 
                                                 
601 Blackley, ‘Annual report Tripolitania, 1949’, TNA FO 371/80864, p.32 
602 Dr A. E. Morgan to A.H. Sheffield, 10 May 1950, London, The National Archives, Council reference 
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The National Archives, TNA FO 1015/800, p.35. 
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606 Interview, Ali, 25 June 2011. 
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and three students were sent to the United Kingdom for English courses organised by 
the British Council.608 English language courses were popular and were held three times 
a year, lasting four months each.609 
The BMA not only created educational opportunities through schools but also 
encouraged Libyans to attend evening classes to learn English as their second language. 
Courses took place three times a week for three months. Students were recruited from 
all trades and professions and from various nationalities but were mainly European. In 
November 1949, around 642 students were enrolled on courses. The percentage of 
beginners passing the examination remained higher than in advanced courses, even 
though the level of English was generally rising among the local population.610  
In 1950, English evening classes continued to attract local people: 581 students 
registered for the spring session (March to June 1950) and a record figure of 800 
students enrolled in the winter session, starting mid-October. Five levels of instruction 
included 32 classes lasting one hour, three times a week. Teachers were mostly Maltese 
and Palestinian and were assisted by two female teachers from the British Army 
Children’s School (St. George’s School).611 The combined results of the examinations 
held in June 1950 are presented in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Results of the English language examinations held in June 1950.612 
SCHOOL LEVEL 
NUMBER OF 
STUDENTS SITTING 
THE EXAM 
NUMBER OF 
STUDENTS 
OBTAINING A 
PASS613 
Beginners 66 51 
Elementary 141 67 
Intermediate 126 73 
Advanced 100 44 
TOTAL 433 (100%) 235 (54%) 
The administration also selected three Libyan teachers to be sent to Cairo for long-term 
                                                 
608 Blackley, ‘Annual report Cyrenaica, 1948’, TNA, WO 222/215, p.7. 
609 Blackley, ‘Annual report of Tripolitania, for the period 1 January to 31 December 1947’, 1947, TNA, 
FO 1015/143, p.46. 
610 Ibid. 
611 Blackley, ‘Annual report of Tripolitania, 1950’, TNA, FO 1015/800, p.36. 
612 Ibid, p.37. 
613 To obtain a pass, students were required to pass both written and oral tests.  
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training. In addition, six students were selected for higher training on the basis of their 
academic performance: three from Tripoli Secondary School, and three from the nearby 
schools. After following a course of English, all six were sent to Victoria College in 
Alexandria “long regarded a symbol of British cultural and political prestige in the 
Middle East”.614 All their expenses were paid for by the administration.615 
As the demand for more schools increased, BMA opened two nursery schools in Tripoli 
in 1950 and trained nursery teachers were made responsible for its management.616 
However, the BMA was not wholly consistent in its school policy, since although it 
opened three kindergartens, one each in Tripoli, Zavia and Khoms, these were solely for 
the children of British troops, Libyan children not being allowed to attend.617 
The BMA did attempt to develop vocational and technical schools although the scarcity 
of funds proved to be a major obstacle.618 The concept of vocational education was not a 
new one. Apprenticeships had long been known and were formerly adopted as a practice 
by the Islamic Arts and Crafts Guild in Tripoli during the Ottoman era in 1889, and this 
organization had continued to supervise this type of education. The Guild’s School of 
Islamic Arts and Crafts continued to play a role until British troops occupied its site in 
1943, halting education. However, soon after the conflict ended in Libya, it was 
refurbished and its syllabi and educational methods were revised, allowing students to 
resume their technical and vocational studies. Another technical college was opened in 
Benghazi (1947–1948) 619  where students followed two-year-long courses after the 
completion of elementary school and could learn a variety of trades including mechanic, 
electrician, and tailor.620 In Tripoli in 1948-1949, a training centre aimed at creating a 
technical and clerical cadre for Libya was established with the assistance of the 
International Labour Organization, an agency of the United Nations.621 It offered a one-
year training course for students who had completed the elementary stage of schooling, 
and later, the duration of study was extended to two years to cover general industrial 
                                                 
614 S. Raafat, ‘Victoria College - Educating the Elite 1902–1956’ Egyptian Mail, 30 March 1996 
http://www.egy.com/victoria/96-03-30.php accessed 12/12/2014. 
615 Blackley, ‘Annual report Tripolitania, 1949’, TNA FO 371/80846, p.32. 
616 Blackley, ‘Annual report of Tripolitania, 1950’, TNA, FO 1015/800, p.36. 
617 Blackley, ‘Annual report of Tripolitania, 1950’, TNA, FO 1015/800, p.36. 
618 Correspondence from Radley to Reid, 1950. 
619 Technical and vocational education in Libya, 1966, p.3. 
620 Technical and vocational education in Libya, p.3. 
621 Foreign office to Tripoli, 7 February 1950, London, The National Archives, TNA FO 1015/566. 
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education. Another technical/agricultural college was established with American 
assistance in Al-Marj in 1950, where the duration of study was four years after the 
student had received an elementary certificate.622 Accommodation for student boarders 
was created, with priority for admission given to students from agricultural backgrounds. 
The opening of a new training college for men was planned for October 1950623 and 
another for women by late November 1950.624 According to the Annual Report for 
Tripolitania UNESCO agreed to pay the salaries of the colleges’ staff, while the 
administration paid other costs, including making a technical workshop available for 
instructional purposes.625 
It is not clear whether these planned developments ever came to fruition. In May 1950, 
Dr Morgan of the British Council contacted the Foreign Office with a request for 
funding and assistance with finding suitable locations for a group of Cyrenaican 
teachers and students to obtain the training they required in Britain. In his reply, Mr 
Sheffield, who had responsibility for Administration of African Territories, assured him 
that British officials were committed to assisting and improving the education system in 
Libya but that the Secretary of State had on this occasion declined his request “due to 
the changing scenarios in Libya”.626 
The British were pioneers in introducing community development, mainly since due to 
British self-interest and the fact that the principles of colonial rule were based upon a 
metropolitan approach that called for the development of civilisation. The BMA 
approach was to bring all Libyans (Arabs and Jews) together through social 
interaction.627 
Thus, Britain attempted to transfer core its cultural values to the Libyans through 
community development. This resulted in many Libyans being trained meaning that by 
the time the country gained independence, they were ready to deal with the issues of 
governance in the various fields of administration, After the BMA left Libya, its policy 
                                                 
622 Al-Gamati, The Development of Educational Management, p.143. 
623 Tripoli to Foreign Office, 18 October 1950, London, The National Archives, TNA FO 1015/568. 
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remained in place in the education system, and the then government was able to build 
on this and open the doors to higher education for the Libyans. In the monarchical 
period, post-independence, the Libyan government regarded education as a continuing 
challenge. One of their first steps was to issue Education Law No. 5 in 1951. This gave 
everybody a right to education making this “compulsory and free in the elementary 
schools, and free through every stage of education all over Libya.” Libya’s two main 
universities were established in Tripoli and Benghazi in the period 1952-1953.628 
3.3 Conclusion 
The BMA’s policy was quite different from that of the Ottoman and Italian systems. 
Firstly, it aimed to be socially inclusive and to maximise participation in education. The 
extent to which it was successful in this aim can be measured at least in part by the 
statistical evidence. The BMA drew on its experience of education in India, and applied 
a similar language policy in Libya, introducing English as a compulsory subject in 
middle schools. At primary level, the curriculum was taught in the local language. The 
implementation of educational policy was strictly monitored. The education system 
which had been developed in India was maintained in all the colonies by the 
Department of Education in London.  
It is important to discuss why the BMA placed emphasis on the education system in 
Libya. This is due partly to the fact that BMA recognised the needs of the Libyans, but 
was also influenced by the 1930 Education Act that was introduced in the United 
Kingdom. The British government believed that it was very important to instill liberal 
values and to maintain these through good governance. As previously noted, the former 
administrations did not consider education from the Libyan perspective, thus dividing 
the community whilst the British approach was entirely different as it stressed 
community development. This approach also postulated the importance of the Libyan 
share of the existing public services and further extending the scope of services at lower 
expense. A similar analysis regarding the British approach towards the colonies has 
been put forward by Gray and Silberman.629 
This desire by the British to use education policy to create a more cohesive, 
participatory and egalitarian society can also be seen in their mass literacy campaign, 
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and in their attempt to address the urban-rural divide by developing primary schools 
better suited to those who lived in isolated areas and instituting boarding schools. They 
also began to address the problem of the lack of educational provision for girls by 
convincing the tribal people to allow their daughters to be educated, a major social 
achievement. Unlike previous administrations they involved the Libyan Arabs in 
decision-making and on key issues, such as the type of education curriculum they 
wanted, the BMA listened to and heeded the wishes of stakeholders, namely the parents. 
The British also attempted to create a meritocracy in which access to education and 
ultimately to social success was not based solely on class or ethnicity but depended on 
talent, ability and a desire to learn. The British approach towards education was 
different as the administration did not force the Libyans to learn English, but created 
opportunities for the citizens to take part. Once they had enough learners, then they 
exploited the potential of these learners, and those who shown positive attitudes were 
benefitted. The British Empire extended the educational opportunities in the colonies 
services along with public services. Obvious similarities can be seen with the education 
systems of Pakistan and India. The BMA’s educational policy quite clearly also aimed 
to produce an academic elite – only a tiny proportion of Libyans were rewarded with the 
coveted prize of secondary and higher education – but this was not for the purposes of 
simply perpetuating the BMA but to develop a class of educated people who would help 
to lead and administrate an independent Libya after BMA. The inclusion of the teaching 
of compulsory school subjects in Arabic further helped the Libyans to strengthen their 
education system. It can therefore be concluded that the education system helped to 
strengthen communities on the one hand and also improved relations between the 
Libyans and the BMA. The majority of the Libyans joined educational campaigns and 
took part in the activities designed to contribute towards nation building. In addition to 
this policy, the contribution of the Libyan émigrés should not be overlooked, as they 
played a major role in encouraging people to participate in cultural and social activities 
working within the community to raise awareness and unify people behind one goal, 
namely the building and unity of the country. 
The British were, perhaps, less successful in terms of developing higher educational 
infrastructure which would prepare citizens with practical and, above all technical, skills, 
but ironically, these skills were to come to the fore after Libyan independence, when oil 
was discovered there in the mid-1950s. In addition, whilst focusing on the pressing 
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educational needs of the Arab majority, they overlooked the concerns being expressed 
by the sizeable Jewish minority in Libya. Closer examination of those concerns, 
described as an “assertion of the Jewish minority’s racial and cultural distinctions” 
might have alerted the British to a broader shift taking place within Libyan society and 
in the Middle East as a whole. For the Jewish minority’s previously ‘amicable’ 
relationship with its Arab neighbours was about to come to an abrupt end.  
Along with educational policy, the press plays an important role in the social and 
cultural life of a society and fulfils many different cultural functions. The following 
chapter will examine the relationship between the Libyan press and broader cultural and 
political developments under the BMA, highlighting issues such as censorship and the 
freedom of the press and the nature of the relationship between the Libyan press and the 
BMA. 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: THE PRESS UNDER BRITISH RULE 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on education in Libya, under BMA rule. This chapter 
examines the role of the press during British rule. Newspapers present materials in 
different sections that reflect the interests of the public, offering the public access to 
socially useful information.630 Originally the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century press 
used to publish accounts of public meetings, presenting the opinions of those present on 
such occasions.631 Particularly at times of national crisis, the press play a vital role, not 
only in satisfying the public’s appetite for news of setbacks and triumphs, but also in 
offering them a welcome distraction. The press has also been used by governments as a 
powerful propaganda tool in wartime for controlling civilian morale and bolstering 
national unity; it can be used to help garner support or manufacture consent from 
citizens in times of crisis. In peace time, the printed press and other forms of media can 
be used to help smooth the path to social change.632 
For historians, examining the discourse used by journalists in news making and 
storytelling can be a useful means of identifying prevailing political ideologies and 
viewpoints and understanding how popular opinions were formed. Interrupted print runs 
of specific newspapers or missing issues can also indicate evidence of attempts at 
external control of the press, necessitating the exploration of matters relating to 
censorship or regulation. Editorial comment can provide insights into how the press 
itself conceived of its role within society at that time.633 
The press which first appeared elsewhere in North Africa during the time of the 
European colonial governments was the product of the indigenous literati elite in most 
Arab countries, whereas in Libya it was created by foreign settlers in the early 
nineteenth century under Ottoman rule. 634  This chapter begins by tracing the 
development of the press in Libya during the years of the BMA. It will identify the 
various types of publications which existed and the different roles which they played in 
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Libyan society. During the years in which the British were in Egypt, journalism there 
experienced something of a Golden Age and played an immensely important role in 
Egyptian cultural and political life.635 The British government’s policy was to promote 
the freedom of the press, with the liberals opposing any attempts to limit what they saw 
as being a key democratic value. Ensuring that the press freedom enjoyed by British 
citizens was also extended to those who they governed in Egypt was seen as a central 
tenet of keeping British values intact and this attitude directly strengthened the press in 
Egypt.636 
This chapter will explore whether the years of the BMA in Libya provoked a similar 
Golden Age of newspaper journalism during the period under study (1943-1951) and to 
what extent this impacted upon cultural and political affairs in Libya. In addition, it will 
examine the BMA’s attitudes towards the press in Libya, which consisted of the BMA’s 
own publications and the national newspapers published by private individuals, and the 
types of censorship and regulation to which these were subjected and the degree of 
freedom they were allowed. This chapter will also explore the different functions which 
the Libyan press played, the extent to which Libyans were able to develop their own 
abilities in terms of journalistic practice and printing to operate independently, and the 
degree to which they can be said to have benefitted from the democratic attitudes of the 
BMA.  
4.2 Emergence of the Arab Press, 1943-1951 
In spite of the precarious existence of Arabic-language publications during the Italian 
era, it was the press that served as a stimulus for intellectual life amongst the Arab 
population of Libya. During the period under study, in addition to the Italian regime’s 
propagandist newspapers, Libyan nationalists were also producing a wide range of 
Arabic-language publications. A range of factors contributed to the emergence of these 
magazines and newspapers.  
The first of these factors relates to the fact that new intellectual trends were emerging 
together with political parties that reflected a diverse range of political and social 
ideologies. The subsequent political tensions helped to fuel the emergence of a group of 
people desperate to engage in that ideological conflict and get their voices heard by 
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writing about their ideas in articles in magazines and newspapers.637 Many, if not all, of 
the political parties published their own newspaper; thus Al-Watan served as the 
mouthpiece for Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar, Al-Istiqlal [Independence] was published 
by the Youth League in Benghazi, whilst Jasr Al-Huria [Brigade of Freedom] served 
the interests of the Tripoli-Egyptian Union Party. There were many others. 638  The 
political struggle led to an outpouring of journalistic activity, which not only helped 
contributors to hone their writing skills, but also helped to create an audience of 
educated readers for these publications and involved students in editing the articles.639 
Among the Libyan Arab population, the articles in Al-Watan helped to make citizens 
aware of the fact that previously they had been deprived of their freedom of speech. 
Most of the contributors to these publications were amateur authors and literary critics, 
who wrote for love not money.640 During this period, there was also a greater degree of 
cultural openness to other Arab countries. Libyan intellectuals had established close ties 
with authors in other parts of the Arab world and they exchanged magazines and 
books. 641  A typical example is Alhadi Ibrahim Almashriqi 642  who maintained an 
extensive correspondence with a group of scholars in Algeria who sent copies of the 
Algerian newspaper Al-Bassaer [Insights] as a gift from their collective. At the same 
time, the number of Egyptian newspapers available in Libya was on the increase, with 
the regular appearance of publications such as Al-Hilal [The Crescent], Al-Rislah [The 
Message] and Al-Thaqafa [Culture]. These newspapers were originally published in 
Egypt and intended for an Egyptian audience.643 However, they played a major role in 
the consciousness-raising and acculturation of Libyan citizens, particularly the younger 
generation.644 The journalists, who were scholars from neighbouring countries, were in 
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close contact with Libyan writers. This helped improve their awareness of various social 
and political activities, and it brought the Libyan people news about what was 
happening elsewhere in the world and forged links of solidarity among the progressive 
forces in Arab countries. 
The press was the only channel to connect the Libyans to the outside world, providing 
them with political, cultural and literary news, through translation, stories reproduced 
from the Arab press of other countries, or contributions from readers. As a result of 
what they had read in articles from the Arab and foreign press, many article writers 
informed Libyan intellectuals about events abroad, among them was an article 
published by Tripoli magazine entitled: “A stream of literary products” by the critic 
Mahmud Abdelmajid Elmuntassir. His article showed that the difficulties caused by war 
had not stopped literary production in the countries of the Middle East, especially Egypt 
and Syria. Books published by Arab publishers such as Dar Al-Maarif, Dar Al-Kutub 
and Al-Istiqama in Egypt and Sader in Lebanon were reviewed by Elmuntassir who 
drew comparisons between different publications by Arab and Western critics. The 
article also referred to Brackenbury, who offered translations of Resalat Al-Ghufran 
[The Epistle of Forgiveness] by the classical poet and philosopher Abul ʿAla Al-Maarri 
and a translation of Mahmud Kamel’s book (Alajnihat Azzarkae – [Blue Wings]. Both 
books were printed by Dar Al-Maarif in Egypt645 and from the above it is clear that 
some Libyan critics were in close contact with Middle Eastern critics, and they used to 
share different aspects of intellectual life. The article urges Libyan critics to keep up 
with intellectual currents followed by their colleagues in the Middle East, who had 
ample outlets for publishing their work due to the quantity of Arabic publications in 
both Egypt and Lebanon.  
Another factor which also helped to facilitate the spread of nationalist ideology in the 
press was the close relationship between some of those advocating Libyan nationalism 
and BMA officials. The British authorities called this newspaper their Arabic 
newspaper.646 This contributed to the smooth running of press affairs, and to the overtly 
pro-nationalistic character of much of the coverage in the press, including the 
newspapers published by the British Information Office itself. In 1950, with an eye on 
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the future fate of the Libyan media under independence, a delegation of six Libyan 
journalists working in the press and on the radio were sent to Britain to find out more 
about working practices at some of the best-known British publications.647 
4.3 Newspapers Printed During British Rule in Libya 1943-
1951 
The BMA laid great importance on the role of the press in ensuring that the population 
should be given clear information, due to the heightened international political tensions 
at the time. The BMA’s aim was to deepen people’s understanding of the main goals of 
the new political system. This led to a transitional phase in newspaper publication 
which witnessed a marked increase in the quantity and quality of the journalistic output, 
and it was this period of intense and fruitful activity in the press that distinguishes this 
period from what went before and what was to follow. Many writers emerged to take 
advantage of this opportunity to express themselves freely, and there was a substantial 
increase in newspaper coverage of both cultural and intellectual issues. Those writing in 
the press during that period used their creativity to express their aspirations concerning 
nationhood and to raise awareness about social problems in a politically committed 
manner.648 
Newspapers published in Libya during the years of the BMA were of two types. The 
first were the official government newspapers, printed by the British Bureau of 
Intelligence. These undertook the task of publishing information about the movements 
of officials in the British government and, in addition, disseminated propaganda on 
behalf of the British government and its allies regarding their policies at the economic, 
social and cultural level. These newspapers principally aimed to inform the population 
about new staff appointments in Libya both foreigners and Libyans.  
The newspapers which fulfilled these functions were Tarablus Al-Gharb, Benghazi, and 
Barqa Al-Jadida.649 Secondly, there were the Libyan nationalist newspapers intended to 
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stir up nationalist sentiments among the local population and to serve the Libyan 
national cause by reporting on political, economic and social concerns. The nationalist 
newspapers were privately owned, but were still subject to regulation by the 
authorities.650 All of them were politically affiliated and tended to give more space 
specifically to coverage of intellectual and ideological debates. Among those that used 
the written word to tackle important political issues were Al-Watan, Liwa Al-Huriya 
[The Banner of Freedom] and Shualat Al-Huriya [Beacon of Freedom]. Some other 
newspapers and magazines aimed to tackle cultural issues, such as Omar Al-Mukhtar, 
and Al-Fajr Al-Libye, Almaraa [Woman] and Libya Magazine.651 
These national newspapers enjoyed much greater freedom than they had been allowed 
by the previous government but still faced censorship on occasion from the official 
authorities. They used their newfound freedom to raise issues and, in some cases, to 
strongly criticise those in power concerning the political and economic situation. Thus, 
the press played a key role in publicising issues that needed attention and educating 
different groups in Libyan society to enable them to make informed decisions.  
In the period after WW2, the development of the Libyan press was concentrated in the 
provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, particularly in their respective capitals, Tripoli 
and Benghazi. During the BMA period, there was no press in the largely desert province 
of Fezzan.652  
4.3.1 Government Newspapers in Cyrenaica Province 
All the government newspapers were under the direct administration of the BMA, 
which established its own newspapers for the purpose of communicating its policies to 
the Libyan people who appreciated having access to this form of media.653 This section 
presents the characteristic features of the various BMA-owned newspapers.  
Benghazi was the first newspaper to be printed in Libya following WW2. The BMA 
initially contacted young Libyans in Benghazi to manage a bureau to deal with the 
situation in Libya during the war, in addition to supporting the British government and 
its allies. These young Libyans were also responsible for launching and running a 
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propaganda campaign intended to win over the local Arab population to the Allies. The 
bureau was founded in March 1943 under the leadership of John Reid,654 who worked 
side-by-side with local youths. 655  Having evaluated the weaknesses of the Libyan 
resistance during the colonial period and the reasons for the failure of so many uprisings 
against the Italian invaders, these young people were determined that the newspapers 
would be overtly nationalist and serve to raise Libyan consciousness about nationhood. 
Thus, after the first two issues of the newspaper, the young Libyan staff stopped 
publishing war-related news and instead declared that their newspaper would focus on 
the Libyan cause rather than praising BMA policies. When it was initially printed, the 
newspaper was solely intended to disseminate essential information to its readers, but 
later it began to focus on topics of social and economic importance, including women’s 
issues, changes to the educational system and civil rights.656 Benghazi came out three 
times a week, with a total circulation of 850 copies in 1945657 which increased to 1,200 
copies in 1946, and reached 1,250 copies by 1948.658 
Having demonstrated their solidarity with the Allied forces during the war, the young 
Libyans wanted urgent reforms and they did not describe themselves as being anti-
British but rather pro-Libyan nationalism. In one article, Ali Falak, a member of the 
Administrative Council in Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar, wrote the following: 
Now, as we celebrate the end of war, we declare our solidarity with the Allies 
until victory is seized. This will not prevent us from acknowledging the truth 
that we have seen no change in this country. We are at war, and that prevents our 
leaders from immediately making the necessary reforms, but these are matters of 
great importance for which we must make the time.659 
The article in question clearly indicated that the Libyans saw Britain as an ally and a 
positive alternative to the Italian occupation; hence, the Libyans would not oppose 
British reforms after the war ended in Libya, especially since they did not believe that 
these reforms would adversely affect the local population and their demands for rapid 
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reform. The publication of this article in a government newspaper indicated that Libya 
was undergoing a transformation after the repression it had suffered under Italian rule. 
Under British rule, there was to be a greater degree of freedom, illustrating the 
difference between the two colonizers and their respective attitudes to the Libyan 
people.  
This article clearly contains a call for change in the status quo of Libya’s position and 
shows that these young Libyans were well aware of the importance of the outcome of 
the conflict in relation to the future of their country. It also makes it clear that in return 
for their support of the Allies, the Libyans were expecting something in return for their 
efforts. 
In late 1945, Benghazi was renamed Barqa Al-Jadida and referred to by the BMA as 
“their Arabic newspaper.”660 It was published by the British administration, with Saleh 
Abobasir661 as Editor-in-Chief. A typical issue of the newspaper carried local official 
information on the first page, followed by a full page of international news whilst the 
remaining pages were devoted to a variety of political affairs, social issues, arts, literary 
reviews and creative writing. This government newspaper placed its greatest emphasis 
on international and local political developments and was deeply concerned about their 
impact on Libya’s future.662 
Government newspapers in Cyrenaica were used to discuss different political trends in 
the country and for publishing information about activities within the province. 
Commenting on the launch of the magazine Omar al-Mukhtar issued by Jam’iyat Omar 
al-Mukhtar in August 1943, Benghazi stated:  
We warmly welcome our national newspaper and greatly praise those 
responsible for it. We urge our readers to support it and learn from it, and we 
hope they are successful amongst the Levantine press.663 
This was a reference to the solidarity which existed among the nationalist elements at 
the beginning of the period. Barqa Al-Jadida had followed the path of Benghazi in 
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remaining loyal to Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar. However, in 1947, this association 
showed it was hostile towards the BMA, as evidenced in attitudes reflected in its 
publication. When British military police questioned Libyan citizens who had 
documents relating to the association, the newspaper showed its support by publishing 
articles declaring that the documents were not secret or illegal, but had been reproduced 
openly in Barqa Al-Jadida and Barqa Al-Riyadiyya (Cyrenaica sports) newspapers.664 
Barqa Al-Jadida also demonstrated its support for the Association’s viewpoint during 
the negotiations between Tripoli and Cyrenaica in January 1947, when some of its 
articles reported that if these negotiations failed this might negatively affect public 
opinion and the attitude of the political parties in Tripoli. Barqa Al-Jadida also 
published a statement expressing its solidarity with the Tripoli front and thanking the 
Association and the young people of Cyrenaica for playing a pivotal role in encouraging 
the unity and independence of Libya. It praised their spirit of nationalism, together with 
their demands for their rights to be recognised and for Libya to join the Arab League.665 
Since Barqa Al-Jadida was a government publication, it was expected to adopt the 
BMA’s point of view. Coverage in the newspaper told readers that the BMA supported 
Libya’s territorial unity; however, the political tensions that arose in the aforementioned 
negotiations suggested the opposite. At the conference of foreign ministers held by the 
major powers in April 1946, Great Britain advanced the idea of strengthening Libya by 
putting the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under its tutelage. By the end of the 
same year, the British had replaced this idea with a plan to place Tripolitania and 
Fezzan under international tutelage; however, Cyrenaica was to come under British 
authority, making it a base for protecting Britain’s colonial interests as it had lost its 
power elsewhere in the Middle East, due to the liberation movements that were then 
sweeping across the region.666 
Negative reactions to the failure of these negotiations made the BMA attempt to combat 
the feelings of despair that prevailed in Libya. The press was one of the methods used to 
suggest that the British had not been responsible for the failure of the negotiations. 
Published articles bore the signatures of some the most famous members of Jam’iyat 
Omar al-Mukhtar, including Ibrahim Usta Omar. Prior to this event, the newspaper had 
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aimed to give voice to all the different points of view put forward by the political 
tendencies. However, in January 1947, the emergence of a rift between the political 
parties in the province of Cyrenaica became evident in the pages of Barqa Al-Jadida.667 
The April 1950 issue of Barqa Al-Jadida was the last to be published under the aegis of 
the British Bureau of Intelligence 668  and an article entitled ‘The Barqa Al-Jadida’ 
written by the Bureau of Publication’s attaché to the government of Cyrenaica was 
printed in the newspaper on 5 May 1950.669 It confirms that Cyrenaica was to become a 
fully independent state. The issue also gave the following as the aims of the publication: 
 Working under the flag of national rule and contributing to the struggle for the 
country’s freedom  
 Raising the quality of its journalism and range of subject matter  
 Responding to readers’ questions and comments, investigating their problems 
and finding solutions 
 Acting as a link to promote understanding between the government and the 
people, by exchanging points of view which are of public interest.670 
The newspaper also said that it intended to support moderate tendencies, on the grounds 
that extremism posed a great danger to Cyrenaica and was to be avoided at all costs, and 
it refused to publish any extremist points of view. It also cautioned against succumbing 
to blind nationalism and flawed ideas, the main source of which was greed. Articles also 
urged members of the political organizations and state agencies not to imitate European 
systems. 671  This position reflected the moderate attitudes of the government of 
Cyrenaica, and it appeared that Barqa Al-Jadida had become its official mouthpiece.  
As a result, it was often critical of coverage which appeared in Al-Watan. Thus, it 
responded when Al-Watan, which was particularly sensitive to issues relating to Arabic, 
condemned a speech made by the Prime Minister of Cyrenaica at the start of the new 
school year about learning English, in which he voiced his opinion that English was 
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being promoted to the detriment of Arabic.672 Barqa Al-Jadida defended the Prime 
Minister, explaining that English was widely spoken throughout the world, and that no 
one would dare to deny its crucial importance.673 
Barqa Al-Jadida also denounced stories printed in Al-Watan about the numbers of 
foreign employees in Al-Maref [the Ministry of Education], referring to this coverage 
about foreign employees as nonsense. It pointed out that there were only a few foreign 
staff employed there and these were technicians and experts who needed to be hired for 
their specialist knowledge and skills.674 Their function was to help to strengthen the 
educational programme and prepare Libyans to take over the management of the 
education system. 
Even though Barqa Al-Jadida actively defended the BMA and later the Cyrenaican 
government, it never suggested extreme measures for tackling issues, instead often 
using articles to clarify misunderstandings or to respond to accusations of 
misinformation. With the exception of Saleh Abobasir and Ibrahim Usta Omar, it was 
difficult to identify the writers who contributed to this newspaper, since most articles 
were published under pseudonyms, often intentionally symbolic. However, readers 
would have easily been able to determine the attitudes of these key figures as reflected 
in their writings, and their political tendencies were always moderate on nationalist 
issues. Thus, when Ibrahim Usta Omar blamed the Cyrenaican government for the 
failure of the negotiations over Libyan unity, he did not criticise the policies of Idris al-
Sanusi as being the cause. Although Saleh Abobasir was an employee of the BMA, he 
was also a nationalist activist, and his articles published between 1946 and 1947 in Al-
Masri [The Egyptian] clearly showed his hostility towards British rule.675 
Barqa Al-Jadida’s nationalism was evident in an article which it published following 
the signing of the British Cyrenaica treaty by Idris Al-Sanusi, when it stated that “Last 
year, Britain granted partial autonomy, but only now does Cyrenaica have the authority 
to assert its autonomy”.676 It noted that Cyrenaica still did not enjoy the right to enter 
into agreements, but that this was a step in the right direction until the whole country 
gained full independence. This confirms that Barqa Al-Jadida was a pro-government 
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newspaper with a nationalist political agenda. However, it continued to maintain the 
moderate position it had adopted throughout and would not countenance extremist 
attitudes. 
The last three months of 1949 witnessed some changes to the focus of Barqa Al-
Jadida’s articles. The newspaper became less interested in international news, 
particularly from the West, and chose instead to focus its attention on local news, with 
coverage of social issues completely overshadowing the political news. When an article 
was published to clarify methods of social reform, this was given three columns on the 
front page, whereas news of world events had once taken precedence.677 The newspaper 
also acted as a forum for reader discussion of topics about which they sought 
clarification. One of the most serious of these related to the introduction of domestic 
water supplies in urban areas. Since the water reached end users through metallic pipes 
(al-mawassir), its cleanliness, particularly in terms of whether it was fit for ritual 
ablutions before prayer, was widely debated.678 Another innovation was the publication 
of short stories and poems written by readers.679 
Barqa Al-Jadida thus moved from being a newspaper focused on war coverage and 
news from Europe to a magazine printed by a nationalist government which encouraged 
readers to express their opinions and to publish their own creative efforts. This meant 
that it gave a much-needed voice to literary hopefuls at varying stages of their 
development. However, it was also guilty of focusing narrowly on provincial events 
either as news or for propaganda purposes, meaning that it became of exclusive interest 
to a minority audience in the province of Cyrenaica.680 It is worth mentioning that an 
English-language newspaper published by the BMA, The Sentinel [referred to locally as 
Al-Raqeeb], was also circulated in Cyrenaica from 13 February 1949. This weekly 
publication was aimed principally at the English community in Cyrenaica, which 
consisted mainly of British soldiers, and was intended to provide news stories which 
gave them an insight into Cyrenaica and its people. It deliberately avoided explicit 
coverage of political issues.681 
Although the relationship between the British authorities and these kinds of newspapers 
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was friendly, sometimes both sides did not agree regarding an issue, which limited 
communication. While such incidences were resolved through negotiations between 
nationalists and representatives of the BMA, the articles in the newspapers addressed 
various topics intended to attract the readers’ attention, including referring to Britain’s 
support for Libyans in their resistance against the Italian invasion. The articles also 
referred to the promises made by Britain to improve living conditions in the occupied 
territory after the war had ended.  
4.3.2 Nationalist Newspapers in Cyrenaica Province 
The nationalist newspapers were not under the direct rule of BMA; however, they were 
still expected to follow the code of conduct promulgated by the BMA and some were 
banned when they published articles criticising BMA policies. These newspapers played 
a major role during and after independence, expressing the resilient attitude of the 
Libyans and awakening their desire to be united, especially before independence, in 
spite of the complexity which tribal politics entailed. Some of the groups in Cyrenaica 
wanted independence for their region first; however, those newspapers that were in 
favour of independence for Libya attempted to dispel this attitude, fearing it would 
shatter the dreams of a united nation. The following section focuses on the newspapers 
in Cyrenaica which were not published under the direction of the BMA.  
Barqa Al-Riyadiyya [Cyrenaica Sport] was the first nationalist Libyan newspaper 
published after the end of the conflict in Cyrenaica. It was launched on 27 August 1943 
by the Sports Section of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar, and originally focused on sports 
coverage until 1947. However, when it came under the aegis of the Central Committee 
of this Association, it became more political and was renamed Al-Watan [The 
homeland]. 682  This weekly newspaper was published every Tuesday 683  and had a 
circulation of about 1,000 copies.684 Most of its articles were published anonymously 
and all were edited prior to publication by Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar, ensuring that 
they represented its political point of view.685 Following publication of issue 92 (23 
September 1947), the BMA ordered suspension of the newspaper and the dismissal of 
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many of the members of the editorial committee on the grounds that it had insulted the 
British authorities. The offending edition included a manifesto for Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar, discussed the BMA’s ban on political activities, and described the events 
which the Association’s Central Committee had held to commemorate the death of the 
shahid [jihadi martyr] Omar Al-Mukhtar which had taken place in 1931.686 
Three weeks later, issue 93 announced ‘The return of Al-Watan’, asserting its official 
position on the principles of the struggle for the right to nationhood. However, this 
return was short-lived, as police raided the newspaper offices at night and arrested 
anyone selling it. Articles referred to reactions to previous “acts of political repression” 
in Benghazi, Darnah, Ajdabiya and the Green Mountain district. When Jam’iyat Omar 
al-Mukhtar Central Committee was dissolved in December 1947 and prevented from 
engaging in any further political activities, Mustapha Bin Amer became the newspaper’s 
Editor-in-Chief while Muhammad Assabari took over as Head Editor.687 Despite these 
changes, the newspaper continued to represent the nationalist views espoused by 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar and coverage of nationalist issues adopted a similarly hard-
line approach.  
The British authorities closed down the newspaper again in March 1950, following a 
complaint from the British Administrator in Cyrenaica about its attacks on British 
policy.688 Two months later it was back in circulation and more critical than before. In 
the first issue after restoration, its leading article stated that the reason for its closure 
was the BMA’s objection to its publishing an article entitled ‘De Candole689 assumed 
personal responsibility’. This article accused the British Administrator in Cyrenaica of 
being personally responsible for failing to implement a reform policy. The newspaper 
continued to attack British policy and the Cyrenaican House of Representatives. It 
criticised the methods by which the elections had been convened, and attacked the 
Ministry of Education for its negligence by printing the headline, ‘We did our duty’, 
implying that it felt obliged to criticise the BMA and the Cyrenaican government in the 
best interests of the nation, on the grounds that what was happening could not be 
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ignored under any circumstances. 690  The newspaper published an article ironically 
entitled ‘Celebration of the Constitution or celebration of its publication’, indicating its 
opinion that the new Constitution of Cyrenaica was effectively an empty declaration 
made by the British Administrator, and not worth the paper it was written on.691 
When the Chief Administrator of the BMA from 1949 to 1951, Mr Blakely, encouraged 
newly enrolled secondary school students to take military training courses on the 
grounds it would help them assume leadership positions, Al-Watan criticised the 
secondary school management in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, arguing that students should 
spend their time studying at school, as they were needed for the future of the country. 
The newspaper article sarcastically concluded by asking: “If Libyans joined the Army, 
whose Army would it be—the British Army or the Libyan Army?”692 
This illustrates the difference between BMA-owned newspapers and the nationalist 
newspapers privately owned by Libyans. The latter highlighted the importance of 
freedom for the Libyans, while the former specifically celebrated BMA policies. This 
further suggests that the private publishers encouraged writers to adopt a pro-nationalist 
stance, signalling a key difference in policy. The BMA gave freedom to writers and 
publishers in the occupied territory, and the residents took advantage of this to publish 
materials which opposed the BMA’s policies and supported the nationalists.  
The Ministerial Council in Cyrenaica issued an order banning the publication of Al-
Watan with effect from 1 November 1950. Issue 283 was re-published on 7 December 
1950, by the order of Idris Al-Sanusi, after he seized power of the Libyan Constituent 
Assembly on the same date. The Constituent Assembly decided to make him King of a 
United Libya following independence.693 From then on, the newspaper adopted a more 
moderate stance towards the government. This can be seen in its coverage of 
discussions about the formation of a united government, since representatives of all 
three provinces were at loggerheads amongst themselves, especially in Tripolitania, 
which had a larger population than that of both Cyrenaica and Fezzan combined.694 Al-
Watan observed that an agreement must be reached on the method by which this 
authority was to be formed, and urged all nationalists to put aside their individual 
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differences and work together for the good of the nation, since continuing opposition to 
the proposals would only hinder and delay independence for Libya.695 
At the same time, though, this did not stop Al-Watan from criticising the Constituent 
Assembly for dragging its feet over this issue, for its lack of transparency and also for 
the suggested distribution of power between the new united government and the three 
constituent provinces. Furthermore, on behalf of citizens, it asked for clarification of the 
exact meaning of ‘united’ in the nation’s proposed new title, and assurance that this 
solution, though far from ideal, was the best alternative. However, it concluded that this 
was merely internal wrangling and that the most urgent priority was to transfer power 
from foreign rule to the Libyans.696 
It is also worth mentioning that Al-Watan enjoyed a close relationship with the Council 
of the Arab League, as evidenced in the telegrams and correspondence exchanged 
between the General Secretary of the League and the Central Committee of Jam’iyat 
Omar al-Mukhtar. Al-Watan acted as a mouthpiece for those who were active 
participants in the movement for freedom and published all the statements made by the 
General Secretary of the Arab League, indicating its close interest in developments 
there. One article, entitled ‘Half a million Arabs ready to fight’, carried his statement 
urging the mujahidin to fight for Palestine.697 Tensions arose when Libya appeared 
hesitant to join the League, as this would have hindered the constitutional process, since 
the League opposed the methods by which the Constituent Assembly had been 
formed. 698  Al-Watan subsequently published a telegram from Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar to the Council of the Arab League calling for its support of the Libyan 
Constituent Assembly on the grounds this was the only way to ensure that the country 
would achieve its goals of independence.699 This indicates the dilemma which Al-Watan 
faced: on the one hand, it supported the Arab League because of its pan-Arabist 
principles but on the other, it opposed its attitude towards constitutional developments 
in Libya. 
Al-Watan had supported the Palestinian cause since the United Nations Partition Plan 
had been proposed, and had written many articles on this subject, including one entitled 
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‘Our duty’, which openly called for support for the Palestinian people; the same article 
also called on Libyans to intensify their efforts and to reject internal disputes which 
were causing disunity. The British Mandate in Palestine ended in 1948; Al-Watan 
published two leading articles about the effects of ending this and the withdrawal of 
Arab forces from the Palestinian territories upon the creation of Israel.700 In articles such 
as ‘The British policy towards the Arabs’, it showed the overlap between British and 
Zionist policies, and warned how close these were.701 Interestingly, although Al-Watan 
did publish articles on the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict, these were 
relatively small in number in comparison with the importance that this development 
meant for the region as a whole, and its principal focus continued to be on local 
issues.702 
The newspaper published many articles about the problems with health services faced 
by the inhabitants of the city of Benghazi and this resulted in a demonstration held in 
the city to protest against an incident involving medical negligence in a hospital. 
Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya accused the newspaper of insurgency, and its coverage of this 
story (issue 270, published on 10 July 1953), led to it being temporarily closed by order 
of the National Government of Cyrenaica. 703  Al-Watan was described in British 
documentation as representing the left-wing of the Omar Al-Mukhtar National 
Association. It was also the highest-selling newspaper in local markets.704 
This gives a clear picture of how the newspapers acted and shows the difficult position 
in which they were placed. On the one hand, they had to follow the code of conduct, 
while on the other they wanted to keep their readers in touch with the changing political 
situation in the regions of Libya. The articles published in Al-Watan were not only 
political in nature but also highlighted the social and economic aspects of Libyan life. 
The most significant role played by Al-Watan was its ability to quickly and effectively 
influence public opinion by influencing readers’ opinions on particular topics. 
In short, Al-Watan was a nationalist newspaper that followed the path previously 
established by Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar’s publications; however, it was also interested 
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in broader trends in the Middle East. Thus, whilst demanding unity and full 
independence for Libya, it also promoted membership of the Arab League. It covered 
social and economic reforms in Cyrenaica, and was not afraid of upsetting any of the 
political players at the time. It was often scathingly critical of both the BMA and the 
Cyrenaican leaders, extending this criticism to political parties in Tripoli and the 
Constituent Assembly. In broader terms, Al-Watan showed its support for a united 
Libya, openly criticising the approach of both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Al-Watan did 
not focus on individual personalities, always writing about a single united country. 
Although its publication was banned on repeated occasions by the authorities, it 
achieved one of the largest circulations and had one of the most loyal readership bases 
of all the Libyan press, because it succeeded in giving a voice to popular aspirations and 
frustrations during the BMA years.  
Here it is important to mention that Al-Watan was subjected to harassment by the 
authorities such as the British administration and the Libyan authorities after 
independence. The authorities alleged that Al-Watan had published articles inciting 
public disorder in the country, especially after the unrest that had occurred among 
Arabs, Libyan Jews and some tribes.705 However, according to Louba the main reasons 
for this newspaper being banned so frequently was that it was extremely critical of the 
policies of both the British and Libyan authorities.706 Although some non-governmental 
newspapers had sharply criticised the British authorities, others publications were more 
positive, such as Al-Akhbar, that noted: 
We are enjoying in the current era of British rule broad freedom of speech and 
opinion, the right to assemble and engage in political activities in this country, 
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we even have several political parties intended to provide for this country and to 
act with sophistication and civility to gain independence.707 
Al-Libye newspaper also praised the BMA officer, Mr. Blackley, highlighting that had 
supported the Libyans’ demonstrations against the Bevin-Sforza Plan. 708  
After a split occurred within Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar, the Central Committee of 
Rabitat al-Shabab (The Libyan Islamic Youth Association) 709  began publishing a 
weekly newspaper called Al-Istiqlal [Independence] in late 1947, with an average 
circulation of 750 copies. 710  It was influenced by traditional trends rather than 
nationalistic principles. Its first Editor-in-Chief, Abdu Raba Ganae, was followed by 
Awad Zaqhob711 in 1948, while Munir Elbaaba remained as its director. After briefly 
renaming itself Sout Al-Nas [The Voice of the People] it reverted to its original title.712 
It stated its aims in articles which were published and sent to the United Nations envoy 
to Libya, one of which was entitled ‘The messenger of independence’: 
You will see tomorrow, as the Fourth Committee saw before you, that this 
country is one hundred per cent behind Sanusi (Emir Idris), and it will never 
accept any alternative. 
If we wish to avoid exaggeration, extremist separatists constitute five per cent at 
the most, and if you really want to know the truth about the greed of the people 
and the truth of their ideas, then ask Al-Mutamar Al-Watani. It is the 
representative of the people, just as tribal leaders and sheikhs from all 
backgrounds and social classes represent their districts to the best of their 
abilities.713 
Al-Mutamar Al-Watani is the parliament of this state. Ask it to understand the 
                                                 
707 Al-Akbar, 25 August 1947. 
708 Al-Libye, 13 December 1943. 
709 This body split from the Omar Al-Mukhtar Association in 1945, as a result of a dispute that occurred 
between members of the Assembly due to differing views on the attitude that should be taken towards the 
British. Most of those young people who had studied in Egypt held anti-British views, while others took a 
moderate position on the British administration. As a result, the pro-British supporters formed a separate 
body called the Libyan Islamic Youth Association. 
710 Blackley, ‘Annual report by the Chief Administrator of the BMA for Cyrenaica 1948’, TNA WO 
222/215 p.32. 
711 Awad Zaqhob (1911-1991) was born in Benghazi and schooled in Zawaya, known as a centre of anti-
Italian activism. In 1938, he moved to the south of Libya and went into exile in Sudan, returning to 
Benghazi in 1942. 
712 Almagrabe, Documents of the Omar Al-Mukhtar Association, p.279. 
713 Al-Istiqlal, 24 December 1947. 
133 
 
hopes and fears of the people; ask the wise government of this country about its 
confidence in the legitimacy of the leader and the congress of the state, the 
young and old of this country.714 
Al-Mutamar Al-Watani backed the Sanusi directive, which prioritized the unity of Libya 
hand-in-hand with a monarchy headed by Al-Sanusi. This was made clear in one of its 
articles:  
The truth is that Cyrenaica never opposed the unity of Libya; rather it has 
defended that unity on many occasions, provided that it does not hurt the 
interests of Cyrenaica. Rabitat al-Shabab called for unity from its foundation, 
asking for this to be one of the fundamental principles of the independence of 
Cyrenaica, followed by the unity of Libya under the Sanusi crown.715 
This newspaper thus took a different direction to that of Al-Watan, which had been 
influenced by the Arab League’s anti-British policy and its stance on the Cyrenaica 
government. However, since Al-Istiqlal supported the Sanusiyya movement, then 
subsequently backed the Cyrenaica government, it was later given a guarantee that it 
would be allowed to continue publishing.716 
Articles calling for social reform were also a mainstay of the newspaper and other 
publications followed its campaigning lead. The following extract, for example, reflects 
its stance on the consumption of alcohol which is forbidden to Muslims:  
It is not our duty to deal solely with political affairs and neglect to take into 
account other issues that touch our lives. It is impossible for any nation to move 
forward without taking politics into account and tending to its other issues as 
well. Some of these are patently obvious to everybody, such as the trend for 
drinking wine; this social disorder must be tackled by our newspaper. To discuss 
political issues without considering other issues makes absolutely no sense.717 
It is clear, then, that Al-Istiqlal newspaper viewed social reform as its key target and it 
dedicated a lot of coverage to addressing social problems, including crime. 
On 2 November 1950 Al-Taj [The Crown] was launched by Omar Alshahab with the 
aim of ensuring that an independent Libya would be an Islamic kingdom. Its title and 
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the timing of its launch reflected the fact that it supported Idris al-Sanusi as the head of 
this state, seeing him as acting as a bridge between the country’s colonial past and its 
future liberation. The Constituent Assembly's resolution on 2 November 1950 
positioned Idris Al-Sanusi as the King of Libya. The direction of this newspaper can be 
clear from some of its pronouncements such as: 
The new Libyan state should be an Islamic state, and all ways of life should be 
in line with the Islamic jurisprudence and all issues must be resolved 
accordingly.718 
In terms of its political leanings, the newspaper also made its views known, stating: 
Some communities have followed the path of extremism with such fervent belief 
in their leadership that they set them up as though they were gods. From the 
dawn of mankind, leaders have been worshipped and today we still find many 
communities that believe the leader is always right and never wrong in this 
context.719 
We don’t believe in a true religion that gives leaders unreasonable limits or 
rather we believe in a true religion that sets reasonable limits for leaders.720 
The newspaper specifically referred to shariah law, urging leaders to be bound by the 
laws permitted in an Islamic country where shariah is practised as a means of resolving 
disputes and conflicts and of providing guidance on social and economic issues. It also 
urged Libyans to follow such leaders.  
This can be seen as a response to the fact that some Libyans had distanced themselves 
from Islamic religious practices as a result of the attitudes and behaviour of former 
governments. Al-Taj adopted a nationalistic stance and saw its task as being to lobby the 
future government to formulate a strategy for introducing Islamic law in the new state 
and also to persuade Libyans to adopt an Islamic way of life. Like Al-Jablakdar, it also 
published poetry composed by popular poets such as Khalil Alarida, Muhammad 
Mansour Almrimi and Ashrif Assaitte.721 
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4.3.3 Government Newspapers in Tripolitania 
This section focuses on those newspapers that were published under the direct 
supervision of the BMA in Tripolitania. These newspapers effectively served as a 
means of disseminating BMA policies. The best known of these was Tarablus Al-Gharb 
[West Tripoli], which was the first daily Arabic newspaper to be printed in Libya. It had 
initially been published during the Ottoman era, but was then banned by the Italian 
authorities.722 However, the BMA resumed publication of this newspaper in January 
1943.723 Following its restoration, the newspaper eventually became a daily again, as 
opposed to three times per week, with a circulation of over 2,000 copies.724  
Tarablus Al-Gharb outlined its aims in a statement published on 8 February 1943: 
We are pleased to inform our readers that from today onwards, our newspaper, 
Tarablus Al-Gharb, will be printed in Arabic, covering all the news and events. 
It does not intend to target anyone for criticism, and it will be small in size but 
every aspect of the news will be covered, in order to satisfy the readers. We are 
strongly determined that it will become one of the best, most widely read 
newspapers, following legal guidelines.  
Tarablus Al-Gharb focused on public interest and provided its readers with up-to-date 
information on world events, including editorials about the international situation as 
well as local issues.725 
The BMA aimed to earn the support of the Libyan population, when they were still at 
war with the Axis powers. The BMA had attempted to exploit the influence of religious 
feelings by publishing a statement in Tarablus Al-Gharb by the Mufti726 of Tripoli 
about the positive impact of the visit of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill727 
to the city of Tripoli. This statement helped the BMA, as Libyans became more trusting 
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of the administration. The newspaper further noted the positive impact this official visit 
had created on the local people.728 The newspaper’s role became highly significant as 
ordinary peoples’ views were presented in different ways including in the main news, 
editorials and journalists’ columns.  
Other issues contained many articles praising the efforts of Tarablus Al-Gharb as an 
Arabic-language newspaper, without referring to the reality that it was being published 
under the aegis of the British Intelligence Bureau. Journalist Abdul Qadir Alipashta 
praised the role of Tarablus Al-Gharb in disseminating political information and news 
about world and local events to the public, and as a result, raising their awareness of and 
enhancing the role of Arabic. 729  Furthermore, by publishing academic and literary 
articles, Tarablus Al-Gharb was simultaneously sharpening the skills of authors and 
readers, helping to bring new life to Arabic literature, which had nearly vanished during 
the occupation of Libya for over 25 years.730 Therefore, it played an important role in a 
province where no Arabic newspaper had been published for so long, engaging readers 
and providing them with intellectual stimulus.  
However, Tarablus Al-Gharb faced many obstacles, such as outdated printing presses 
and a scarcity of trained staff to pass on their expertise to others.731 These problems 
were not due to neglect on the part of the British authorities, but rather a consequence of 
the previous era.732 Due to many problems, including the shortage of newsprint used for 
the production of newspapers, the publication consisted of just two pages until mid-
1947.733 However, it improved significantly after newsprint was imported from Tunisia 
and Sicily.734 
Concerning the style of the political, social and cultural content of the articles, the 
information was succinctly presented and reflected the political views of the newspaper. 
Material was presented in a similar fashion to that followed by Benghazi, and whilst the 
conflict was still on-going in 1943-1945, it focused on coverage of the war. The purpose 
was to offer balanced views and also to gain support for the British in their struggle 
against the Axis powers.  
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Another of the BMA’s main priorities in contributing to general reform in Libya was to 
publish stories about the efforts made by local people to modernize. One article focused 
on the inhabitants of the villages of Tumzine, Diaae and Sidi Abu Issa, all located in the 
province of Tripoli, who had constructed school buildings at their own expense. The 
newspaper explained that local projects of this kind were paving the way for an 
academic renaissance in a country where there was a dire need for education and 
learning.735 An article penned by Abdessalma Bash focused on the role played by the 
most highly qualified students in civilized nations and their importance within a future 
independent state.  
In addition, the newspaper published items about cultural and political associations, 
sports clubs, and provided reports on the Tripoli Literary Society, which was 
established at the same time that Tarablus Al-Gharb re-started its publication. This 
newspaper had reporters in different areas of Tripolitania and journalists used to edit 
their contributions prior to publication.736 The BMA’s annual report for 1947 described 
the newspaper as an excellent place for advertising, as it promoted all the pro-BMA 
campaigns.737 This does not match the opinion of Captain Simon who was then the 
British Director of Information and Publishing in Tripoli, and claimed that Tarablus Al-
Gharb was a national newspaper that served the public interest and acted as a gauge of 
public opinion.738 
Like other newspapers which soon grasped the important role they could play in relation 
to raising standards of cultural knowledge, Tarablus Al-Gharb published the text of 
talks given on various topics, either by speakers at cultural associations or broadcast on 
the local radio. Their aim was to educate people by different means, helping individuals 
to enhance their level of understanding to increase knowledge. For example, the 
newspaper published a talk about Ibn Khaldun, the founder of sociology, by the 
Headmaster of a Secondary School in Tripoli, Mustapha Fahmi, which was broadcast 
on local radio.739 
Tarablus Al-Gharb also closely followed developments at the Council of the Arab 
League, covering the signing of the Arab League Convention by its original six 
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members on 22 March 1945 in issue 30. The newspaper also focused on the activities of 
the Libyan students who were studying in Egypt, organised by the Western Tripoli 
Cultural Association in Cairo. It published the text of the lectures given to members of 
the club, and reported on cultural excursions which they undertook.740 This illustrates 
the close links between the members of this organization and the editors of Tarablus Al-
Gharb, the only Libyan newspaper in Libya that showed an interest in reporting on 
these cultural activities. 
In 1950, the newspaper invited new writers to submit their articles on various topics 
related to the arts, science and politics. Mustapha Alamir, who had previously worked 
as a pharmacist, contributed articles on health, while Fuaad Kamal Abdul-Aziz, wrote 
numerous articles about war, the Libyan situation during BMA rule, and other aspects 
such as the nature of politicians and ethics in politics.741 By early 1950, Tarablus Al-
Gharb had begun to abandon its emphasis on Tripolitanian affairs and to show more 
interest in the citizens of Cyrenaica. It published, for example, an article about repairs 
and improvements being carried out at Benghazi Airport, whilst another reported the 
Cyrenaican government’s order banning civil servants from involvement in politics.742 
This change reflected larger political developments, with the United Nations having 
passed its Resolution regarding Libyan independence, followed by the formation of the 
Consultative Assembly made up of deputies from all three provinces of Libya. Tarablus 
Al-Gharb highlighted the importance of these developments by publishing the 
statements of some of the most significant political figures. These included Ali Alharbi, 
who at that time occupied the post of the Minister of Works and Telecommunications in 
the Cyrenaica government, and was subsequently appointed as a representative on the 
Consultative Assembly743, and Ahmed Baq Soufou, a notable from Fezzan who was 
appointed administrator of the Murzuq region in southern Libya.744 
Thus, it can be concluded that Tarablus Al-Gharb emerged as a source of news on 
current affairs, and then shifted its focus towards informing the public about the cultural 
and political activities of the authorities in Tripolitania. Paying close attention to both 
literary and intellectual affairs, it promoted creative writing, both prose and poetry, and 
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disseminated different intellectual trends by republishing articles from other Arabic-
language newspapers. Despite the political in-fighting over various issues, it never 
adopted an overtly critical stance towards any of the Libyan political parties. Nor did it 
espouse any particular political ideology that led it into direct conflict with any political 
group. It attempted to report in a balanced manner on the activities of all parties, and did 
not comment negatively on any other Libyan newspapers. 
4.3.4 Nationalist Newspapers in Tripolitania 
Nationalist newspapers published their articles and news in consultation with their 
editorial boards. The role of national newspapers in Tripoli was similar to that of their 
counterparts in Cyrenaica. The nationalist newspapers were published after obtaining 
permission from the BMA and played a major role in disseminating public interest 
stories. The Tripoli newspapers and their writers played a pivotal role in bridging the 
gap between Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The Tripoli-based newspapers played a significant 
role in raising the consciousness of Libyans and encouraging them to ignore the 
differences between the people of the regions of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. This 
establishes the BMA’s explicit policy concerning the press in Tripoli.  
Al-Akbar [the News] was the first nationalist newspaper to be published in Tripolitania 
following the cessation of hostilities in the region. Muhammad Almaizzi launched this 
two-page weekly newspaper in June 1947.745 Al-Akbar condemned the BMA on many 
occasions in articles such as the one entitled ‘How long will this take?’. The newspaper 
also exposed unacceptable behaviour by the British Director of Education in Tripoli, 
who was accused of being abusive to teachers of Arabic and ignoring letters sent to him 
in Arabic, on the grounds that he knew no Arabic and needed them to be translated into 
English. Al-Akbar regarded his attitude as an expression of disdain for Arab culture. It 
published an article to this effect, entitled ‘If you don’t respect the rules of our country, 
then you can leave’.746 In its sixth issue, the newspaper criticized Italians who showed 
contempt for Libyans,747 Al-Akbar following a similar attitude to that adopted by Al-
Watan in Benghazi.  
The British authorities banned Al-Akbar after its sixth issue because it did not follow the 
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agreed terms of the Publication Law; however, it was back in circulation by August 
1947, using less explicit forms of criticism. However, following publication of issue 19, 
it was banned once again for strongly criticising the BMA’s policies. It later returned 
due to the fact that the newspaper’s management sought help and in line with the 
BMA’s policy of freedom of the press it was allowed to resume publishing the 
newspaper on 26 July 1948. It explained that its absence had been due to a lack of 
financial support since it was not subsidised by the BMA.748  
In subsequent issues, the newspaper focused on the activities of various political groups 
in the province, in particular the movements of Idris Al-Sanusi and other key political 
figures, such as Bashir al-Sadawi and Omar Faek Shunaib.749 This is because these 
Libyan politicians’ movements, especially at the Arab level, were aimed at winning 
support for the Libyan case for independence through political and diplomatic means 
with a number of Arab countries. Therefore, the newspapers published the politicians’ 
movements via their pages, to make Libyans aware about these and to get support from 
local people. 
Analysis of articles in Al-Akbar suggests that this newspaper did not favour any political 
party or personality, focusing solely on establishing the cultural unity of those living in 
Libya to support the cause of national unity. The vast majority of the Libyan population 
were Muslim Arabs, bound together by the same culture and religion. Therefore, Al-
Akbar argues that although the people of Libya may represent different tribes, they form 
part of the same culture. Egypt and the Arab League also influenced Al-Akbar’s 
thinking, as it issued a warning accusing Libya of betraying its Islamic origins if it 
failed to apply shariah law. 
The close geographical and historical links between Egypt and Libya was the reason 
why the former was keen to sponsor an Islamic state. It can be argued that Al-Akbar was 
backed by either the Libyan Liberation Committee 750  or the Arab League. The 
newspaper shared a number of similarities with the goals and methods of the Libyan 
Liberation Committee and was launched in the same year that this organization was 
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formed. Further evidence can be found in its call for unity among the parties of 
Tripolitania. As with Tarablus Al-Gharb, Al-Akbar finally folded not for political 
reasons, but due to its financial problems. Elmaizzi stated that he had contacted all the 
political parties in the country in an effort to gain financial backing for the newspaper, 
but failed to receive any positive responses.751 
Muhammad Kanaba launched Al-Morsad [the observer] on 20 November 1950 with the 
slogan, ‘No more political parties’. An editorial explained the meaning of this slogan in 
the following manner:  
This newspaper belongs to al-ummah [the nation of Islam]. It is ours. We are 
confident that our generous people will give us their whole-hearted support to go 
ahead and carry out this project, which is our duty and the duty of every free 
Arab.  
The slogan ‘No more political parties’ is not just for general interest, but is the 
interest of the state. We are committed to being of general interest as our goal is 
to publish a weekly newspaper dealing with all aspects of social, economic, 
literary, academic and political life in this part of the world.  
Your newspaper—Al-Morsad —promises you that it will challenge any traitor 
who wants to degrade the dignity of the nation and break apart its sovereignty 
and independence.752 
The newspaper represented a remarkable turning point in the history of the Libyan press, 
as no previous Libyan newspaper had ever expressed this rejection of political 
expression in such plain speech. However, in reality, like a number of the political 
parties in Tripolitania, Al-Morsad opposed the way in which the Constituent Assembly 
had been formed. The reason for this was to express its opposition to the existence of 
foreign companies in Libya, considering this to be a form of economic colonization.  
The Tripoli-Egyptian Union Party launched Liwa Al-Huriya [banner of freedom] which 
was originally printed by the Magi printing press. Since the newspaper was hostile 
towards the BMA, serving as the mouthpiece of the Tripoli-Egyptian Union Party, the 
owner of the printing press refused to continue printing it, so it moved to another 
publisher known as the Barbiera brothers in Tripoli. The general ideology adopted by 
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the newspaper can be judged from a nationalist manifesto which it printed, entitled 
‘What are your views?’. This spelled out its point of view and its opposition to the 
undemocratic way that the Libyan government had been formed. It stated the following:  
Fellow citizens, the illegitimate Constituent Assembly formed by the British and 
the French was made only to steal your dreams and destroy your hopes and the 
hopes of all Islamic and Arab countries, and of all those who struggle for full 
independence and true sovereignty, not a mere façade.753 
This manifesto makes it clear that Liwa Al-Huriya opposed the federal government, 
which had been constituted by the Constituent Assembly, and also clearly connected 
Libya not only with the ummah but also more broadly with all oppressed nations. This 
aligned the newspaper with the Arab League’s policy to place Libya under Egyptian or 
Arab tutelage. Liwa Al-Huriya openly criticized the BMA on several occasions, one of 
its major criticisms being in relation to it allowing those members of the Jewish 
community who were migrating to Palestine to take industrial equipment with them 
from Libya. The newspaper considered this to be robbery from Libya’s already disabled 
industrial facilities.754  This suggests that there was a conflict between the approach 
adopted by Liwa Al-Huriya and the BMA. When the BMA supported the decision of the 
Constituent Assembly, this was openly opposed by the newspaper.  
In February 1951, Muhammad Zarim launched Shualat Al-Huriya [Beacon of Freedom] 
a nationalist newspaper that was to be published daily and to last for a year. It acted as 
the official mouthpiece of Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi in Tripolitania, 
representing its views and supporting the processes necessary to assist constitutional 
development in Libya.755 
The newspaper was published only for a short period, since its articles were hostile to 
the government. In issue 22, published on 23 July 1951, it criticised the attitude of the 
police towards citizens, and the government viewed this as a clear expression of 
opposition. The Editor-in-Chief was pressed to refute the content of the article; however, 
he resigned instead, considering that this censure was an insult against him personally 
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and against the newspaper.756 The most important characteristic of Shualat Al-Huriya 
was that it made passionate pleas for the unity of the country and was opposed to the 
creation of any form of a federal state in Libya. 757  According to Adrian Plet, 
representative of the UN in Libya, it was an opposition newspaper.758 
In August 1951, Al-Libye [Libya] appeared, published by Ali Muhammad Addib in 
Tripoli. This weekly four-page newspaper focused on news concerning international 
conflicts between the East and the West, which it viewed as opposing blocs; it also took 
a keen interest in social issues. Al-Libye showed pride in the Libyan citizen, its name 
symbolising the hope of achieving the goal of national unity under the right leadership. 
Its banner head carried an image of a knight on his horse, referring to the Libyan 
resistance against Italian colonialism, and this attitude was also adopted in its articles. 
Al-Libye was originally edited by Addib Abdessalam Bash Imam and, most remarkably, 
it opposed the creation of political parties in Tripoli, claiming that some of these 
invented conspiracies, exploited the people and worked against the interests of a unified 
Libya. It considered political gatherings to be a place for plotting and intrigue759 and 
argued that having multiple political parties was not in the national interests, as Libya 
had not yet secured its freedom. In addition, it claimed that some of the political parties 
were backed by Italian settlers who did not really support the cause of a united Libya. 
Furthermore, some of the political parties supported Egypt becoming custodian of Libya 
rather than Britain, an attitude which it judged to be against the spirit of nationalism.  
The newspaper also attacked the separatist tendencies adopted by Al-Istiqlal and 
Shualat Al-Huriya. Both these newspapers supported independence for Cyrenaica first, 
followed by independence for the whole of Libya, acting against the aspirations of one 
united Libya. Some Libyans did support the idea disseminated by the newspapers 
through news and articles about a united Libya. In addition, both these newspapers 
openly published articles about the separatist movement which Al-Libye denounced:  
What is this friction and war of words, the archaic tribal trends that are devoid of 
sense, the childish behaviour and the intense competition to break apart the unity 
of this young country and depict the independence of the country in a negative 
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light?760 
Al-Libye’s contents include coverage of political, social, economic, and literary issues. 
According to Louba, this newspaper played an important role during the BMA era and 
the period of independence, due to the topics that it covered as theses raised citizens’ 
consciousness concerning the need for unity and joint efforts to advance Libyan nation 
building.761 
The rise of newspapers numbers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica suggests that the BMA 
authorised those who had experience and skills to publish newspapers. Using their 
respective publications, the Libyan nationalists hammered home their point to the 
general population about the cause of a united Libya. At the same time, the newspapers 
brought the different communities closer to each other, in a common struggle for the 
unity of Libyans. Many of those who had suffered in exile for many years were 
journalists. They even wrote in violation of the code of conduct established in 
consultation with the BMA, however, they were determined to urge Libyans to unite 
behind the cause of independence.  
The press was the sole means of publishing intellectual property at that time in Libya. 
There were not enough means to publish books and that period of time coincided with 
the emergence of a group of critics and authors. These individuals were able to read 
Arabic literature and were aware of the different cultural trends as a result of their 
studies in Egypt or Syria, through their personal reading of books, either from modern 
or ancient literature, or through literary societies. Newspapers offered them a means to 
publish their literary efforts in poetry or prose inspired by what they read elsewhere.  
Journalism saw an evolution in its development at the level of content, with authors 
tackling new subject matter on political, social and literary matters. Political articles 
examined the consequences of the Italian withdrawal and also the nature of the 
relationship between Libya and Britain. Writers considered the promises made to Libya 
and what Italy’s intentions were towards its former colony, and informed readers about 
what was being said in diplomatic circles and at the international negotiations 
concerning Libya’s future. These articles also followed constitutional developments 
from the formation of constitutional council under the aegis of the United Nations until 
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the constitution was drafted, with writers clearly indicating their personal support or 
opposition to these developments based on their own political background. 
Saleh Boussir, for example, supported the efforts made by Idris Al-Sanusi762 in bringing 
the Libyan cause to the attention of the Arab League Council:  
The Libyan cause entered a new era when [Al-Sanusi] presented a memorandum 
to the Arab governments, explaining the requests of the Libyan people and the 
developments of internal tensions, and asking Arab governments to convene a 
forum to discuss the cause of Libya.763  
The writers of these political articles were clearly aware of all the latest developments in 
Libyan political thinking and they were circulated widely as a result of the efforts made 
by the national movements that had emerged in the country. 
While newspapers in Libya during the period 1943-1951 covered many social concerns, 
many articles focused on education in both government and non-government 
newspapers. These reflected the important role that education was seen as playing as the 
foundation of nation-building , as the examples discussed here show.  
Tarablus Al-Gharb highlighted the importance of education in nation building in many 
articles, urging Libyans to send their children to school, especially their daughters, and 
asking the BMA to send eligible students to attend university in Egypt or elsewhere.764 
Al-Fajr Al-Libye also constantly urged the British administration to send more Libyan 
students to pursue higher education abroad. 765  Writers of articles argued for the 
establishment of schools in every city and encouraged the population to improve their 
levels of literacy as the only way to develop the nation. They maintained that this was a 
more immediate concern than rebuilding the economy, since Western education and 
learning would fuel Libya’s advancement and renaissance. 766  Al-Libye encouraged 
every home to make learning become an activity that was much a part of everyday life 
as eating and drinking.767 Benghazi, the government newspaper, devoted a full page to 
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educational activities and to highlighting the benefits of knowledge for a nation that 
possessed little more than its own flag.768 
4.4 Conclusion 
The BMA respected the guidelines provided by the Colonial Office in London which 
allowed for the publication of newspapers, particularly for the purposes of developing 
communities. The BMA’s approach with regard to the press was similar to the approach 
they adopted towards education in Libya and reveals that the British acknowledged their 
commitments towards the Libyans and that this would probably take them ultimately to 
their desired destination of independence. 
Those Libyans who had previously contributed articles to the press in neighbouring 
countries raised the levels of consciousness in their fellow citizens at home and 
persuaded many exiles from Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan to return to Libya, as well as 
ensuring that printing machinery was brought in from neighbouring countries to 
strengthen the press.  
The evocative names of the newspapers that were founded during that period such as Al-
Watan [The homeland], Al-Istiqlal [Independence], Al-Taj [The Crown], Liwa Al-
Huriya [Banner of freedom], Al-Sarih [the truth], Al-Libye and Shualat Al-Huriya 
[Beacon of Freedom] capture the popular sentiments of the time in relation to Libya’s 
future.  
Nationalist newspapers such as Al-Watan and Al-Akbar started to highlight the 
importance of self-determination for Libya rather than promoting BMA policies. The 
nationalists were afraid that they would lose their chance of independence and that 
future generations would never forgive them. Such fears seem reasonable given the 
trauma that Italian rule still represented for many Libyans, denied opportunities to 
exercise their talents in so many fields. The BMA was determined to win the general 
support of the Libyan masses and also to train a Libyan elite to tackle the future 
challenges and threats that a newly established country would be likely to encounter. 
Thus when the BMA adopted a dual educational program, the daily papers became a 
popular mouthpiece speaking for the public interest, making it clear that this divisive 
policy would be rejected by the Libyans who demanded a single system of education. 
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Likewise, they petitioned the BMA to open more schools and ensure talented students 
were sent elsewhere for higher education. 
The main reason why the nationalist newspapers in Libya criticized the British 
administration was because they wanted accelerated reforms in the country prior to 
independence. It is clear that the press criticized the British administration in the 
immediate post-war period because they began to fear that the Italian regime had simply 
been replaced by a British administration. Al-Watan and Al-Akbar were heavily 
influenced by the tide of Arab nationalism, reflected in events in Egypt, and the creation 
of the Arab League. 769  These newspapers called repeatedly for the British 
administration to help Libyans to obtain their independence and when this was not 
forthcoming were quick to criticize.  
These newspapers provide a good example of the range of roles which the Libyan press 
played during the BMA years. Although its emphasis shifted over the course of its 
existence, it kept its readership informed about current affairs and events at the 
international, regional and local level, in particular the cultural and political activities of 
the provincial authorities. The press also played a crucial role in fostering increasingly 
strong nationalist sentiments and consciousness among the Libyans, in developing and 
consolidating the growing nationalist movement. It helped to mobilize public opinion 
about national demands for independence and the rule of the country by the Libyans 
themselves. Its success can be measured by the fact that when the United Nations 
mission visited Libya, the masses demanded their right to national unity and 
independence by organising demonstrations across the country to express their 
demands. It also offered a forum of debate for intellectuals and political commentators 
and their deliberations and multiple perspectives on constitutional matters. 
The press also demonstrated a keen interest in both literary and intellectual affairs, 
promoting new writing talent, creating national and provincial literature and cultures. It 
also disseminated new ideas from other Arab countries and helped to forge bonds of 
fraternity with other peoples in the outside world.  
Chapter Four discusses the social and cultural associations and institutions which 
flourished in Libya under the BMA, focusing on the various roles which they played 
and the extent to which the policies and attitudes of the British authorities fostered or 
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS IN 
LIBYA UNDER THE B M A 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the developments in the press in Libya in terms of 
quantity and quality in the short period under the BMA. It also explored how the press 
affected mass political opinion and mobilised public opinion about national demands for 
independence and the rule of the country by the Libyans themselves. This chapter 
focuses on the importance of social and cultural associations and other common interest 
groups770 during the same period. It explores the role they played in the formation of 
various types of public non-state activities.771 It can be argued that the formation of 
these associations and organisations in Libya was particularly important in terms of the 
role which they played in helping to create a nation from what had previously been 
disparate communities focused narrowly on tribal, sectarian or ethnic interests. 
According to Hann, this type of organisation can only exist when individuals and 
groups are free to form organisations that function independently of the state.772 
The main emphasis in this chapter is on the experiences and approaches adopted by the 
BMA that were intended to bring a degree of stability to Libyan society and that 
enabled voluntary organisations, associations and clubs to experience a previously 
unknown rate of popularity and to play an important role in the development of 
democracy.773 This analysis of the role of these associations, which were founded with 
non-political aims, including cultural associations, literary societies and sports clubs, 
will also explore the extent to which the experiences of the British administration 
gained elsewhere in the British Empire formed the basis of introducing democracy in 
the occupied territory. The chapter also explores the BMA’s policies towards these non-
political organisations and the extent to which these hindered or encouraged their 
growth within Libya and the degree to which these associations were actually free to act 
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is also discussed in detail.  
The chapter explores the role which different associations played in community 
development. The growth in interest in voluntary associations, including the aims and 
activities of several the most influential Libyan organisations which came to the fore 
during 1943-1951. It will also consider libraries and the role which they played in 
promoting social and cultural activities.  
5.2 Factors Affecting the Growth of Voluntary Associations 1943-
1951 
Following the social, cultural and political repression experienced under the Italian 
regime there was renewed interest in social and cultural activities under the BMA.774 
The British administration in Libya created an environment in which Libyans could 
practise the formation of associations and clubs, encouraging them to participate in 
community development. This shift followed the instructions of the Colonial Office in 
London and general British mandate policy. Numerous social and cultural associations, 
organisations and clubs were established in Libya during British rule, and this resulted 
in more Libyans being educated, establishing a more open cultural climate and 
developments on a number of social and cultural fronts. The BMA encouraged diverse 
types of associations and organisations so that increasing numbers of Libyans became 
involved in a wide range of activities focusing on culture, education and other fields.775 
This approach broadly satisfied the British values of creating voluntary organisations in 
territories under their administration and indirectly supporting these entities. 776  In 
general, these voluntary associations attracted local youth and community leaders to 
engage in social, cultural, and literary activities.  
The British strategy of encouraging the creation of associations formed part of the 
liberal approach which allows people to enter into free association and generates an 
obligation to respect others. Locke’s argument about liberalism has been well 
recognised, and it highlights the importance of such associations within a society, as this 
helps to build resistance to tyranny.777 The Libyans were made aware about associations 
in keeping with this liberal approach. Furthermore, the BMA offered moral support to 
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these associations which were intended to bring Libyans together so that they 
participated and interacted among themselves.  
A series of factors played a role in encouraging the Libyans to establish social and 
cultural organisations and engage in different types of cultural activities, since these 
were viewed by many as a reaffirmation of Libyan identity and by some as a precursor 
to the formation of political organisations and, ultimately, a tentative step towards 
independence. Firstly, the victory of the Allies in January 1943 was seen in Libya as the 
beginning of a new era of independence even though the country remained occupied 
territory under the BMA. Following the end of the conflict, many Libyans called for the 
need to establish cultural associations and sporting clubs which would allow them the 
chance to once more engage in a range of social activities that marked the end of 
hostilities and the BMA agreed. Consequently, Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar (the Omar 
Al-Mukhtar Association) was set up in Benghazi in 1943 and the Literary Circle in 
Tripoli re-established in July of the same year. This decision shows the difference in the 
approach adopted by BMA and that of their immediate predecessors. This development 
also encouraged the émigré community of Libyans in Egypt and elsewhere to return to 
their homeland from exile and take part in establishing these new activities.778 
At the same time, in the broader regional context, there were increasing demands by 
various Middle Eastern peoples for independence post-1943. The Syrians and Lebanese 
were given independence and the British rule in Transjordan also came to an end.779 
This was mainly as result of anti-British liberation movements that had emerged in 
Egypt and Sudan. The Egyptians called for an end to the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 
which had given rise to the British Military presence in Egypt. In addition, the Sudanese 
demanded the abrogation of the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian condominium, under which the 
British authorities effectively controlled Sudan. These calls for independence 
encouraged the Libyans, particularly those émigrés who had witnessed the changes in 
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neighbouring countries to consider creating their own social and political organisation 
as a first step towards demanding independence.780 
In addition, the British Prime Minister declared on 18 January 1945 that the 
governments of free countries or those that had been previously occupied by Axis 
powers would only be accepted if they were voted into power by their own people. This 
further encouraged the Libyans to voice their claims for independence,781 particularly 
following the Potsdam Conference (17 July-2 August 1945)782 that raised fears amongst 
Libyan nationalists about the future role which Italy might play in the country. Thus, 
requests were sent to the British authorities asking for permission to be granted for the 
establishment of political parties in Libya but this petition was rejected by then British 
Military Administrator, Brigadier T. R. Blackley, on the grounds that the war against 
Japan was still ongoing and that the local political situation could only be addressed 
once the future of the country had been decided. Hence some Libyans decided to start 
establishing political parties without waiting for prior permission, forming secret cells 
until the authorities finally granted them the right to participate openly in political 
activities.783 
Like many other colonised countries, Libya was also interested in the resolutions that 
had been issued by the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in October 1944, which had called 
for the establishment of a post-war international organisation which would succeed the 
League of Nations. Government representatives from China, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom and the United States met to formulate the foundations and principles 
upon which this new international body (the United Nations) would be based. It was 
intended to preserve international peace and security worldwide, develop friendly 
relationships between nations, achieve international cooperation and resolve 
international disputes using peaceful means. 784  The Libyans hoped that such an 
organisation would also address issues of sovereignty and, potentially, their future 
demands for independence which would be likely to spark a furious debate due to the 
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local, regional, and international implications of such a development.  
All these events served to heighten nationalist sentiments among Libyans. This was 
reflected in the massive growth of interest in creating both political organisations as 
well as cultural associations of many different types right across the social spectrum. 
This served the need to re-assert a cultural identity suppressed for many decades. The 
establishment of these groups was to have a major influence on cultural development in 
Libyan society under British rule. 
An insight into the British government’s attitude towards the growth of such 
organisations in Libya is provided by a report written by Dr A. E. Morgan of the British 
Council following his visit to Cyrenaica in April 1950. Morgan argued that political and 
social growth in any society cannot be sustained unless it is managed and disciplined 
through education, which provides the energy needed to encourage growth. It binds the 
individuals who together form a community or a society to remain within the 
boundaries of prescribed rules and laws.785  
He commented on the growing influence of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar and called for 
measures to be quickly implemented to develop Libya and reduce social and political 
instability there. He also expressed concerns about “signs of interest in social issues, 
tinged with discontent”, amongst young male thinkers, and stressed that the growth of 
such associations should not be ignored. If given the right material, he advised, “they 
could become a positive asset to the country as a means of channelling the intellectual 
and moral energies of the keener young men”.786 
Morgan argued that these organisational and associational leaders would presumably 
emerge as the future leaders of an independent Libya but lacked discipline since they 
were mostly not well-educated. The discipline required of successful leaders when 
communicating with one another and representing their national interests, Morgan 
argued, can only be achieved through education and training. Therefore, and his report 
strongly advocated the need for adult education in Libya, recommending that British 
approaches in this field might help the leaders of these groups.787  
It is evident that the British administration was interested in developing organisations 
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like the Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar, which offered cultural and intellectual activities and 
encouraged volunteering, seeing these as a means of assisting the development of 
Libyan society, both culturally and politically. 
5.3 Emergence of Social and Cultural Associations in 
Cyrenaica 
There is some debate about the exact date that the Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar788 was 
established, with dates ranging from 1940 to 1942, but all agree it was originally 
founded in Egypt by the Libyan émigrés. Libyan soldiers who had fought in the British 
army in Egypt also sympathised with this organisation. However, it is important to 
recognise that Libyan students who were studying in Egypt played a pivotal role within 
the association, initially in educational activities and later in Libyan politics. 
In 1943, after finishing their studies in Egypt, three young Libyans named Ali Fallag, 
Mahmoud Mahlouf and Muhammad Al-Mutardi returned to Cyrenaica. 789  They 
established a voluntary association in Benghazi790 which would be involved in activities 
related to culture, sports and other areas.791 Sheikh Khalil Al-Koafe,792 the qadi [judge] 
in Benghazi at that time, was elected president by the other members.793 The elected 
committee agreed to name the organisation Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar for Sports and 
Cultural Activities. Its aims were: 
(1) To raise levels of national consciousness among Libyans;(2) To carry 
out sporting and cultural activities that would enliven the lives of Libyan 
troops, who were working side-by-side with the British army in World 
War Two; (3) To support refugees and war victims to gain official 
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recognition of their status.794 
The founding members themselves did not appear to have participated in the 
Association’s activities since most of the work was carried out by young volunteers, 
supervised by the three committees. This suggests that their election to executive posts 
was merely a cover for the real purpose of the Association. Al-Sanusi accepted a role as 
Honorary President, but was not in favour of political activities as he makes clear in a 
letter which he sent to the Association’s Executive Committee: 
I would wish to see branches of this association established throughout 
our country, but on condition that its activities are limited to fulfilling the 
previously stated aims including cultural activities, sport, co-operation, 
economics, financial assistance, sharing of knowledge, moral guidance, 
improving the lot of common people, lectures, and steering clear of any 
political activities.795 
Al-Sanusi was well aware that if political activities were adopted by Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar, this would not be keeping with his own philosophy and might impact on the 
political stance that he planned to adopt during his exile in Egypt. He considered the 
Arab countries, including Egypt, to be weak and unable to protect themselves from the 
threats posed by Western colonisation and he was seeking a strong ally. This was an 
issue that influenced his relationship with the Association as its founders had strong 
hopes for the Arab League, which at that time was still in its infancy.796 Jam’iyat Omar 
al-Mukhtar was registered as a cultural and sporting club in 1943 under the provisions 
made by the BMA, its specific objectives being:  
 Spreading cultural knowledge through educational classes, carrying out literacy 
campaigns, and publishing newspapers and magazines.797 
 Offering sports activities through establishing clubs, sports facilities, and 
competitions to support Libyan youth fellowship through competitions and 
sporting activities.798 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar was warned by the BMA about its political activities in 1944 
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because it began criticising the BMA as a form of colonialism. Furthermore, there was 
widespread discontent within Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar in 1945 due to the BMA’s 
attitude to introducing reforms as evidence of its support for political action.799 The 
resignation of Mustapha Bin Ameer from his post as the BMA’s Inspector of Education 
to become President of the Association in 1946 only served to aggravate the situation.800 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar filed a memorandum, dated 22 December 1946, to the 
Committee of Inquiry tasked by the British Ministry of War with accessing Cyrenaica’s 
state of preparedness for independence. 801  This memorandum, published in the 
newspaper Barqa Al-Riyadiyya [Cyrenaica Sports], criticised the BMA’s record of 
neglect with respect to economic and social conditions in Cyrenaica and made clear 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar’s lack of faith in the British regime. Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar concluded by demanding that the BMA address these problems. 802  The 
members of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar wanted the reforms which had been promised 
and agreed to be quickly implemented and felt they could not remain silent when in 
their opinion the BMA had failed to keep its word.  
Barqa Al-Riyadiyya was originally published in Benghazi by Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar 
but then changed its name to Al-Watan marking the Association’s transformation into 
an openly political organisation, against Al-Sanusi’s express wishes. The publication of 
Al-Watan was to be taken over by Mustafa bin Ameer, with Mohammed Alsabry as 
Editor-in-Chief. In the issue of Al-Watan published on 7 January 1947 the Association 
publicly declared itself to be a political organisation. Following the failure of the unity 
talks between Tripoli and Cyrenaica in January 1947, the Central Committee issued a 
statement on 24 January 1947 blaming this on the Cyrenaican delegation, openly 
accusing it of jeopardising the possibility of a Libyan nation.803 When Al-Jabha Al-
Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya (the Cyrenaica National Front), published its manifesto 
calling for an independent Cyrenaica led by al-Sanusi, the Association declared that this 
ignored both what the Tripolitanian parties and the Arab people as a whole (ummah) 
had endorsed (specifically mentioning the Arab League), rejecting the manifesto as an 
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absurd anomaly.804 
Al-Sanusi sent a memorandum to the Arab League, explaining the principles of Libyan 
unity and his confidence in the Arab League805 while the Central Committee of Jam’iyat 
Omar al-Mukhtar continued its efforts to further the cause of a united independent 
Libya. 806  However, on 21 November 1947, Al-Sanusi ordered the dissolution of 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar due to its political activities.807 The Central Committee of 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar duly received a letter signed by Al-Sanusi on 12 December 
1947, declaring its dissolution in order to comply with the aforementioned order. The 
members of the society disagreed with this decision and declared their intention to 
continue with their social, cultural and sporting activities, to which the BMA agreed on 
14 June 1948. Activities including football and boxing were to continue as were some 
other cultural clubs and night school teaching.808 
In 1949, members of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar travelled to participate in the wave of 
demonstrations which swept across Tripolitania in protest at the Bevin-Sforza Plan.809 
When this was rejected, the Association organised a conference of young people at their 
Cyrenaica headquarters, inviting delegates from Tripolitania to attend. The conference 
decided to inform the Permanent Secretary of the British Foreign Office on behalf of al-
Sanusi that Libya would refuse to abide by any decision made by the United Nations 
that ran counter to its wishes for independence. At the same time, the conference 
welcomed the support of any country backing this decision, and was prepared to form 
an alliance with any of their forces to defend this position.810 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar also opposed the independence of Cyrenaica by mounting a 
noisy demonstration at which Mustafa bin Ameer declared: 
Here is Cyrenaica which falls under the tutelage of Britain as actually 
stated in the Plan because our acceptance of the independence of 
Cyrenaica means acquiescing to British tutelage under the banner of 
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independence; so Tripoli and its sister Fezzan have been left to their 
inevitable fate; and Libyan unity has been broken by Libyan hands.811 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar saw Cyrenaica’s independence as an empty gesture, which 
effectively played along with the Bevin-Sforza Plan. The Association made its position 
on Libyan unity clear, but was ready to support Al-Sanusi’s idea to become leader of a 
unified Libya because Cyrenaicans saw him as their leader and thought it was a political 
necessity. Most Cyrenaican people wanted to avoid the division of the country and this 
approach eventually brought about independence but only on condition that every 
political group accepted Al-Sanusi as leader of the whole of Libya. 
When the details of devolution were published, the Central Committee of the 
Association held several meetings to review its position, then wrote a memorandum 
protesting that this limited the powers of the Cyrenaican government and gave more 
power to the British, sending copies to the BMA representative, Al-Sanusi and the 
Council of Ministers of Cyrenaica and Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya.812 
The BMA administrator responded that the memorandum would be forwarded to the 
British Cabinet. The response of the Prime Minister of Britain included a promise to 
reduce the powers of the British after a discussion at the Council of Ministers. In also 
added that many of the articles of the Constitution would be amended. Moreover, the 
powers given to the British representative were temporary and would end after the 
future of Libya had been decided by a declaration of independence.813 The fact that the 
Central Committee of the Association received a response signified implicit recognition 
by the authorities, whether national or British, of the Association’s political status, even 
though Al-Sanusi had repeatedly cautioned it against entering into politics.814 Both the 
Cyrenaican government and the BMA were well aware of the status this Association 
enjoyed, especially in urban areas.815 
Item 21 of the Associations Law, which was enacted in January 1950, stated that no 
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organisation could adopt the name of any person, living or deceased. 816  Therefore 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar was formally disbanded and divided up into several different 
sections. In accordance with this Law, the Association was renamed as Jam’iya Al-
Wataniyya and concentrated on political activities. The National Sports Association and 
the National Cultural Association were set up as separate bodies whilst a new 
organisation which catered for cultural and sporting activities was established called Al-
Nadi Alhli [National Club] with Mohammed Bashir Almagrabe as its president.817 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar started its activities in Benghazi by making arrangements to 
increase its scope by organizing a broader range of activities. A committee was tasked 
with setting up a club for young men, Nadi al-ummal [Working Men’s Association],818 
to provide lectures. All activities were to be carried out by volunteers, whether cultural 
activities or participation in forums to discuss politics and the importance of creating 
associations.819 
With regards to education, the Association took the initiative to improve levels of 
literacy, feeling this should be their responsibility towards their fellow Libyans and 
something for which they should not have to be dependent on the BMA. Though the 
Association had limited scope to develop educational programmes, their long-term aim 
was to raise educational levels among citizens so that eventually there would be enough 
skilled local workers to replace foreigners.820 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar commenced its activities by offering classes run by 
volunteer teachers to students in the summer 1943, and from the original cohort of 25, 
seven were successful in obtaining certificates to work as clerks and secretaries in 
administration. 821  These voluntary classes were intended to improve the levels of 
students who already had elementary education, hoping to create local administrative 
staff.822 Another initiative targeting illiteracy led to the opening of the Working Men’s 
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Institute in 1944, duly approved by the BMA which was in line with the British model 
of education designed to reduce illiteracy among workers. Two other schools that tried 
to improve illiteracy also became well-known. Two Benghazi merchants, the brothers 
Mohammed Alaalem and Saeed Hayo, concerned about the plight of young street 
cleaners who had never attended school, asked Sheikh Abdul Salam Al-Fatouri if he 
would accept these young men as students in his small mosque. In addition, Ali Al-
Laglag, Director of the Municipality at that time, also introduced two new classes in the 
Municipality’s School. Mustafa Ameer and Ali Algerbi taught classes for the Working 
Men’s Association and supplied books and stationery whilst the philanthropic 
merchants met all other costs. When student numbers rose to 85, further classes were 
added.823 
Labourers joining the Institute were encouraged to attend class daily after working 
hours, to develop good study habits, and were taught as mature students. This allowed 
them to complete the usual syllabus in only three months, following which certificates 
were awarded to those who had passed at a ceremony. Successful candidates were also 
given a week’s leave on condition they re-joined the study group, which all of them did, 
setting a good example to their fellow students. Student numbers rose to 200 for the 
second session, financial contributions to the Institute increased, and volunteer teacher 
numbers also grew.824 
One of the distinguishing features of the Working Men’s Institute is that it had both 
high level and popular support. Its supervisor occupied a high administrative post in the 
government, meaning that this Institute and others like it aimed at mature students were 
integrated into the mainstream system.825 The fact that they followed the same school 
curriculum allowed studies to be accredited, thus increasing students’ chances of 
gaining civil service posts, especially after completing secondary-level studies. There is 
evidence that students from the Working Men’s Institute improved their educational 
standards, in some cases sufficiently to go on to higher education.826 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar also ran a weekly programme of lectures on various topics, 
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usually culturally related, with many scholars, men of letters and students participating. 
The inaugural lecture was given by the Association’s Treasurer, Khalil Algalal, on the 
topic of ‘Sport and its benefits’.827 The list of topics delivered in the lectures gives a 
good indication of popular interests during the period, and suggests that Libyan 
intellectuals followed contemporary debates, particularly with regard to religious issues. 
Following a strategy agreed in consultation with the British government in London, the 
BMA gave priority to education and reassured the people of the occupied territory that 
they were developing schools as well as a curriculum suitable for the Libyans. The 
administration gave workers the opportunity to learn and encouraged them by offering 
them night school tutorials by the organisations that were responsible for such schools. 
The ultimate goal of the BMA was community development and to increase Libyans’ 
awareness about democratisation, which would not have been possible without 
education. The fact that the BMA adopted a community development approach is 
validated by Mukhtar Alasoud.828 
These educational programmes provided opportunities for the illiterate, the working 
class and young people in Cyrenaica and Tripoli who took advantage and increased 
their knowledge about community development. They also helped to restore their pride 
in Libyan culture and traditions. The intellectuals availed themselves of the chance to 
contribute towards community development through this collective approach. These 
activities succeeded in bringing individuals together to create communities of interest.  
The sporting activities were also a mandate of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar. Mahadi Al-
Matrady became President of the Sports Association established in 1943 with 
responsibility for the Football Association and Athletics Referees Association.829 As 
noted in the previous chapter, the sports section of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar also 
published its own sports-orientated newspaper, Barqa Al-Riyadiyya, from 1943 to 
1947.830 
In 1945 the Association built a stadium in Al-Barqa district, financed with an interest-
free loan from one of the Association’s members, which was eventually re-paid in full. 
This greatly increased sporting activities, providing sporting enthusiasts with practice 
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facilities.831 The end-of-season report by the Football Association for 1947-48 suggests 
a full programme: 
(1) Away match at Darnah to build fellowship amongst Libyan youth; (2) 
Competition for the Omar Al-Mukhtar Memorial Cup between Libyan 
teams and five German teams; (3) Friendly matches with German Team 
and the Egyptian team; (4) Eight matches against the British Army 
Team.832 
 
Football was seen as a healthy activity and also allowed young men to meet other 
groups from the locality, elsewhere in Libya or from abroad, providing valuable 
opportunities to share experiences and ideas. Given the BMA’s enthusiasm for sport and 
the participation of British Army teams, sporting activities were no doubt viewed as a 
positive development.833 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar was instrumental in giving rise to or shaping the landscape 
of political associations in Libya during the BMA era. This section explores these 
organisations and provides an insight into how they developed in the province of 
Cyrenaica as a result of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar’s influence in the BMA era. 
One such organisation was the Al-Kishaf Association (The Libyan Boy Scouts’ 
Association), which was established by Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar’s Central Committee 
under the umbrella of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar in October 1947.834 On 18 March 
1948, some teachers within Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar established a section dealing 
with cultural activities under the supervision of a Scouts’ Cultural Committee, electing 
Mahmoud Al-Shibani as secretary. Cultural activities had already been taking place, and 
included a weekly programme of talks on the scouting movement, its responsibilities 
and form of organisation, together with an English language course.835 The Cultural 
Committee was particularly active in promoting the growth of this programme, 
specifically promoting the involvement of school students.836 The first talk under the 
new arrangement was given by committee member, Muhammad Hami, on the subject of 
‘Scouting as a means to improve your cultural knowledge’. He also announced that the 
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next talk, to be delivered by the Secretary of the Cultural Committee, would be entitled 
‘Self-discipline in the scouting life’.837 
The establishment of a number of scout troops facilitated various sporting activities and 
competitions. The Association also exploited the existence of scout troops to help 
prepare acts of resistance against British policies and later against the Cyrenaica 
government. A German scout leader claimed that he accompanied several scout troops 
to Ajdabiya where they started unarmed military training. He said that Bashir Al-
Magrihi had also delivered a talk encouraging townsfolk to prepare themselves for 
overthrowing the British and fighting for Libyan unity. He estimated the number of 
scouts on the trip to be 150, 80 of whom were 14-year-olds.838 
There is documentary evidence that suggests that the British authorities were suspicious 
about such ‘scouting’ trips and forms of training, which they believed to be a cover for 
military exercises, employed as a screen to hide an anti-British movement and 
Sanusiyyah influence. The Prime Minister of Cyrenaica, Omar Basha Al-Khalid, 
ordered the prohibition of scouting troops, although they re-surfaced unofficially in 
1951.839 Al-Sanusi justified the disbanding of the Scouts’ Association as a preparatory 
step to legalising this organisation, while the Central Committee of Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar took this to be evidence of a dispute between the Scouts’ Association and the 
Prime Minister who wanted to rename the organisation as the Cyrenaican Scouts’ 
Association, a change which the Association’s Secretary rejected.840 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar was initially broadly active in Cyrenaica, though much like 
with the Scout’s Association, its off-shoots in the province did not thrive. Although 
initially a number of branches of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar opened in various parts of 
the province of Cyrenaica, these were not long-lived and soon only one branch, the 
Darnah branch, remained active. It was founded in July 1943, and originally was simply 
a club where young people gathered to share their concerns about their own future and 
that of the country.841 In mid-May 1944, the branch decided to start organizing activities, 
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and its members formed four committees: the Executive Committee; a Board of 
Directors, a Committee for Cultural Activities, and a Committee for Sporting 
Activities.842 
In mid-December 1945, the youth of Darnah called for the formal establishment of an 
Association intended to facilitate a range of activities relating to sport, culture and 
politics. 843  The Board of Directors approved, on condition that it would abide by 
existing legislation. A small number of members 844  were active regarding literary 
matters, and they organised and catalogued the Association’s book collection, and set 
up a lending library, together with establishing classes to combat illiteracy.845 
The main achievement of the Darnah branch was the organisation of a Literary Circle, 
which began on 9 November 1947. They put together a programme of speakers and 
organised literary debates, devising guidelines for how the debates were to run and 
appointing a panel to judge the winner.846 The lectures at the Circle were mostly on 
social and political topics. One given by Al-Mabrook Al-Theebany, entitled ‘Sin in our 
Society’, argued that both good and evil are natural instincts in man and need to be 
refined by sound education and knowledge. He also noted that loose morals had evolved 
in Libya due to colonialism, and therefore needed to be eliminated by a growth in 
numbers of educational institutions together with advice and guidance.847 Under the title 
‘Drinking Water’, Al-Mahdi Al-Mirghany, the health inspector for Darnah, delivered a 
lecture looking at different sources of drinking water and how they become 
contaminated and the methods of preventing the diseases which they can cause.848 
The political lectures delivered at the Literary Circle included one by Mubarak Al-
Shibani on ‘Libyan unity’ which argued that there were geographical, historical, racial 
and religious reasons for maintaining that unity. He concluded that though Libyans were 
passing through difficult times, “this made it all the more important to unite and ignore 
those aspects that can divide us, for we all are the sons of this land”.849 
Thus, the Literary Circle served as a means of raising cultural awareness and a forum 
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for public debate on social problems and political issues. It also provided an opportunity 
for intellectuals to showcase their talents by participating in lectures and literary debates, 
which required research and in-depth knowledge and helped these scholars to enlarge 
and enhance their cognitive capacities.850 
Although its activities were limited, the Committee for Cultural Activities worked hard 
to raise people’s cultural knowledge. In addition to its Literary Circle, the branch put on 
plays based on the belief that theatre would act as a form of moral education, addressing 
many of society’s ills in the popular style of a comedy or tragedy. During 1944, the 
Theatre of Darnah presented two plays by the writer Mahmud Timor: Suhad and The 
Drifting Melody, and two others by Ahmed Shawki: Al-Abbassiha and The Princess of 
Andalusia. 851  Both these playwrights were from Egypt, showing the extent of the 
cultural communication between the two countries and suggesting that these introduced 
new literary trends into Libya.852 
The areas of interests covered by these organisations performed a diverse range of 
social and educational functions. Literary and debating societies helped to sharpen the 
intellects of the scholars and literati. Lecture programmes helped to disseminate both 
useful information as well as radical new ideas including Pan-Arabism. Poetry recitals 
and musical performances showcased new talent and inspired the audience with pro-
independence verse and song. The role of theatre was particularly noteworthy. Zarem 
has argued that this element clearly reflects the influence of the Syrian Arabs who had 
used various forms of social mobilisation including theatre as a means of conveying 
complex ideas from the prevailing intellectual trends in a simple form to a mass 
public.853 Pan-Arabist ideas were clearly visible in the plays which those leading the 
groups chose to be performed. Dramatic productions served to awaken the spirit of 
patriotism and fuel it in Libyans through the revival of Arab heritage.  
Although the interest in literary and dramatic activities was a prominent feature of the 
Darnah Branch, it did not neglect the political aspect of its work, especially after the 
Secretary of the Association presented a proposal in May 1946 for the creation of a 
Committee of Political Activities in the branch, which split the membership. Ahmed 
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Fouad Shunaib opposed the proposal on the grounds that this would hinder the work of 
Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya as well as creating too many political bodies 
and giving foreigners a chance to achieve their goals by exploiting the differences 
between these organisations.854 However, vocal support came from Abdu Al-Kareem 
Elias and Ibrahim Usta Omar, who asserted that: 
The presence of a Political Committee in the branch would serve to 
support Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya, and help with its nation-
building agenda, maintaining that the existence of different groups would 
not damage public interests as long as they all had the same aim.855 
Usta Omar illustrated his point by mentioning the number of parties in Egypt, all of 
which sought national independence and differed only in their means of achieving that 
goal. He stated: 
If only one organization worked on behalf of the people, that would turn 
into a dictatorship and that organization or party would be completely 
authoritarian and would probably, quite unintentionally, cause its own 
downfall. A range of organisations means different styles and produces 
different ideas. And when ideas challenge each other, facts emerge. We 
seek to enter the democratic era based on freedom of assembly, of 
expression and of opinion. We will not thrive in that era unless we have a 
diverse range of organisations for, within them, there will be room for 
ideas and people to develop and struggle to defend the rights of the 
people.856 
These two viewpoints clearly represented two opposing philosophies. The first may be 
referred to as the traditional tendency which rejects diversity of political opinion, on the 
grounds that this could damage the interests of the country, and so focuses all efforts on 
one single organisation in order to reach the desired end. This was the tendency 
followed by Al-Sanusi. The second viewpoint believes that one single party leads to 
dictatorship and thus considers political action to be a right enjoyed by all. 
Following the UN resolution on independence for Libya, Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar 
organised a celebration to which it invited all the Benghazi city’s citizens, taking 
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advantage of this to influence public opinion by delivering enthusiastic speeches about 
Libyan unity.857 The branch also leafleted everyone present with a flyer calling for all 
three territories of Libya to be united under the rule of Al-Sanusi as Emir and declaring 
that it did not recognise the Cyrenaica government. Thus, Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar 
was at the forefront of political developments in Darnah, and stepped up its 
campaigning by delivering speeches in mosques, public squares and theatres.858 The 
purpose of opening branch offices under the auspices of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar was 
to try to gain popular support from Libyans, which was difficult given that the 
population was scattered over such a large geographical area. Often it was not possible 
for Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar to arrange lectures in isolated locations due to a lack of 
resources. Therefore, branches were opened to try to help those interested in cultural 
and political activism. The BMA neither overly opposed nor promoted the activities of 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar in Darnah, but did want it to be legally constituted. 
5.4 The Emergence of Social and Cultural Associations in 
Tripolitania 
This section investigates the emergence of social and cultural associations in the 
province of Tripolitania under the BMA and how these voluntary organisations came to 
influence the nature of the unified Libyan state that emerged after independence. 
The origins of the first Libyan cultural association lie in the territory of Tripolitania, 
going back to 1920, when the Al-Nadi Al-Adabi (Tripoli Literary Circle) was founded 
by Ahmed al-Faqih Hassan whose programme included presentations on Arabic 
literature and Islamic culture.859 However, in 1922, the Italian government closed it 
down when the new Fascist authorities introduced strict new legislation. After Italian 
rule, the nationalists began demanding the re-opening of this club, especially since large 
numbers of the émigrés who had been living in self-imposed exile in Egypt were 
returning home and insisted on being allowed to participate in cultural activities.860 
Faced with such insistent demand, the BMA could not see any reason to prevent the re-
opening of the club and agreed to this on 29 June 1943, on condition that its activities 
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should be restricted to ones of a cultural nature.861 The club was restored under the 
presidency of Ahmed al-Faqih Hassan862 and its first five members.863 
Given that the BMA had specified the areas in which the organisation could be involved 
it was named Al-Nadi Al-Adabi to make it clear that its activities were to be restricted 
to literary affairs and that its members should not be concerned with politics. Such a 
description also precluded discussion of social or economic issues in Libya, since these 
areas were considered to be the remit solely of the BMA, pending a decision on the 
future of Tripolitania. Despite the restrictions that this imposed on their activities, the 
nationalists saw this as the first step on the way to asserting their Libyan identity. 
Therefore, to mark the occasion, they arranged a celebration, described by the 
newspaper Tarablus Al-Gharb as impressive, with many speeches about the Libyan 
homeland and in praise of the struggle against fascism and in support of Britain which 
called for democracy.864 
This demonstrated the fact that the Libyans felt reassured following the Italians’ exit 
from their country. They were filled with excitement and felt that they had been 
liberated from Italian colonialism, considering this the first step towards full 
independence. The Society appealed to local citizens, asking them to support their cause, 
since under the new era of democracy and justice for all they would be allowed to take 
part in the Society’s activities. It was stressed that the Society was a legally constituted 
Libyan organisation, which sought to provide a forum for public discussion and 
encourage charitable giving to the poor and the needy. The Society’s appeal can be 
interpreted as being intended to remind Libyans to give their support to the demands for 
a free country. The nationalists were pinning their hopes on the BMA, and the initially 
positive tenor of their discourse suggests that relations between the Society and the 
government administration were originally cordial.  
The Society had two distinct goals, the first of which was bringing culture to the local 
population, and the second, performing charitable works to help those in need. This 
gave the Society a means of circumventing the restrictions that the BMA had tried to 
impose on it, declaring itself to be a centre of cultural enlightenment, as well as acting 
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as a charitable organisation. Some members 865  took part in charitable work and 
collected donations.866 In order to convince the British Intelligence Service that it was 
indeed a Literary Circle, it offered a library containing a large number of books in 
subjects of literary, scientific and social interest, as well as a range of Arabic 
manuscripts concerning literature and Islamic teachings.867 
Al-Nadi Al-Adabi started its cultural activities with a series of lectures calling for the 
need to raise the cultural knowledge of ordinary people. In October 1943, Abdullah 
Shareef gave a lecture on the importance of education, arguing that human beings were 
naturally inquisitive and curious, and that ignorance was therefore the result of corrupt 
societies. To ward off its dangers, more schools needed to be established and organised 
on modern principles.868  The Literary Circle was also interested in the question of 
women’s education and called on educated men and writers to give their views on this. 
Discussion on this issue also reflected two opposing tendencies, with the progressives 
supporting women’s education and the conservatives opposing this.869 In his lecture 
delivered at Al-Nadi Al-Adabi Hall on December 27 1946, Khalifa Al-Zintanee stressed 
the urgent need for educational volunteers to help usher in a new era in the country, by 
bringing education to ordinary people, and for the authorities to back this initiative.870 
Many of the lectures addressed the history of Tripoli before the Italian Occupation, such 
as the one by Sheikh Muhammad Al-Misrati entitled ‘Tripoli Before and After the 
Occupation’. He lectured on social and literary developments in Tripoli in the pre-
Occupation era, quoting from poetry depicting Tripoli’s struggle against Italy.871 
These lectures were the key cultural activity of the Tripoli Al-Nadi Al-Adabi and were 
reported in Tarablus El-Gharb from the very outset. There are two clear themes 
amongst the lectures: firstly, to emphasise Tripoli’s glorious history and, secondly, to 
call for efforts to improve educational standards in the country, with speakers 
highlighting the current shortcomings in knowledge and calling for schools to be 
                                                 
865 Bashir Al-Zakalay, Al-Hadi Al-Mashearki, Salim Nadeer, Muhammad Al-Mayit, Fadel Benzekri, 
Muhammad Al-Mahjoob, Ali Bin Othman, Abdul-Hameed bin Al-Ameen, Muhammad Al-Najjar and 
Muhammad Mahfooz. 
866 Tarablus Al-Gharb, 6 July 1943. 
867 Tarablus Al-Gharb, 3 August 1943. 
868 Tarablus Al-Gharb, 21 October 1943. 
869 Tarablus Al-Gharb, 8 January 1945. 
870 Tarablus Al-Gharb, 3 January 1947. 
871 M. S. Ibn Musa, ‘The Literary Press in Libya from 1869 to 1 September 1969’, unpublished Masters 
Dissertation, Tripoli University (1982), p.223. 
170 
 
opened, volunteers to help with the task of educating the masses and education for 
women. Members of Al-Nadi Al-Adabi particularly enjoyed this lecture programme.872 
The lecture programme created a focus where Libyan intellectuals, of diverse tendencies 
and interests, could meet to exchange views and make plans for charitable work. Not 
surprisingly, the secret nucleus of the first political party in Tripolitania was formed in 
this Literary Circle. As a result of these meetings, the Committee for Cultural Activities 
at Al-Nadi Al-Adabi decided to establish a night school to combat illiteracy and 
improve the educational standards of those who had already obtained some elementary 
schooling. Students at this school, which began on 20 December 1943, were divided 
into two groups. For those who had never received any previous education, lessons 
included basic reading and writing, arithmetic, and religious instruction.873 When the 
Libyan Youth Association was later established under the aegis of the Literary Circle 
with Milad Al-Zakalay as President, it opened another night school to teach those who 
were illiterate in October 1948.874 
The Literary Circle’s activities expanded to include scouting, sports and theatre, in 
addition to its established literary and educational activities. It also engaged in political 
activities, as demonstrated when the troop of Tripoli Scouts joined Al-Nadi Al-Adabi in 
August 23 1943. This organisation had been formed spontaneously in Tripoli by a group 
of boys who imitated military tactics in their play until a group of them decided to meet 
every evening to train together. 875  The Literary Circle also encouraged nationalist 
organisations to take part in physical activity and to compete seriously with foreign 
opponents. For that purpose, it organised a sports event at its headquarters on 19 
September 1943, when the Literary Circle’s Secretary, Ahmed Al-Hadairi, gave a talk 
about the importance of sport in communities. The gathering also included bouts of 
wrestling and boxing.876 Thanks to the support for local footballers, several succeeded 
in playing for teams outside Libya.877 
With regards to drama, the Literary Circle did not have its own theatre group until 1946, 
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and all the plays performed in its theatre were productions by existing drama groups, 
such as Nadi al-Ummal [the Working Men’s Association] Theatre Group and the 
Osman Taheem Theatre Group. When Ahmed Qaniah became President of the Literary 
Circle on 16 January 1946, he formed a theatre group that presented its first work 
entitled: Blessed but ungrateful. Later that year, it performed You are the reason for 
everything in late June 1946, and then put on a production every month until 1948, 
when the Youth League revived its weekly gatherings alongside the other activities 
which included plays, performances of local songs and literary debates.878 
Al-Nadi Al-Adabi became the centre of activities for Tripoli’s youth who took full 
advantage of the activities which it offered, and through its volunteer efforts, the 
Literary Circle became involved in community development in the region. Its activities 
were thus in accordance with the British policy of community development. Hence it is 
argued that Al-Nadi Al-Adabi took part fully in developing links between different 
groups of people, helping them to understand the needs and necessities of a nation. It 
also shows that the creation of such associations and clubs can help in developing 
communities.  
The political activities of Al-Nadi Al-Adabi were restricted to organizing occasional 
gatherings. These were usually held to commemorate noteworthy events, such as the 
one held on 22 March 1949 on the fourth anniversary of the formation of the Arab 
League,879 or to honour a national figure, such as the celebration held in honour of 
Bashir al-Sadawi on 7 February 1949.880 In addition, their hall was used by all the 
political bodies in Tripoli as a meeting place to discuss new developments in the 
struggle for independence. When the Tripolitanian delegation was sent to the United 
Nations, the leaders of all political organisations and the Presidents of all nationalist 
Associations and institutions met in Al-Nadi Al-Adabi’s hall, together with intellectuals, 
dignitaries and important merchants, and drafted a telegram to the Secretary General of 
the United Nations in support of this delegation.881 
As with so many of the cultural organisations at that time, Al-Nadi Al-Adabi had a clear 
mandate from the BMA to facilitate only social and cultural activities, but some of its 
members were political activists and many of its activities indirectly supported the 
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nationalist cause. Its main focus, however, was on social/cultural activities and on 
helping to educate Tripoli’s society at all levels, providing basic literacy training to 
those who had never had the opportunity to experience education, whilst at the same 
time helping to form an intellectual elite.  
The labour force in Libya would be at the centre of another organisation that emerged in 
the BMA era. The Nadi al-Ummal (Tripoli Working Men’s Association) was founded in 
1944 by Mustafa Al-Ijailee along with three others who went on to become its board 
members; its aim being to revive theatrical activity in Tripoli.882 The first production 
prepared by the Association’s theatre group after the conflict in Libya had ended was a 
play entitled Back to School, which encouraged young people to think about returning 
to study after what had been a difficult time. The group also put on The Betrayal of 
Mates, a morality play which ended with a local song performed by Ahmed Gunnabah. 
The British authorities carefully monitored the activities of this club to ensure it had no 
opportunities to engage in activities that might generate a resistance movement.  
The Nadi al-Ummal also announced a forthcoming performance entitled The Burden of 
Wealth by Sheikh Abd Al-Raziq Al-Basheeti. 883  However, the British authorities 
banned the show on the grounds that it was intended to expose the workings of the 
capitalist system and was viewed as a call to Islamic socialism.884 
In 1944, Nadi al-Ummal organised a memorial service marking four years after the 
death of those who had fought against the Italian occupation.885 The Association also 
held several events to welcome back those refugees who had played a role in the 
national movement in exile; one of these being in honour of Bashir al-Sadawi. Although 
there is little information concerning the sporting activities of this club, there is an 
indication that these also formed part of its general programme. An invitation card from 
the President of the Working Men’s Association to Ahmed Gunnabah indicates that 
Nadi al-Ummal also used to organise boxing matches. 886 
The plays put on by Nadi al-Ummal were seen not only by Association members but 
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also a wider audience since the theatre group performed at the venues of other 
organisations whenever it had the opportunity. The Betrayal of Mates, for example, was 
also performed at the Literary Circle on 22 April 1945.887 In 1946-1947, Nadi al-Ummal 
organised a theatre season that included performances of several historical dramas, 
including The New Day of Judgement, The People of the Cave, Saladin and Rustum’s 
Nights.888 In general, the Association encouraged individuals to work together through 
these drama activities. This again suggests that the BMA motivated Libyans to take part 
in such activities as a means of community development in the occupied territory.  
Although Al-Nadi al-Ummal was originally established as an organisation for sports, 
theatre and music, it became more interested in other cultural activities, when Ahmed 
Al-Hadairi assumed the Presidency in January 1946. The Committee organised a 
weekly programme of lectures, which dealt with topics of interest to working men 
including the importance of industry, training, and education for nations and individuals. 
Some of these lectures also touched on current social problems and proposed ways of 
tackling these. Sheikh Ahmed Rasim Bakir was one of those who showed interest in 
contributing to these talks at the club.889 
Al-Nadi al-Ummal contributed on a wider scale to reducing illiteracy in the region by 
starting a basic course in writing skills for all those wishing to be involved in April 
1945.890  In June 1947, a volunteer-run evening school was started, which included 
several courses including basic literacy classes and more advanced literary studies for 
teachers.891 The courses to combat illiteracy and to raise the educational standards of 
workers continued as long as the Association remained. Along with these activities, it 
also demonstrated its loyalty to the nationalist cause in celebrations that were used to 
deliver pro-independence speeches.  
Al-Nadi al-Ummal provided a broad range of leisure time activities including sports, 
music and theatre, but it used these recreational activities to achieve its goal. Its 
particular focus on dramatic productions stemmed from its belief that theatre was the 
easiest and fastest means of educating large numbers of mostly illiterate workers about 
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key social and political issues in terms which they could easily grasp. However, due to a 
combination of factors the Association was forced to abandon these activities in 1947. 
Firstly, an outbreak of political unrest led the BMA to clamp down on its activities. 
Secondly, as increasing numbers of younger members of the Association found full-
time employment, they no longer had sufficient free time for participating in theatrical 
rehearsals. Thirdly, the growing diversity of groups within the Association 
encompassing political, sporting, literary and dramatic activities led to constant 
wrangling among their members and eventually led to it being disbanded.892 
In addition to theatrical activities, sport provided a key framework in which political 
ideas and organisation spread in BMA era Libya. Al-Nadi al-Etihad (Tripoli United 
Football Club)893 was founded in 1944 under the aegis of Al-Nadi al-Naza [Renaissance 
Club], which had been founded on 15 November 1943 in Tripoli and focused its 
activities around football.894 Initially, they played many friendly matches against other 
teams, including, for instance, one composed of soldiers and officers from the BMA, 
several from the local Italian community and others made up of German prisoners of 
war.895 
Al-Nadi al-Etihad was the first Libyan team to play abroad, travelling to Tunisia in 
1948 to play against Espérance and Hammam Al-Aanif. The first Libyan player to turn 
professional, Ali Al-Zakoozee, was also from Al-Nadi al-Etihad, and joined a Tunisian 
club; the first Libyan player to play professionally in the European stadiums was 
Mahmood Bizaio who joined the French team AS Cannes in 1960.896 Al-Nadi al-Etihad 
followed a similar path to other organisations at the time, and in addition to football, it 
also set up a drama group and a programme of educational talks. The former became 
very popular and performed a number of different plays during the period 1944 to 1950, 
some by Arab writers, others translations from foreign writers.897 
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On 10 November 1950, Al-Nadi al-Etihad organised a reception for Bashir al-Sadawi 
and the theatre group put on two plays: Libya in 1950 and One Hour with Omar Al-
Mukhtar, Martyr. Pro-independence songs written by Ahmad Gunnabah and Ali 
Siddiqui Abdul-Qadir were also performed. 898  Like other organisations, the Club 
organised a programme of cultural talks. Two talks from the 1947 programme were 
‘Islam’, by Abdul Rahman Dukduk899 and Suleiman Tomeeah’s lecture entitled ‘The 
Special Status of Women’. Tomeeah called for women to be emancipated and educated 
so that they could play their role in building a better community. He explained the 
progress being made in the Levant concerning women’s education and the obstacles to 
be faced despite the fact that Islamic teachings stipulate that women should be 
educated.900 
Although Al-Nadi al-Etihad worked indirectly on political mobilisation through its 
activities, it also announced its political activity explicitly before the Commission of 
Inquiry by the Allied powers, and worked on influencing Libyan public opinion to 
welcome this Commission. It also welcomed the members of the Libyan Liberation 
Committee, sent for the same purpose, and organised a reception in their honour. It 
opened its doors to the local people so that they could listen to the directives from the 
political leaders regarding the views which were to be voiced to the Commission.901 In 
addition, the Club received a delegation from Fezzan who wanted to reveal the 
underhand dealings of the French Administration before the Commission of Inquiry 
without fear of reprisals from that administration.902 
Thus, the various aspects of Al-Nadi al-Etihad, including its recreational activities and 
political lectures, helped it to fulfil its role in serving the Libyan cause by helping to 
influence public opinion. 903  Sports activities encouraged school boys to organise a 
friendly football match against Al-Nadi al-Etihad in order to collect funds for a three-
week training camp on the coast. Some 230 boys went on to participate during the 
summer holidays.904 
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These young boys were motivated through their involvement in sports activities. Others 
were attracted to the social activities in addition to the healthy environment. The sports 
clubs were the centres of positive activities that encouraged physical and mental 
exercises, and above all, self-discipline and behaviour management. This was viewed as 
the first step on the path which might take the youth towards democratic attitudes and 
moral growth.905 
The activities of the larger organisations discussed above are well-documented through 
surviving documents and press coverage. However, there were many other smaller clubs, 
such as Al-Nadi al-Arabi [The Arab Club] whose members met officially at the Friday 
market hall for the first time in 1945. The leading newspaper Tarablus El-Gharb 
reported the existence of this organisation and its activities before 1945.906 It organised 
courses for learning English907 and encouraged celebrations to mark religious festivals 
to help strengthen Arab-Islamic identity. It also established a theatre group in October 
1948, which performed its first play, entitled The Spirit of Jihad in Andalusia, on the 
stage provided by Al-Nadi al-Arabi.908 
Some other organisations were also founded in Misrata in early 1945,909 in Gharyan in 
January 1949,910 in Al-Zawiah911 and other parts of Tripolitania. However, these were 
somewhat different since they did not only involve Libyans. Notably, a member of the 
BMA in the Gharyan area, contributed to founding the Staff Club there. A Major 
Dayton was also in charge of the Social Club in Misrata.912 Their recreational activities 
still played a role in raising awareness of the need to improve educational standards in 
Libya and allowed for locals to meet individuals from elsewhere.913 Mukhtar Alasoud 
illustrated the vital and prominent role played by the many different kinds of 
associations during the BMA era in Libya when he stated: 
They were just as important as the Press, and they matched each other, 
step for step, in the march of progress of cultural life in Libya. With their 
lectures and poetry recitals, cultural activities and sporting events, they 
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helped in the difficult process of bringing to birth a generation of writers 
from that period.914 
Those Libyans who were already aware of their rights became involved in the 
associations with the aim of assisting others and many other Libyans who lacked this 
knowledge and ability made the most of the opportunities on offer. One of the BMA’s 
key aims in supporting the creation of these organisations was to develop relationships 
with the Libyans, reflected in the fact that some BMA representatives also took part in 
these organisations. This indicates that the BMA was sincere and honest in 
implementing its agenda in the occupied territory to train Libyans in different capacities, 
preparing them for independence. 
Some of the public libraries in Tripoli were new, such as the Library of the British 
Information Bureau and the governmental library, known as Bayt Al-Marfa [House of 
Knowledge], whilst others were older such as Al-Awqaf [Library of Endowments] 
which housed items and collections donated by individuals. The BMA took sincere, 
practical steps to provide opportunities for all the people in Benghazi and Tripoli to 
access written materials. 915  This was partly related to their policy of community 
development. A collection of English books on different topics was added to Al-
Awqaf’s existing collections of Arabic and Italian stock in August 1950.916 Furthermore, 
at the same time, an attempt was also made to encourage more teachers and students to 
become members of the library by reducing the annual subscription from 400 to 100917 
Military Authority Lira.918 The BMA took these measures, especially the fee reduction, 
to encourage the dissemination of knowledge to the Libyans so that in future they would 
be able to play a major role in running their own country.  
5.5 Libraries and Bookshops 
The BMA strengthened Libya’s libraries, by importing books from the nearest countries 
such as Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan. This was part of the British policy implemented on 
Libyan soil to help communities to develop their reading and writing skills. More 
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broadly, libraries provided opportunities for the residents of the occupied territory who 
took advantage of the opportunity to increase their knowledge. Whilst the various 
cultural organisations formed a means of improving cultural standards in Libya, the role 
played by libraries in disseminating culture and learning should not be ignored, even 
though their direct benefits were restricted to the educated classes. During the period 
under study, there were two types of facilities in Tripoli and Benghazi, namely public 
libraries and private bookshops.919 
On 23 October 1947, the archive of historical documents was transferred from the 
Assaria al-Hamra [Red Castle] Museum Library in Tripoli920 to new premises, and the 
BMA instituted a system which required anyone wishing to consult historical 
documents to submit a request to the Department of Antiquities at the BMA, which 
authorised access to the archives.921 The library of Mustafa Qadri Maroof, founded in 
1917, was also relocated. It contained Italian reference material and all the books from 
the other libraries in Tripoli were added to its holdings.922 In early May 1947, the BMA 
opened a new public library in Tripoli which contained books and manuscripts on many 
different subjects, especially law, economics, history and literature. These books, in 
addition to 25,000 manuscripts, 923  had been amassed from many different sources 
including the State Library. This library also included light reading such as daily 
newspapers, magazines, reports and bulletins.924 
Similar to the facilities in Tripoli, Cyrenaica’s Al-Awqaf library included a large part of 
the collection which had been housed in the zawiya at Jaghbub, and in 1949, this library 
was estimated to have some 3,000 manuscripts, mostly related to jurisprudence and 
subjects of historical interest. 925  The British Reference Library was also opened in 
Benghazi and was staffed by John Ride and two Libyans. The British authorities hoped 
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it would become a competitor to the library run by Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar.926 
There were also two private bookshops in Tripoli. Al-Fenadiqh was situated in the old 
city in Tripoli and had been established during the Italian era by Sheikh Muhammad 
Mukhtar Sharif Al-Deen who imported newspapers, art magazines and books from 
Egypt.927 This bookshop continued to serve scholars, elementary and secondary school 
students throughout the era of the BMA, providing them with literature, text books and 
modern science books. It also used to send books elsewhere in Libya when requests 
were received from patrons.928 The second bookshop was located in Al-Mosheer Market 
in front of the Ahmed Pasha College.929 
Bookshops, owned by Al-Boukiaisis in Benghazi, continued to provide books to the 
people while there were three bookshops in Ajdabiya, Al-Marj and Misrata, all three 
having opened during the BMA era. The BMA encouraged and motivated Libyans to 
import books from Egypt. Most of the publications on offer came from Egyptian 
publishers, such as Bayt Al-Marfa Al-Arabi [The Arab House of Knowledge], Dar Al-
Hilal [Crescent Publishing House], Dar Al-Rissalah [The Message Publishing House], 
Al-Bayt Al-Masr [The Egyptian Publishing House] and Dar Akbar Al-Youm [Today’s 
News Publishing House]. This bookshop was able to supply books on customer request 
from most of the publishing houses throughout the Arab world.930 
5.6 Conclusion 
The British were very clear to develop communities through various activities. The 
BMA helped the Libyans to establish many types of social organisations. Although 
many Libyans had not been given the opportunity to learn to read and write by previous 
regimes, they were able to engage in educational activities as were working men, thanks 
to the involvement of volunteers from a range of organisations established during the 
BMA era. This alternative form of provision in the form of community development did 
not threaten normal education in the occupied territory.  
The BMA helped Libyans to get involved in various recreational and educational 
activities, partly to dispel the idea that this would be simply another form of occupation, 
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partly to offer entertainment to a population emerging from conflict and in dire need of 
distraction. It also realised that in order to create civil society in the regions, there was a 
need to develop associations run by citizens themselves. However, the BMA was surely 
also under no illusions about the potential which such associations might have for 
developing into political organisations, as reflected in its attempts to regulate and 
maintain strict surveillance of the activities that were permitted.  
It is clear that citizen volunteer organisations were at the heart of both cultural and 
political activism in Libya. In the case of an organisation such as Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar, the thin line between cultural and political activism was quite clearly crossed 
on multiple occasions. Eventually it disappeared altogether. The Association’s political 
aspirations became clear following its active interventions in the run-up to Libya’s 
eventual independence, when it became the anti-separatist mouthpiece for Libyans in 
Tripoli and elsewhere in favour of the unification of an independent Libya. This 
scenario eventually transformed the Association into the Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya Party, 
the political party which many of its leading members had undoubtedly been working 
towards since its inception, as discussed in the following chapter.  
Volunteers were either politically inspired or were simply bored bourgeois young, 
seeking distraction in the association activities. However, educational initiatives, such 
as the Working Men’s Institute, seem to reflect the levels of solidarity and desire for 
self-improvement in Libyan society. Different sectors of society participated to achieve 
the goal of educating working men, merchants and the wealthy providing financial 
backing, whilst volunteer teachers and administrators used their time and abilities to 
raise the low levels of literacy that existed in the country after decades of neglect.931 
With their rich associational life, voluntary organisations contributed to the formation 
and practice of democratic attitudes among citizens. People learned to develop tolerance, 
mutual trust and the ability to find compromise through democratic procedures. Libyans 
took advantage of this opportunity to create numerous organisations, some short-lived, 
some still in existence to this day. The level of cultural renaissance that followed could 
be considered extraordinary, by any standards. On the one hand, this led to the creation 
of civil society within Libya, with individuals coming together not to make money or 
purely to gain political power, but because they cared passionately about their own 
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future and that of their fellow Libyans. On another level, these associations succeeded 
in raising the consciousness of nationhood amongst previously disparate individuals and 
groups in Libya. They also helped to plant and disseminate the seeds of new political 
and ideological ideas which were to lead to the development of parties in Libya during 
the period under study. It is worth mentioning that, some of these voluntary socio-
cultural groups transformed into political parties, as will be examined in the following 
chapter. The next chapter will explore the formation of political parties in Libya under 
the BMA, to see how these parties were created and their reaction to the BMA and their 
role in uniting Libya as an independent country. 
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6. CHAPTER SIX: POLITICAL PARTIES IN LIBYA DURING 
BRITISH RULE 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the cultural and voluntary organisations which 
emerged in Libya during the British Military Administration (BMA), and detailed how 
these associations, clubs and societies helped to create a thriving cultural scene during 
that era. Since political life and its different philosophies, theories and systems of 
governance are intrinsically connected with culture,932 including its spiritual dimension, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the same period also witnessed an equally important 
development in political associations that were concerned with raising the profile of the 
nationalist agenda. 933  Moreover, since cultural organisations have always been 
associated with the formation of a particular type of political authority as part of civil 
society it was perhaps to be expected that such groups would also go on to demand 
political and administrative reforms. As noted in the previous chapter, in time, many 
cultural associations went on to become political parties.934 
During this period of Libyan history, it is very difficult to distinguish between civil and 
political organisations because the same or related organisations were active in both 
sectors. Most of the younger members of these groups had originally met like-minded 
individuals through recreational activities, such as literary circles and sports clubs, and 
there, they had also developed their new social and political views. It could be argued 
that the distinguishing feature of the political associations was that they considered their 
primary concern to be the issue of achieving Libyan independence.  
The war and its aftermath did not affect the moral strength of Libyans; on the contrary, 
the conflict revitalised their activities, opened their minds and increased their awareness 
of important realities that provided the basis for voluntary associations that became 
political organisations. Soon they began demanding the right to establish political 
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parties.935 However, over the course of time, differences emerged between the leaders of 
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, leading to the formation of two distinct lines of thought. 
The Cyrenaica group backed the idea of becoming an Emirate under the rule of Idris Al-
Sanusi, while the Tripolitania group, which ultimately wanted independence, sought 
unity amongst all Libyans before dealing with the question of the form of governance of 
the country.  
This chapter begins by examining the development of the key political parties during 
British rule, a crucial period which ended when the struggle for independence finally 
bore fruit. It will consider developments in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania separately as, 
prior to the creation of a united independent Libya, political parties with distinctive 
identities and agendas emerged in both these provinces, although some went on to gain 
support beyond their original regional territory. It details how newly formed political 
parties, which had originally emphasised their differences by appealing to issues such as 
tribal and regional loyalties, class consciousness and pan-Arabist sentiments, then 
attempted to work together for the sake of a greater cause: a united independent Libya. 
During this period of concerted effort to focus on this common goal these disparate 
groups helped to forge a nation; as defined by Alter, that is: “a cultural-political 
community that has become conscious of its coherence, unity, and particular 
interests”.936 
6.2  Political Organisations under the BMA (1943-1951) 
Once the Italians had been defeated in Libya in 1943, the political consciousness of the 
Libyans started to become evident again as they began to demand the right to participate 
in the administration of the country and to form their own political parties. In 1943, a 
meeting was convened in which all those recognised as community leaders in Tripoli 
participated and they agreed to put forward to the BMA the demand to establish 
political parties. Initially, the BMA responded that such activities needed to be deferred 
until all conflict considered part of the on-going Second World War was successfully 
concluded.937 However, the British military administrator, Brigadier George Davy, gave 
hope to the Tripoli leaders that their demands to form political parties and their 
aspirations to be an independent nation would be addressed in due course. In the five 
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years of occupation until 1946, the administrative arrangement in Cyrenaica remained 
of a provisional nature, due to The Hague Convention which “tied our [i.e. British] 
hands”938, and partly because of the substantial capital expenditure involved as the 
future of the territory remained undecided. The prolonged lack of progress evident in 
the administration gave the more politically minded Arabs reason to criticise the British 
and they hoped to extract an advance commitment from the authorities in relation to 
achieving independence. 939  Some political parties already existed, having been 
established either by groups formed during the Italian occupation or by Libyan émigrés 
in other countries during their years in exile. The Libyan émigrés in Egypt took the 
advantage whilst there to learn about organising political parties and raise their political 
consciousness under the patronage of British rule. This was possible as the British 
government policy allowed them free reign to pursue their political aspirations. The 
return of these exiled leaders who had taken an active part in the political activities of 
neighbouring Arab countries together with the greater freedom they enjoyed under 
British administration, prompted them to resume their political activities.940 A spirit of 
nationalism had been partly awakened by the events of the Second World War, whilst a 
new desire for self-determination formed part of a larger wave of political 
consciousness that swept North Africa following the conflict. Those Libyans with 
aspirations for independence saw the creation of political organisations together with 
the use of different modes of communication941 as a means to motivate the masses and 
lobby for the transfer of political authority from foreign rulers, allowing them to control 
their own destiny as a nation.942 
The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, General H.R. Alexander informed the War 
Office in London about these demands by telegram and was reminded that Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica should be treated equally. Despite this, the BMA dealt with the two 
regions differently. 943  Since the people of Cyrenaica were allowed to establish 
organisations, unlike those of Tripolitania, this differential treatment prompted the 
Libyans to send petitions to remind the BMA that under Italian rule, the two regions had 
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been considered as a single entity.944 Community leaders demonstrated in Tripoli 1943 
against what they saw as a form of discrimination which pressurised the BMA into 
allowing Al-Nadi al-Adabi to re-open.945 
This forced the BMA to visit Cyrenaica and accept Idris al-Sanusi as the only leader 
who could unify the two provinces. However, there was still some opposition in 
Tripolitania to his leadership. 946  Those who agreed with his leadership made their 
feelings known in writing to the BMA, demanding that Libya should be under British 
tutelage not that of the Italians. However, the nationalists also protested that those who 
had asked for British tutelage did not represent the majority opinion of the people of 
Tripoli.947 The British were aware that differences among the Tripoli leaders were not 
new, dating back to the 1920s, and that a well-known figure in Tripolitania, Ramadan 
Al-Swahili, had been killed as a result of tribal disputes in 1930.948 They also thought 
that it was unlikely that one leader would emerge in Tripolitania as was the case for 
Cyrenaica where Idris Al-Sanusi was already being recognised as the key political 
figure in late 1942. 949  The separation of Libya into three provinces (Cyrenaica, 
Tripolitania and Fezzan) after WW2, the latter administered by the French, had 
significant effects on the political unity of the country.  
Unlike the case in Cyrenaica, there were disagreements amongst the Tripolitanian 
leaders.950 The British government was aware that it needed to make a declaration on its 
policy concerning the future of Libya; otherwise, it was expected that the BMA 
administration would have to deal with local trouble, which was not anti-British as such, 
but rather sought to put pressure on Britain to clarify the future of the territory.951 The 
people of Cyrenaica wanted Idris al-Sanusi as their Emir952 and in order to satisfy his 
people, al-Sanusi pushed the British government into granting Cyrenaica 
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independence. 953  He later accused the BMA of relying on ex-Fascists and taking 
insufficient steps to prepare the country for self-government.954 Moreover, in a report 
dated 2 July 1945, on future policy in Cyrenaica, it was recommended that the British 
government should take the decision to recognise Al-Sanusi as Emir of Cyrenaica955 and 
an advisory council was established in the province.956 
However, when the Arab League was being formed Al-Sanusi sent to the British 
Resident Minister of State and on February 20 1945 he requested the British 
Government to “determine the future of our (i.e. the Libyans’) country and that this 
should be complete independence.”957 Al-Sanusi believed that this action lay within the 
power of the British government and its power alone. He also asked the British 
government to help the Libyans join the League of Arab Unity.958 However, the British 
government was not able to determine the future of Libya in accordance with the wishes 
of its leaders, as expressed in the letters of Al-Sanusi to Mr R.G. Casey, and grant then 
independence because of the ‘juridical status’959 of the occupied enemy territory, its 
future could only be decided by the allied powers at the Peace Conference. In addition, 
the British government could not agree whether any delegation purporting to represent 
Tripolitania or Cyrenaica should take part in the discussions on Arab unity. Thus, it was 
not possible for Libya (or even only Cyrenaica) to join the League of the Arab States.960 
On September 6, 1946, Cumming and Anderson met in Paris with the foreign secretary 
and high-ranking policymakers, including Pierson J. Dixon, the private secretary to 
Bevin, and Oliver C. Harvey, Deputy Undersecretary of State. The agenda for the 
meeting on general policy was set by Bevin and included the need to incorporate more 
Arabs into the Libyan BMA and the importance of maintaining separate administration 
for the two territories in Libya. Bevin’s view was that establishing an advisory council 
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in Cyrenaica was not contrary to international law, and a tight budget should not dictate 
policy in such an important area. For Bevin, the methods that were used at that time 
appeared to be a treasury rather than a political concern. Security and strategy were also 
relevant factors.961  
In August 1946, Al-Sanusi declared that if Libya had to be placed under trusteeship, 
Britain would not be a suitable country to undertake this task. The BMA was anxious to 
postpone any major decisions concerning Libya’s future for a year and during that time, 
it planned to prepare the Libyans for self-government. This would allow Britain to 
present this as a fait accompli to the other members of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 
Al-Sanusi, however, suggested that this length of time would only serve to aggravate 
the situation and would not benefit British interests.962 
The British government unilaterally decided the future of the Libyans by offering their 
official support for Al-Sanusi becoming Emir of Cyrenaica and potentially the Libyan 
national leader, but failed to take into consideration the views of those representing the 
other political parties in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. This attitude created doubts about 
the motives of the British, particularly among the Tripolitanian political parties, and 
hence they organised a demonstration, demanding the right to establish political parties. 
It is also important to note that the BMA had not only accepted Al-Sanusi but had failed 
to bring the Tripolitanian organisations which already existed into the main stream of 
national politics. It is possible that they saw the differences in aims of the political 
parties of Tripoli as a potential problem. Nonetheless, representatives of the major 
parties visited Cyrenaica and started negotiations which later paved the way for the 
development of political parties in both regions, and resulted in Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica eventually agreeing to unification.  
6.3 The Formation of Political activities in Cyrenaica 
This section begins by examining the key political organisations which emerged during 
this period in the Cyrenaica region, the origins of most of which can be traced to 
cultural associations, literary circles and sports clubs. 
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Some members of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar were vehemently opposed to the BMA 
and to its supporters among the older politicians. 963  Others took a more moderate 
position vis-à-vis the BMA, on the grounds that Libya still faced a period of uncertainty 
and was not in a position to adopt a hostile attitude towards the British. Since these 
positions were judged to be irreconcilable, in July 1945 those who felt that Britain still 
had a valuable role to play decided to form a splinter group which was dubbed the 
Rabitat al-Shabab and was led initially by Munir Babaa with Saad Jihani as General 
Secretary.964 
In the same month, another organisation, Etihad Al-Ummal [the Union of Workers] 
joined the Rabitat al-Shabab, and they jointly founded the Workers’ Union Club. The 
club’s president was Rajab Al-Nayhoum, whilst Abd Rabbo Al-Ghannay acted as his 
deputy; the post of Secretary was assigned to Abdul-Hafez Ibn Saod.965 The working 
men’s section of the Association was mainly made up of Benghazi labourers, together 
with some young people belonging to other sectors, as well as some former Libyan 
army officers.966 Another branch of Rabitat al-Shabab was founded in 1946 in Al-Marj. 
Its committee was formed by Muhammad Sharif as President and Abdul-Hamid Bin 
Halim as his deputy. Al-Salihin Qamati took on the role of Treasurer, whilst Tahir Al-
Megrisi agreed to act as Secretary.967 
The Al-Marj branch of the Rabitat al-Shabab was viewed as a rival organisation to 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar and published the Al-Istiqlal [Independence] newspaper with 
Editor-in-Chief Awad Zagbub. This branch of the Association also organised Arabic 
classes and put on didactic plays. Anyone wishing to become a member was allowed to 
do so, there being no conditions regarding age limits.968 
A further split occurred in Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar on 14 July 1946, when a group of 
sports enthusiasts left to establish a sports club under the aegis of the Rabitat al-Shabab, 
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headed by Muhammad al-Sanusi Al-Bijoo. They were involved in activities such as a 
Football Club and a Boxing Association.969 This club organised educational, literary and 
recreational activities, but internal differences among its members led to problems. As a 
result, the Workers’ Union Club which had been affiliated to the Rabitat al-Shabab 
since 1948 began to lose members and was forced to ask the workers to join the 
Working Men’s Institute if they were interested in literacy classes.970 In the same year, 
the original members of Rabitat al-Shabab established a Veterans’ Association based in 
Al-Marj city which was intended to collate information about and remember fallen 
comrades, both resistance fighters and those who had fought in the Second World 
War.971 This association adopted the same stance as the Rabitat al-Shabab, maintaining 
friendly relations with the British.972 
Due to disagreements amongst the founder members, its activities and role gradually 
declined until June 1949, when it re-appeared on the political stage as being pro-
Cyrenaica government.973 By 1949 it constituted itself legally as a political party and 
delivered a memorandum to the Cyrenaica Advisory Board on 30 May 1950, containing 
three demands. Firstly, it called for the unity of Libya based on the natural borders of its 
federated territories, and on condition that this union would be hereditary under the Al-
Sanusi emirate. Secondly, it insisted on the declaration of a united and fully independent 
Libya in early 1952. Thirdly, it demanded indemnity reparations for Cyrenaica, as a 
result of what had occurred during the military operations which had taken place on its 
soil.974 
The Rabitat al-Shabab in Darnah, which had formerly been part of Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar there, produced a virtually identical memorandum which was signed by its 
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President, Muhammad Al-Fayed, and its Secretary Fawzi Bader, along with 75 other 
members. The level of animosity between the Rabitat al-Shabab and Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar can be seen in the description by the former Association’s Secretary of the 
celebration held in Darnah in December 1949, organised by their rival association for 
the members of the Cyrenaica delegation who were carrying the United Nations’ 
resolution regarding Libyan independence. He described the occasion thus: 
The Association organized a big celebration to which it invited most of 
the residents of this city who are angry about this situation and 
mistaken in their views. It is very clear that we are at the forefront of 
those. 
It is a pity that, in general, those who gave speeches 975  so badly 
exploited this opportunity and the presence of the public. They did not 
organize the gathering solely for the delegation, but to be able to openly 
challenge the government in the capital and to indirectly challenge 
those who support it.976 
The Rabitat al-Shabab’s declaration of its principles in the memorandum submitted to 
the Advisory Board and its opposition to the political activities of Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar illustrate that it was greatly influenced by the political positions adopted by 
both Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya and Al-Mutamar Al-Watani (National 
Congress) in the territory of Cyrenaica. 
Another organisation, Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya (The Cyrenaica National 
Front) was formed in June 1946 following the imposition of a ban on the Conference of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs977 for discussing the Libya issue and as a result of the 
sudden return of Idris Al-Sanusi to Egypt, after claiming he had decided to settle in 
Cyrenaica. These events raised suspicions among the leaders of the Saady tribe978 who 
met to elect members to form a Cyrenaica Defence Committee. The Committee issued a 
statement which made three key demands. Firstly, it asked for the right to independence 
and the establishment of a constitutional government to be acknowledged by the British; 
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secondly, it demanded that the Sanusi Emirate to be headed by Al-Sanusi should be 
recognised; and finally, it insisted that Libyans should be involved in the administration 
of their own country.979 
On 9 August 1946, Idris Al-Sanusi ordered that the Committee membership was to be 
expanded beyond the Saady tribes and was to include elected members of the Mrabten 
and other tribes. 980  Eventually the Committee membership, made up of elected 
representatives from various tribes, reached 75 and it was dubbed Al-Jabha Al-
Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya.981 In the same month, Al-Rida Al-Sanusi (the nephew of 
Al-Sanusi) was elected as President of Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya. It was 
also decided at a meeting of this association held on 17 September 1946 that 
membership would be withdrawn from anyone in the organisation if it was proved that 
he had connections to any political body outside Libya. The members were committed 
to providing full reports to the President concerning their districts and their areas. It was 
also decided that the leader of Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya should demand 
that the administrator of the BMA pay close attention to the current state of the country, 
especially with regards to the impact of unemployment.982 
When Britain decided in September 1946 to appoint a Committee of Inquiry983 to visit 
Cyrenaica as a prelude to independence, 984  Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya 
submitted a memorandum to the British Commander-in-Chief (Middle East) on 30 
November 1946, calling for the recognition of the Sanusi Emirate and allowing the 
establishment of a national government to administer the country as a prelude to 
independence.985 At the same time, the Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya issued a 
statement to the Cyrenaican people that said: 
Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya finally called men from 
Benghazi to a meeting during which they decided unanimously to alert 
the Administration to the need to deal with the aftermath of the war. 
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They delegated the Cyrenaica Front to work on the major issues of the 
country politically and administratively under the auspices of Prince 
Muhammad Idris and the formation of a national constitutional 
government to manage the affairs of the country.986 
Thus, Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya, which styled itself as the representative 
of the Cyrenaican people, officially announced its policy on the independence of 
Cyrenaica before joining the unity movement with Tripolitania.987 It considered that 
Tripolitania was still threatened by Italian influence because of colonial conflicts of 
interest. 988  Meanwhile, some members of Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya 
started to show separatist tendencies formed as a result of the events surrounding 
Libya’s entry in the Second World War on the side of Britain and the Allies.989 The 
signs of that policy were evident in the negotiations on unity held between delegations 
from Tripolitania990 and Cyrenaica on 18 January 1947, at which the Al-Jabha Al-
Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya accepted the demands made by the Tripolitanian delegation.  
The demands were, firstly, that the entity to be known as Libya should follow the 
natural borders that were in place before WW2, and that any attempt to divide this 
territory should be rejected. Secondly, there was to be full independence for all Libyan 
territories. Thirdly, Idris Al-Sanusi was to be supported as King of Libya by a 
parliamentary democratic constitutional government. It also asked for the establishment 
of a joint body to unify the efforts related to the interests of the homeland under his 
supervision. Its final demand was that both sides should demonstrate their commitment 
to working together to achieve these principles and to defend them, including by 
rejecting any situation that was not in accordance with them. The Cyrenaica delegation 
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insisted on the addition of the word ‘unconditionally’ to the third demand. It also added 
a further clause: “If this is not possible, what can be salvaged should be salvaged and 
means sought to solve outstanding issues”. 991  Thus, Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-
Barqawiyya did not object to these basic principles regarding the unity of Libya, its 
independence and accession to the Arab League, but it placed the independence of 
Cyrenaica and al-Sanusi’s leadership claim above all else.992 
Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya reflected this policy in the conditions for unity 
with Tripoli by stipulating unconditional recognition of the Sanusi Emirate and the 
unanimous support for this from all the people of Tripolitania. It also wanted that 
support demonstrated in front of those foreign states which were entitled under 
international law to decide on the fate of the country. Unity would not be prejudiced in 
any way by the promises given to Cyrenaica that the Italians would not return to 
Tripoli.993 
Crucially, then, as far as Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya was concerned, unity 
with Tripolitania was conditional on following the agreed principles. Its attitude was 
influenced by Britain’s desire to realise its ambitions in Cyrenaica, and since the 
Tripolitanian leaders refused to agree to those conditions, it maintained its separatist 
stance.994 
Following the disagreement between Cyrenaica and the delegation from Tripoli 
regarding Libyan unity, on 11 January 1948 Al-Sanusi created Al-Mutamar Al-Watani. 
This body had the same structure and objectives as its predecessor, Al-Jabha Al-
Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya. It consisted of some 75 community leaders, who together 
represented all the different areas of Cyrenaica. An elected Executive Committee 
comprising eighteen members995 was also created in order to examine the issues of 
establishing Cyrenaica as an Emirate, independence, Libyan unity under the leadership 
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of Al-Sanusi’s brother, Mohammed Al-Rida, and two deputies, namely Al-Siddiq Al-
Rida (Idris Al-Sanusi’s nephew) and Abu Al-Qasim Al-Sanusi. 996  This committee 
reached a consensus on the following points: 
 The need to emphasise the hereditary nature of Idris Al-Sanusi’s position as 
emir. 
 The need to uphold the unity of Libya by forming two administrations, one in 
Cyrenaica and the other in Tripoli, operating on a federal basis to prevent Italy’s 
return to Cyrenaica in any shape or form.997 
 The need to declare the independence of the Libyan territories before the arrival 
of the Commission of Inquiry regardless of local conditions and international 
circumstances, because no one wanted to run the risk of falling foul of the 
international ambitions and political bargaining that might surface when the 
issue of the country’s independence was raised.998 
Consequently, the members of Al-Mutamar Al-Watani signed and sent a memorandum 
to Idris Al-Sanusi stating that, since the Peace Conference, the country had considered 
itself to be independent, and that the relevant international powers should recognise this 
independence and hand over administration of the country to Libyans. Al-Mutamar Al-
Watani members also called on the Arab States to help Libya ensure that its demands 
were recognised.999 They also sent the summary of the committee’s resolutions to all 
parties and political organisations in Tripolitania and Fezzan, demanding that a 
delegation be formed including Omar Bek Shinaib, Khalil Bek Alkallal and Abdul-
Razik Shaqloof.1000 The formation of the delegation did not face any real opposition 
from Al-Mutamar Al-Watani. 1001  However, Cyrenaica appeared unified and any 
disagreement regarding differences in political views was not stressed. This was not the 
case for Tripolitania since two separate delegations represented through their own 
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identity, such as the Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida, and Hizb Al-Istiqlal 
[Independence Party].1002 
Al-Mutamar Al-Watani was opposed to any interference in the internal affairs of the 
country. This position was evident in its explicit stand against Abdul-Rahman Azzam’s 
intervention in Libyan affairs, accusing him of having caused a rift amongst Libyans 
since the establishment of the Libyan Army in Egypt.1003 Their opposition was made 
clear in a complaint which Al-Mutamar Al-Watani addressed to the Egyptian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs regarding the publication of criticism of Idris Al-Sanusi in the 
Egyptian Press.1004 The Administrative Authority of the Congress also protested about 
the Articles of the Constitution of Cyrenaica when it saw the version published by the 
British Representative in Cyrenaica. The representative noted that according to that 
Constitution, people did not consider themselves in an era of independence but of 
tutelage; therefore, the Administrative Authority of the Congress disassociated itself 
from this publication by calling an assembly of Al-Mutamar Al-Watani to determine 
exactly what had happened.1005 
The Congress sent several telegrams over the course of two years to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations protesting about it having not sent a representative and an 
Advisory Council1006 to Libya from Iraq, Syria and Turkey did not form part of the 
membership of the Council since these countries did not have any ambitions or vested 
interest in Libya.1007 Thus, it became clear that Al-Mutamar Al-Watani rejected any 
intervention in Libyan affairs. However, its opposition to issues relating to 
constitutional development in the country fell on deaf ears as the United Nations paid 
no attention to the opposition and continued with the process of Libya’s independence. 
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With regards to cultural activities, Al-Mutamar Al-Watani contributed to the 
advancement of Libyan culture by participating in a conference organised by the 
Khaldunian Society in Tunisia held on 20 September 1949. Their contribution took the 
form of financial assistance to Congress member Abdul-Hamid Al-Dibyani, a judge in 
Benghazi, to enable him to attend the conference after being deputised by the judges of 
Cyrenaica.1008 Moreover, Al-Mutamar Al-Watani provided material and moral support 
to some of the cultural organisations such as Rabitat al-Shabab, and national 
newspapers including Sout Al-Nas and Al-Jablakdar.1009 
Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya was an extension of the political activity of Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar because, following the implementation of the Associations Law of January 
1950, this organisation was renamed.1010 The sports, culture and scouting organisations 
which had previously been under the aegis of the Association formally became 
independent entities. Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya made a formal request to the Ministry of 
Interior of Cyrenaica on 11 February 1950 to register as a political body managed by the 
Committee of Ten1011 (so-called because of the number of members who represented the 
Benghazi and Darnah groups).1012 The founding principles of Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya 
were: 
(1) To work for the unity of Libya and its independence under the 
Sanusi crown; (2) To defend the rights of the people and preserve the 
nation as one entity; (3) To work for the development of patriotic and 
national consciousness; (4) To support Arab unity and to strengthen the 
principles of Islam through cooperation with other Arab and Islamic 
nations.1013 
These principles clearly show that Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya retained the principles of 
Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar except with respect to its relationship with the Arab League. 
It is not clear why this was the case but there are two possible scenarios. 
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The first concerns what the Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya actually intended by the reference to 
cooperation with other Arab and Islamic nations and whether this is a veiled reference 
to the Arab League. Possibly this wording was chosen so as not to provoke the wrath of 
the national government, which did not see the League as being suitable for Arab 
leadership. The second possibility is that Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya had begun distancing 
itself from any links with the League as this was consistent with the policy of the 
national government. Given their general policy, the second possibility appears to be 
more likely since Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya would appear less threatening if it was seen to 
be complying with the principles of the Constituent Assembly. 
The rest of the principles outlined by Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya follow the same approach 
that had been previously adopted by Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar in relation to national 
matters, in so far as it retained the right to influence public opinion and to work for the 
benefit of the nation and defend its interests. Britain wanted to create a Cyrenaica army 
in consultation with the Cyrenaica government, but Libyans were divided on this issue. 
In addition, some of the members of Cyrenaica openly criticised the idea of a Cyrenaica 
army and the name itself proved confusing for Libyans. This did not appear to be in the 
interests of the whole of Libya, but rather highlighted divisions amongst them. Hence 
the role played by the members of Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya was a positive one since it 
urged Libyans to unite for the main cause: a unified Libya. Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya sent 
two memoranda to Idris Al-Sanusi and to the British Representative explaining that the 
creation of a Cyrenaica army would be against the wishes of the Libyans.1014 
However, the members of Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya supported the creation of a Libyan 
army. This could have been disastrous politically and morally.1015 Politically, Libya’s 
situation was still fluctuating and the United Nations’ decision to grant independence 
had not yet been implemented. In moral terms, cooperation on military matters in this 
way with the British would have given them an excuse to maintain an interest in Libya’s 
internal affairs.1016 
When the Advisory Board was established, Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya sent a memorandum 
to the United Nations mission in Libya and to Council members providing a clear 
picture of the situation in Cyrenaica. According to the Assembly’s viewpoint, Cyrenaica 
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would not make a suitable capital for the anticipated Libyan state because it would be 
established in a separatist stronghold and under the management of a foreign 
administration. The memorandum also pointed out the shortcomings of the BMA and its 
plans to keep possession of Cyrenaica. Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya concluded the 
memorandum by demanding that the Advisory Board take the necessary steps to limit 
the political influence of Britain in Cyrenaica, so that plans could be drawn up that 
would apply to all three regions of Libya at the same time.1017 
Thus, the leadership of Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya authorised the Advisory Board to choose 
the political system of the Libyan state, believing that it should be a unified state with 
regards to its internal and foreign affairs; however, at the same time, it did not object to 
the federal system approved by the Advisory Board. This did lead to a dispute between 
the leadership of Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya and the Darnah branch as the latter held 
tenaciously to the core principle originally established by the Assembly, namely, that 
federalism should be rejected as a form of colonialism. This rejection of federalism was 
in accordance with the stance of the Tripolitanian parties and Egypt. As for the 
leadership, it abandoned its commitment to the principle of unconditional Libyan unity 
and prioritised the need to transfer power from the BMA to the Libyans at once. The 
leadership realised that the dispute about the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly1018 
would impede independence and believed it was better to establish the federal system as 
a first step to achieving Libyan unity and a truly national government.1019 
Thus, the Benghazi leadership took a more moderate stance in relation to Jam’iya Al-
Wataniyya than that of the Darnah branch because of its evaluation of the situation in 
light of the circumstances then pertaining in the country; namely, it believed that Libya 
was still caught between opposing forces with different political goals. As a result, it 
abandoned its original principles in order to avoid creating obstacles that would hamper 
the country’s constitutional development and block the path towards independence. 
However, the Assembly was far from actively supporting the federal system, on the 
grounds that this would be costly, especially for a poor country such as Libya. The 
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members of the Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya met with Adrian Plet 1020  at the Egyptian 
Consulate trying to convince him not to implement the federal system on the grounds 
that Cyrenaica favoured full Libyan unity and the elimination of all British and French 
influence in Libya.1021 
Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya was influenced by nationalist principles which called for the 
entire territory of Libya to form the building blocks for the construction of national 
unity. However, it realised that despite any objections it might raise, Cyrenaica would 
not be the valid location for its opposition as long as Idris Al-Sanusi was still in charge. 
On that basis, Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya viewed Al-Sanusi as a political necessity to bring 
about the unity of the country. That being the case, Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya thought it 
was important for it to prevent him from falling under any influence that would force 
him to establish a politically retroactive system—hence its opposition to the BMA.1022 
Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya continuously criticised the BMA and the Cyrenaica government. 
The Assembly Building was attacked in July 1951 following a mass demonstration 
concerning an act of medical negligence in a hospital.1023 The national government then 
accused the Assembly of inciting the demonstrators. As a result, on 23 July 1951, Prime 
Minister Muhammad Alsaqazly issued a decree dissolving the Assembly and any 
organisations affiliated to it, such as the Libyan Scouts and Al-Nadi Alhli. The 
newspaper Al-Watan was also closed down.1024 However, it should be noted that these 
demonstrations were not a sign of awareness of the objectives of Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya. 
It is more probable that they simply wished to make their opinions known to the Libyan 
community in response to the Assembly showing its opposition to the BMA and the 
National Government, especially in those matters that were directly related to the 
everyday life of citizens.  
Although Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya tried to exploit popular feelings of resentment towards 
the government in order to expand its sphere of influence in the cities and rural areas to 
the detriment of Al-Sanusi, they made few inroads due to the strength of tribal loyalty 
towards him. Not everyone who supported Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya was fully aware of its 
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principles. Moreover, the extent of Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya’s impact was limited, even on 
those who were prominent elements in it, due to that same tribal loyalty, which 
overrode personal political convictions and feelings of patriotism. That became evident 
in the elections for the Cyrenaican Representative Council in June 1950, when two 
members of Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya—Ali Zowarwah and Abdul-Hamid Najm—relied on 
the support of their tribes rather than contesting the electoral battle on the basis that they 
were members of the organisation. As a result, they were both elected while Ahmad 
Rafiq Almahdawi, who had relied purely on the influence of Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya, 
failed to win.1025 
It appears that the BMA gave the Libyans political freedom, even though this ultimately 
led to dividing the people as they favoured different political parties. However, Al-
Sanusi banned some political parties in Cyrenaica on 7 December 1947.1026 
6.4 The Formation of Political activities in Tripolitania 
A number of political parties and organisations were created in Tripoli during 1946-
1949, with each having fairly similar political agendas. This clearly demonstrates that 
the BMA provided opportunities for the Libyans to establish political parties. It could 
also be argued that the BMA gave backing to each of these political parties in order to 
win their support. Some grew out of organisations which had originally been established 
as cultural and sporting organisations, such as Al-Nadi Al-Adabi, Nadi Al-Ummal, 
sports clubs, and Nadi Al-Eslah (the Reform Club).1027 
For instance, Al-Hizb Al-Watani was the first political party to be formed in 
Tripolitania in 1945, and had its origins in the revival of Al-Nadi Al-Adabi, the Tripoli-
based Literary Circle in 1943, when the numbers of citizens increased due to the return 
of émigrés following the war. Many of the Circle’s members joined Al-Hizb Al-Watani 
under the leadership of Ahmad Alfaqih Hassan, and other prominent members.1028 The 
party also included members from Misrata. 1029  It operated as an underground 
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organisation until it was formally recognised by the BMA on 8 April 1946. It espoused 
the following principles: 
1. Preserving the unity of Libya (including the territories of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica 
and Fezzan), and opposing partition and division.1030 
2. Improving the general socioeconomic level of the Libyan people in order for 
them to be able to run their own affairs.  
3. Working to link Libya politically and economically with the Arab League.  
4. Making the Libyan case for independence by contacting all international 
conferences focusing on matters of interest to Libya.1031 
Al-Hizb Al-Watani also issued a statement which clarified the reasons for its 
establishment and its objectives: 
Al-Hizb Al-Watani in Tripoli was established to work hard and 
courageously to achieve the hopes of the Libyan people and champion 
these; the hopes of independence and sovereignty on the basis of unity 
and bonds between the various parts of the country: from the Egyptian 
border in the east to the Tunisian border in the west, and from the 
border with Sudan in the south to the Mediterranean Sea in the north. It 
was also established with the aim of joining the Arab League, as per the 
Charter of the League, and cooperation with all democratic peoples on 
the basis of the international coalition and respect for sovereignty and 
independence.1032 
On this basis, Al-Hizb Al-Watani aspired to represent all Libyans, whether they lived in 
Tripolitania, Cyrenaica or Fezzan. However, it had never previously stated that it 
intended to work within a regional framework. This reflected the influence on its 
founders of the political current prevailing in the Levant, which called for all Arabs to 
form one single united political entity. Evidence for this opinion comes from the fact 
that there was a close relationship between those on the fringes of this party and the 
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Libyan political and cultural bodies outside the country. As soon as it won recognition 
from the BMA, the President of Al-Hizb Al-Watani sent the aforementioned list of 
principles to the Tripoli Cultural Club in Cairo with a letter attached which read as 
follows: 
Our hope is that you will make every effort to make Al-Hizb Al-Watani 
acceptable, in the hearts of your brothers and neighbours in Egypt. To 
facilitate this task, you will find herewith a set of print copies of the 
party’s manifesto extracted from its constitution and a statement 
directed to the people that you can show to your brothers to make them 
aware of the principles of this party and its objectives.1033 
Thus, in general terms, Al-Hizb Al-Watani had purely nationalist tendencies because it 
was keen to find channels of contact with other Arab countries to be able to explain the 
Libyan issue to them and enlist their support for the full independence of a unified 
Libya, so it could join the Arab League.1034  It therefore refused all other proposed 
solutions, including a protectorate, mandate or trusteeship, whether this was to involve a 
single state or a multinational agreement. In addition, Al-Hizb Al-Watani would not 
discuss the form that the state should take on the grounds it was too early to address this 
issue.  
This meant that initially, at least, it did not oppose the Al-Sanusi administration, though 
some of its elements were not happy about the Emirate.1035 This failure to oppose Al-
Sanusi’s rule later became a source of concern for other Libyan parties. Due to the 
party’s position on independence, national unity and joining the Arab League, most of 
its supporters were young intellectuals and tribal representatives. The party had nearly 
15,000 members1036 and pursued its political activities in accordance with the principles 
it had laid out. It also tried to strengthen its influence at the expense of the other parties 
and to gain the majority of the political clout in the territory of Tripoli. It demanded that 
the representatives of Tripoli at the Advisory Board be from among Al-Hizb Al-Watani 
members.1037 Its President, Mustafa Mirzan, also opposed the federal system and the 
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legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly, giving his reasons for this in a statement 
published in the press.1038 
In a notable example of continued British influence, another organisation, Al-Jabha Al-
Wataniyya Al-Muttahida (The United National Front) was established on 10 May 1946, 
a month after the recognition of Al-Hizb Al-Watani by the BMA. It appeared as a result 
of a split between the members of Al-Hizb Al-Watani regarding the principle of 
trusteeship, which was raised at the Peace Conference held in Paris on 29 July 1946 to 
discuss the former Italian colonies. 1039  At the conference, the British indicated the 
possible return of Tripoli to Italy under Britain’s tutelage. Although Al-Hizb Al-Watani 
rejected the tutelage of any country, a group emerged which had been influenced by 
British propaganda and demanded the trusteeship of Britain, believing this to be the best 
option if there were to be any tutelage of Tripoli. The aim of the group was to prevent 
the return of Italy to Tripoli under the guise of this principle.  
As already mentioned, the result of that dispute was the split of this pro-British tutelage 
group from Al-Hizb Al-Watani and the establishment of Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-
Muttahida which included conservative elements.1040 The latter enjoyed the support of 
the BMA who wanted it to run against Al-Hizb Al-Watani which was opposed to the 
British. Consequently, it was not a political party in the true sense of the word, but more 
of a body representing nearly seventy percent of the population of Tripoli. 1041 
Membership included Arabs, Berbers and Jewish people, and representatives of almost 
all political opinions.1042 
In June 1946, Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida sent a memorandum to the heads of 
the main powers with an interest in the future of Libya, outlining the demands of the 
Libyan people which were: 
(1) to maintain the unity of the country; (2) to guarantee independence 
under a constitutional democratic rule headed by Emir Idris Al-Sanusi; 
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(3) to ensure that an independent Libya would be able to join the Arab 
League.1043 
The Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida entered into negotiations with the Al-Jabha 
Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya for recognition of the Al-Sanusi Emirate. The aim of the 
Tripoli Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida was to obtain the support of Al-Sanusi for 
the unification of Tripoli and Cyrenaica in order to fend off Italy’s claims to Tripoli.1044 
The evidence shows that if Cyrenaica had gained independence, Tripoli could have 
gone to Italy. This urged Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida to begin negotiations 
with Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya, wherein the issue of Tripoli and national 
unity was raised and discussed. Eventually, the Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida 
accepted Al-Sanusi as the future leader of the country. 
After the failure of the negotiations regarding unification between these two parties—
those of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania— Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida became 
less enthusiastic about supporting the Al-Sanusi Emirate. This was evident from the 
appeals and statements it issued in preparation for receiving the Four Powers 
Commission of Inquiry on 25 October 1947. At the meeting, Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya 
Al-Muttahida emphasised its position regarding the need to maintain its demands for the 
independence of a Libyan state, consisting of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, and 
its accession to the Arab League.1045 It also issued a statement in which it confirmed the 
need to maintain this call for independence and unity, pointing to its attempts at 
unification in talks with the Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya and the causes that 
had led to their failure, concluding that the decision on the form of government should 
be deferred until Libya was an independent state. 
Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra (The Free National Bloc), was founded on 30 May 
1946,1046 with Ali Alfaqih Hassan as President. This was another political association 
that supported the unity of Libya but not the Al-Sanusi Emirate. Members1047 included 
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Zachino Arbib and other Libyan Jews who supported the party financially.1048 In terms 
of its three fundamental principles, firstly it considered Libya to be an indivisible unit 
with borders extending as far as Egypt to the east, Tunisia to the west, Sudan to the 
south and Mediterranean Sea to the north. 1049  Secondly, it demanded Libya’s full 
independence and its accession to the Arab League. Thirdly, it called for the Libyan 
people to be given the right to choose the form of their constitutional government.1050 
These principles were formulated in a memorandum submitted by the party to the Paris 
Peace Conference.1051 A copy was also sent to the Secretary General of the Arab League 
in Cairo.1052 Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra thus demonstrated its opposition to the 
Al-Sanusi Emirate. Moreover, it called for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly 
to decide on the future form of the government, which it thought should be a modern 
republic.1053 To achieve its objectives, Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra started to hold 
open meetings as a means of influencing public opinion. These meetings usually 
focused on the rejection of the Al-Sanusi Emirate and of any form of tutelage, the need 
to establish a republican regime and to protest against British policy, particularly with 
regards to the migration of Italians to Libya and the creation of an Anglo-American 
naval base on Libyan territory. Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra organised a strike on 
May 15, 1946, against Italian return which proceeded without incident.1054 The party 
also issued publications as a means to clarify its views and deny accusations, for 
example, a publication issued on 3 October 1946 protested against the actions of the 
BMA regarding the flow of Italian migrants into Libya.1055 
Following a meeting held by Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra on 15 February 1948, in 
which speeches were delivered that stirred up public opinion against the BMA, the 
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party’s president was arrested on 18 February 1948 and released two months later. The 
police also raided the party’s headquarters and arrested some forty of its members.1056 
The BMA believed this was a reprisal for Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra’s 
harassment of Italians and the elements loyal to them.1057 In response, a crowd of locals 
set off from the Al-Sanusi Mosque led by Ali Alokab, one of the main supporters of the 
Bloc, and clashed with the BMA police force.1058 
Before the arrival of the Four Powers Commission of Inquiry, the Bloc issued an appeal 
to the Libyan people, informing them of the demands that they believed should be 
raised to the International Committee of Referendum; namely, full independence for a 
unified Libya and joining the Arab League. It also reminded Libyans that they should 
defend their right to govern themselves. It confirmed in its statement that the monarchs 
and the heads of Arab countries and the Arab League supported their demands and that 
their voice must be one and present a united front before the Committee.1059 
Although the President of the Bloc denied that a meeting had taken place between his 
party and the International Committee, the report by the Commission of Inquiry records 
that the delegates from the party did appear before the Commission and expressed their 
hostility towards the Italians. However, they indicated their willingness to allow the 
Italian community to continue to live in Libya after independence and to grant them 
their full rights under the law.1060 
The Bloc opposed the constitutional developments, and their opposition was evident in 
an article written by their party leader and published in the Egyptian newspaper Al-
Ahram [the pyramids] on 15 January 1950:  
In short, not all the nation recognises those individual nominations to 
take over the presidency of the Libyan state in the name of ‘Prince’ or 
‘King’; rather, our nation wants free elections resulting in the selection 
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of whoever is eligible for presidency and leadership in all respects: 
legal, legitimate and national.1061 
The party leader’s rejection of the manner in which the Advisory Board had been 
formed was clearly expressed in his article. The party rejected the idea of federalism on 
the grounds that this would preordain the division of the country, and therefore its 
members refused to participate in the Commission of Twenty-One and the Constituent 
Assembly.1062 On 11 November 1951, the flag of the party was raised at its headquarters 
and five slogans spelling out its position also appeared on its banners as follows: “The 
eyes of the citizens are watching the traitors”, “Right will overcome”, “The penalty for 
pride is severe, but the penalty for violence is worse”, “Libya will not be separated from 
the Arab League” and “Colonial rule must end”.1063 
Thus, the party openly voiced its policies opposing the newly formed Libyan 
government. Moreover, it described this as another kind of colonialism and, as a result, 
one of its members sent a threatening message to Bashir al-Sadawi. Another exploded a 
bomb in front of the car of Idris Al-Sanusi on the road known locally as Independence 
Street. Although the President of the Bloc dismissed these incidents as actions carried 
out by individuals acting on their own initiative,1064 the fact that they were members of 
Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra created a backlash in public opinion against that party 
because it was viewed as being extremist in its demands and in how it achieved its 
objectives. That opinion impacted on the nature of its membership which was by then 
restricted to those holding extremist views, but it still attracted some 800 members.1065 
Regardless of whether the Bloc succeeded in achieving its goals or not, its main 
importance lay in that its demands reflected a political awareness in the community that 
supported it, especially with regards to the question of the rights of the citizens which 
was not found in the other Tripoli parties. While the Bloc demanded the formation of a 
constitutional government, the rest of the parties either opted to defer the question of the 
form of government to a post-independence period or recognised Al-Sanusi as Emir. 
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With regards to its principles, Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra was clearly influenced 
by contemporary nationalist and republican systems. In this respect, it was—to some 
extent—in agreement with Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar. The difference was that Jam’iyat 
Omar al-Mukhtar did not explicitly state its opposition to the Sanusiyyah movement 
because it was based within a tribal community which supported Al-Sanusi. 
In November 1946 Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-Misri Al-Tarablusi (The Egypto-Tripolitanian 
Union Party) was formed in Tripoli under the leadership of Ali Rajab1066 and Yusuf Al-
Mushayriqi as result of a split from Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra.1067 The main 
reason for founding this party was the decision taken by the four major powers to send 
the International Commission of Referendum to the former Italian colonies, and the 
founding members of the Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-Misri Al-Tarablusi party feared that the 
outcome of this Committee might lead them to recommend referring the Libyan case to 
the United Nations Trusteeship Council. The Libyans’ thoughts were clear that after the 
war, Libya would be independent, but the convening referendum in Libya would delay 
the independence, meaning that the Libyans would lose all legal basis to state their 
dissatisfaction with tutelage and find this imposed upon them.1068 
These demands related to the call for administrative and legislative independence on the 
basis of a union between Egypt and Libya under the Egyptian crown. Egypt had been 
chosen from among the other Arab states for several reasons. The United Nations 
Charter specifically highlighted the need to create regional units made up of similar 
peoples who shared cultural and historical bonds. Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-Misri Al-Tarablusi 
was in favour of forming such a unit, which would build on the strength of the existing 
links between the people of Libya and Egypt. Knowing that the Four Powers 
Commission of Inquiry would present Libyans with the opportunity to express their 
opinion regarding the possibility of joining one of their neighbours, Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-
Misri Al-Tarablusi wished to encourage people to seize that opportunity and join 
Egypt.1069 On this basis, the goals of Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-Misri Al-Tarablusi were: 
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1. To achieve the union of Libya with Egypt under the Egyptian crown on the basis 
of shared sovereignty and a unified defence and foreign policy, with Libya 
enjoying autonomous status regarding legislative and administrative 
authorities.1070 
2. To form one single Libyan nation from the three regions (Tripoli, Cyrenaica and 
Fezzan) based on their common historical and geographical bonds.  
3. To resist all ideas or efforts intended to separate any of these territories from the 
body of the nation.1071 
Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-Misri Al-Tarablusi sent memoranda in which it explained its 
objectives and demands to the King of Egypt, Egyptian politicians and the Secretary 
General of the Arab League. It also sent similar documents to other parties in 
Tripoli.1072 
From this information, it is clear that the founders of Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-Misri Al-
Tarablusi built their demands on the basis of their data relating to the failure of the 
Tripoli parties to reach an agreement; therefore, they expected that the imposition of 
trusteeship on the country would be judged the most appropriate solution by the United 
Nations Commission of Inquiry. Their suspicions proved to be correct as the Committee 
of Inquiry concluded that Libya was not yet eligible for independence. However, the 
party erroneously gave the greatest weight to the views of foreign states and neglected 
domestic public opinion. This was due to its wish to avoid foreign dominance in the 
affairs of Libyan unity1073 and to get rid of the morass of conflicting political opinions. 
If Tripoli accepted the trusteeship of Egypt because most of Tripoli’s political parties 
had connections to Egyptian nationalistic groups, these parties would not have been 
satisfied with Al-Sanusi’s Emirate, which was simply considered a political necessity 
for the unity of the country. Joining with Egypt would have removed any justification to 
approve the emirate. Equally, Idris Al-Sanusi would not have allowed Cyrenaica to be 
affiliated to Egypt, as his policy was to form an independent emirate.1074 Nor would he 
have been satisfied with Egypt as trustee, since he himself had declared on more than 
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one occasion that the country needed a strong ally but Egypt could not even defend 
itself, let alone Libya. So Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-Misri Al-Tarablusi failed to secure 
sufficient support in either Libya or Egypt, its membership eventually sinking to less 
than 300.1075 However, there is evidence that suggests it continued to exist until the 
Declaration of Libyan Independence.1076 
With regards to the party’s position vis-à-vis the Al-Sanusi Emirate, despite the 
negotiations conducted by the party’s executive body with Cyrenaica before the arrival 
of the Four Powers Commission of Inquiry, the head of the party considered these 
contacts to be a complement to his talks with Idris Al-Sanusi in Egypt aimed at 
convincing him that a unified Libya, consisting of all three of its territories, would 
create a union with Egypt; his acceptance of the Al-Sanusi Emirate was intended to 
improve relationships with Cyrenaica. Ali Rageb, President of Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-Misri 
Al-Tarablusi sent a personal invitation to the Emir to visit Tripolitania.1077 
Thus, Hizb Al-Ittihad Al-Misri Al-Tarablusi was not truly supportive of the Al-Sanusi 
Emirate nor did it advocate this; however, it was prepared to accept this due to the 
difficulties of the circumstances that the country was going through. 
A further example of the BMA’s continuing influence is that of the Hizb Al-Ummal 
party (Libyan Labour Party). The party’s founder was Bashir Bin Hamza, who had been 
Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra treasurer until July 1947. 1078  The party was 
recognised by the BMA at the beginning of September 1947 on the grounds that it was a 
labour organisation that had the support of dock workers, transport workers, Italian 
factory workers and public civil servants.1079 The party’s main objective was to improve 
conditions for workers, protect their interests and consider their importance in public 
affairs, but in terms of its more general political outlook, it called for the total 
independence of a unified Libya and accession to the Arab League. In addition, in 
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keeping with its socialist leanings, it espoused the philosophy that the power of the 
people is greater than the power of the individual.1080 
The political objectives of Hizb Al-Ummal were similar to those adopted by Al-Kutla 
Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra, but in spite of its clear political stance, it did not strive to make 
its voice heard and always remained outside of political talks. It did not contact the Four 
Powers Committee of Inquiry to clarify its demands, as there is no mention of it in the 
reports. Alhadra points out in her study that the reason for this was the party’s 
dependence on the labour movement, which was still developing, meaning that it lacked 
cohesion and political awareness.1081 
Hizb Al-Ummal lacked support due to its president’s connection with some sectors of 
the Italian community.1082 Muhammad Alfarjani, one of the members of the Workers’ 
Trade Union, which was formed later, indicated that the trade union movement began 
when Arab workers joined forces with Italian workers, who were allowed to form 
unions, which enabled both groups to gain some concessions.1083  Thus, it could be 
argued that the head of Hizb Al-Ummal was not loyal to Italian elements but rather 
using them as a tool to achieve rights for Arab workers.1084 Nevertheless, this party’s 
low level of support strongly suggests that feelings towards the Italian community in 
Tripoli were overwhelmingly negative with increasing calls for it to leave. Ultimately, 
in January 1949, the BMA in Tripoli issued a decision to dissolve Hizb Al-Ummal and 
no longer recognise it as a political party because it did not have the necessary quorum 
to retain this status.1085 
The BMA was also involved in eventually recognising and to some degree helping 
legitimise the Hizb Al-Ahrar (The Liberal Party). This party consisted of a group of 
intellectuals working in the field of education under the leadership of a former member 
of Al-Hizb Al-Watani, Alsadik Bin Zarra. Hizb Al-Ahrar’s main objective was to work 
towards overcoming the difficulties that stood in the way of Libyan unity and to make 
this a reality which could be demanded by all Libyan parties once they had the means 
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by which to achieve this purpose.1086 Therefore, this party took the initiative to contact 
all the influential players in the fight for Libyan policy, including the leader of Fezzan, 
Ahmad Saif Al-Nasr. It also made contact with Al-Mutamar Al-Watani in 
Cyrenaica.1087 
Although the BMA did not recognise this party officially until 11 March 1948, its 
activities had actually begun before that, as it had had contacts with Al-Mutamar Al-
Watani in Cyrenaica since it had been founded in January 1948. Hizb Al-Ahrar received 
a message from Al-Mutamar Al-Watani on 29 January 1948 on the issue of identifying 
political bodies in Cyrenaica and integrating these into Al-Mutamar Al-Watani.1088 This 
cleared the way for Idris Al-Sanusi to become the emir of a united Libya. This was 
because Libya’s unification, independence and formation of a national government had 
been agreed.1089 
Hizb Al-Ahrar endorsed its decisions of how to support Libyan unity and its future ruler 
and its President met with Idris Al-Sanusi at the end of February 1948. Alsadik Bin 
Zarra assured Al-Sanusi that the critical circumstances in which the country found itself 
demanded cooperation and a joint effort since acting in a way which lacked cohesion 
would be against Libyan interests and the enemy would be the only beneficiary from 
that.1090  Thus, Hizb Al-Ahrar focused its efforts on realising Libya’s aspirations to 
nationhood by liaising between leaders and key organisations in the political arena.1091 
Adding to the breadth of the emerging organised political landscape in Libya, Hizb Al-
Istiqlal (The Independence Party) was founded on 6 September 1949, under the 
leadership of Salim Al-Muntasir following his resignation from the presidency of Al-
Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida in Tripoli. This split was caused by a dispute 
between Al-Muntasir and Bashir al-Sadawi, each of whom proposed different initiatives 
to ensure acceptance of the Al-Sanusi Emirate. Al-Muntasir wanted the Egyptian 
authorities to negotiate with Al-Sanusi as the key player in matters of national interest, 
but Al-Sadawi discussed this with the Prime Minister of Egypt without consulting Al-
Muntasir. To heal the rift between the two, the Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida 
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Secretary, Abdul-Rahman Alkalhood, held a meeting to discuss the dispute and 
pronounced in favour of Bashir al-Sadawi. Taking this as a personal insult, Al-Muntasir 
resigned to create Hizb Al-Istiqlal1092 with a group of other members.1093 
In terms of general principles, the party supported the people’s right to choose the form 
of political system that best satisfied them, whether this be monarchist or republican. 
This was to be achieved by a Jam’iya Al-Wataniyya to be configured by a preparatory 
committee headed by Al-Sanusi, which represented the various Libyan political parties. 
Should the people opt for a monarchy, Idris Al-Sanusi was judged to be the best man for 
uniting the Libyan territories by the Libyans.1094 It also advocated cooperation with Italy 
in order to guarantee Libya’s independence. Hizb Al-Istiqlal therefore won broad 
support amongst the Italian community in Tripoli although anti-Italian feelings 
continued to run high amongst the Libyan Arabs.1095 
It is clear that personal ambitions and feuds had an impact on the formation of this party 
and its tendencies, suggesting that loyalty to the clan and the tribe was stronger than 
loyalty to the government during that period. Foreign influences had the upper hand in 
the direction of this party and in the setting of its goals, as evidenced in its refusal to 
support the Arab League. Although the party claimed to support the Al-Sanusi Emirate, 
this can be viewed, in fact, as simply a way for Al-Muntasir to steal a march on the 
other parties that deferred the question of government to the post-independence period. 
The final political organisation to emerge in the BMA era in Libya was Al-Mutamar Al-
Watani Al-Tarablusi (The National Congress of Tripoli). The presentation of the draft 
of the Bevin-Sforza plan affected the composition of Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-
Tarablusi because the crisis created a kind of rapprochement between all the political 
parties in Tripoli, especially the Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida and Al-Hizb Al-
Watani. Therefore, the members of both these parties called a meeting on 14 May 1949 
and formed a new body, Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi under the leadership of 
Bashir al-Sadawi, which then invited all the other political bodies to join it.1096 
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On 15 May 1949, the Executive Committee of Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi 
decided to organise a display of civil disobedience in Tripoli and the neighbouring 
provinces. Following this, a demonstration was organised with the participation of some 
of the members of Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar. The demonstrators called for an end to 
the rule of both Italy and Britain and demanded the independence of a unified Libya 
under the crown of Idris Al-Sanusi. When the Bevin-Sforza Plan failed, the Conference 
announced this decision on 18 May 1949, which put an end to the civil disobedience.1097 
Al-Sadawi outlined the principles of Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi in one of his 
statements: 
The consensus of the Libyan nation to obtain its unity and 
independence has been manifested in all the decisions taken by Al-
Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi. These have relied on the sons of this 
tenaciously brave people throughout all the phases of its long national 
resistance with a strong resolve to see that the Libyan nation alone has 
the right to self-determination and to liberate itself from this protracted 
interregnum. Today, it is taking effective steps to achieve the legitimate 
aspirations of the country and its national and patriotic objectives. 
Those national and patriotic aspirations are simply to support the unity 
of Libya and its independence under the crown of the Al-Sanusi 
emirate.1098 
Thus, Al-Mutamar Al-Tarablusi supported Al-Sanusi’s Emirate, and it was supposed 
that the Tripolitania parties, especially Al-Hizb Al-Watani, the Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya 
Al-Muttahida and Al-Kutla Al-Wataniyya Al-Hurra, would agree to accept the emirate 
as the core of a new entity, but that did not happen. Moreover, those parties that united 
to fight the Bevin-Sforza Plan soon divided once again when the project failed and 
challenged Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi’s right to act as the political body 
representing all the parties of Tripolitania. The split was caused by the fact that most of 
the people and political parties of Cyrenaica had placed their loyalty and confidence in 
Al-Sanusi, wishing to see him as the leader of the unified Libya. The Tripolitanians, on 
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the other hand, were mostly against him, believing he had let them down when he fled 
to Egypt in 1922.1099 
These parties rejected the appointment by Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi of the 
representatives of Tripolitania in the Committee of Twenty-One, 1100  prompting Al-
Sadawi to ask Al-Sanusi himself to appoint these members. However, he refused on the 
grounds that he did not have the authority to do that. Thus, Al-Sadawi remained the 
most prominent figure in Tripolitania for the purposes of negotiation. Al-Sanusi agreed 
with him on most of the points concerning the form that the state should take (it was to 
be a federal model) but they disagreed on two points. The first related to the presence of 
an Italian member in the Preparatory Committee, as Al-Sanusi did not want any Italian 
representation. He finally accepted this on the basis of a recommendation from the 
United Nations representative. The second point related to the presence of foreign 
troops in Libya. Al-Sadawi demanded a specific date be given for the withdrawal of 
these forces since he regarded them as interfering in the country’s internal affairs, 
whereas Al-Sanusi insisted on their staying.1101 
When the Commission authorised the written constitution to be approved, on 9 
December 1950, a Sub-Commission was charged with choosing the type of government 
for Libya, and stipulated that this should be a federal one. Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-
Tarablusi and the Tripoli parties opposed that decision, and Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-
Tarablusi called an emergency session on 5 January 1951, which resolved:  
Libya must be unified under the crown of Idris Al-Sanusi; with its own 
government and parliament that should be freely elected by the people. 
There is no objection to the formation of local administrations in each 
region of Libya, on the condition that there should be a local parliament 
and ministries in each of these.1102 
A delegation from Tripoli was formed to bring these demands to Al-Sanusi, but it was 
prevented from travelling to Cyrenaica. Therefore, the delegation sent him a telegram 
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on 15 January, expressing their unhappiness at this decision since the delegation 
represented the people. Moreover, on 24 January, the youth of the Congress led protests 
against federalism, leading to their arrest and imprisonment.1103 It paid no heed to this 
opposition and issued a decision concerning the configuration of the three Libyan 
provinces on 21 February 1951. Following that, Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi 
held a meeting on 6 March at which it resolved firstly, to uphold the unity of Libya and 
the position of Idris Al-Sanusi as monarch and to insist on the full implementation of 
the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations issued on 21 November 
1949. Secondly, it was resolved that it would not recognise the legitimacy of the 
Constituent Assembly since it had violated the United Nations’ decision which 
stipulated representation for the people not regions. Furthermore, the Constituent 
Assembly was judged to have committed an even more serious violation of this decision 
by creating temporary governments in both Tripoli and Fezzan in addition to that of 
Cyrenaica, and thus effectively establishing three governments in Libya and imposing a 
federal system on the country.  
On this basis, Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi took the following decisions: by 
resolving to withdraw its members from the Constituent Assembly and to dismiss 
anyone who did not agree with that decision from membership of Al-Mutamar Al-
Watani Al-Tarablusi. It also called for the other members from Tripoli to withdraw from 
the Constituent Assembly.1104 
At the same time, the opposition parties, including Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi 
presented a memorandum to the Advisory Board, and the representative of all parties 
denounced the establishment of the separate governments. Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-
Tarablusi in Cyrenaica also sent a telegram to the Secretary General of the Arab League 
appealing for a discussion of the issue of Libya in the Political Committee of the Arab 
League so that they might take whatever action they deemed appropriate. Despite Al-
Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi’s opposition to the federal system and its non-
recognition of the National Constituent Assembly, it was ready to stand in the elections 
for the House of Representatives. Muhammad Wahib, a member of Al-Mutamar Al-
Watani Al-Tarablusi stated: 
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Any force in the world, no matter how powerful it is, will not be able to 
rob us of our right approved by the United Nations to form a genuinely 
untarnished independent state under the crown of the holy King of 
Libya, Idris I [...] And the day will come when the independence which 
we are so eagerly awaiting will be declared. We protest vigorously 
against those who wish to delay it or those who accuse Al-Mutamar Al-
Watani of causing the delay of Independence Day, which your 
Congress, led by its great leader, fought to win until it succeeded, 
thanks be to Allah. Your Congress will run in the election battle and is 
confident by Allah that it will be the winner.1105 
Thus, there was no clearly designed policy for Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi, 
meaning it was difficult to determine its political direction, as it initially claimed to be 
in favour of federalism as a political system in the country and later opposed it. It also 
agreed on the way in which the Constituent Assembly had been formed and then 
accused it of having no legitimacy and called on its members to withdraw. Finally, it 
participated in the elections. Its decision to participate was an implicit recognition of the 
constitutional evolution that had occurred in the country, which had previously been 
rejected by Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi. It did not always appear to have a 
clear strategy and its policies were governed by personal interests. 
The Tripolitanian parties had different political opinions, for instance, Al-Kutla Al-
Wataniyya Al-Hurra was nationalist in orientation, and wanted a unified independent 
nation and accession to the Arab League. It demanded a republican system, and thus 
unequivocally opposed the Al-Sanusi Emirate. Other parties also sought a unified 
independent nation and accession to the Arab League, but supported the establishment 
of an emirate under Al-Sanusi. These were Al-Mutamar Al-Watani Al-Tarablusi, Al-
Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Muttahida, and Hizb Al-Ahrar.1106 
However, the support for the emirate by these parties was not absolute, as their views on 
this issue were usually ambivalent and lacked consistency, and depended on their 
perception of the degree of danger threatening Tripoli due to the possibility of the return 
of foreign influence. Thus, for these parties, backing the Al-Sanusi Emirate was nothing 
more than a political manoeuvre designed to gain support for autonomy in the 
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international arena, particularly since Cyrenaica had received a promise from the British 
government that the Italians would not return to Libya. Many belonging to these parties 
realised that a unified Libya could not be achieved unless the people of Tripolitania 
recognised the leadership of Idris Al-Sanusi. He was seen as a key figure in the 
international arena as a result of his contact and agreements with his allies.1107 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered how the key political parties in Libya developed during the 
period of British Rule in Libya. Voluntary associations and cultural activism paved the 
way, step by step, for the formation of political parties with distinctive identities and 
agendas which reflected many of the prevalent intellectual and ideological tendencies of 
the era including class consciousness and socialism, anti-colonialism and pan-Arabist 
sentiments.  
The BMA’s role shaped the way in which these political parties emerged because of the 
laws they established that gave the Libyans (Arabs and Jews) the right to express their 
wishes. This freedom paved the way for the members of such associations and political 
parties to talk about various aspects of politics. After the BMA introduced reforms and 
promulgated new laws in Libya, those who had been oppressed under the Italian regime 
in the regions of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania formed political parties.  
This marked the real beginning of the emergence of its ambitions of nationhood, being 
aware of the extent of the country’s strategic importance. Libyans joined political 
parties demanding their right to nationhood, building consensus around core principles 
including complete independence, self-determination, a unified Libya and rejection of 
any foreign intervention against the wishes of the people. Although the new legislation 
granting permission to form political parties was positive in itself, it also led to the 
creation of factions and divisions amongst the Libyans as these groups began to 
multiply in both regions of Libya, and, furthermore, pursued different agendas. In 
addition, some political parties of Cyrenaica held a different view, as their agenda was 
Cyrenaica as an independent country first, then unification with Tripoli. Contrary to 
this, the political parties of Tripoli focused solely upon unification. This led both sides 
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(Tripoli and Cyrenaica) to initially fail in negotiations. Eventually, both sides agreed to 
one independent Libya.  
In addition, the BMA promoted different activities designed to improve the civic 
education and community development including membership of associations and 
political parties. Initially, intellectuals were motivated and encouraged to take part in 
such activities, but the BMA was also committed to allowing different classes of 
Libyans to voice their demands more forcefully. The BMA agenda was to ensure 
Libyans understood the theory and practice of democracy so that they would be 
empowered to develop their own institutions and a strong democratic framework in the 
future built on associations and political parties. 
The émigrés in Egypt and the students at Al-Azhar University were the pioneers, firstly 
in creating social and cultural associations and then in re-forming these as political 
parties. Just as their cultural activism had been one of the most prominent features of 
life in Libya during that period, so their pro-nationalist political activism was to come to 
the fore in the run-up to independence. Some of these individuals and parties would 
play a decisive role in carving out the future path for Libya while others would fail to 
exert widespread influence because they lacked the support of the masses. The BMA 
privileged those who were educated and had worked in different cultural associations in 
Egypt under the auspices of the British rulers there. 
It can also be noted that the political parties were more numerous in Tripoli than 
Cyrenaica. This was due in part to the larger population in Tripoli and the lesser 
influence of the tribal system there in this urban centre. In addition, Libyan émigrés 
returning from Egypt were attracted to Tripoli, which also strengthened its political base 
since they were educated and had a good understanding of political activities based on 
their experiences in Egypt. 
In Cyrenaica, the situation was different. The Cyrenaica population was more rural and 
included Bedouins who were under the influence of tribal Sheikhs who were often 
unwilling to cooperate with others. In addition, the influence of the Sanusiyyah 
remained strong. One of the key characteristics which distinguished the Cyrenaican 
political parties, especially Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya, was their 
opposition to a unified Libya. Whilst some parties strongly supported the idea of a 
unified Libya, comprising all three of its territories, other separatist groups were in 
favour of the independence of Cyrenaica. Al-Jabha Al-Wataniyya Al-Barqawiyya gave 
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its backing to the creation of an emirate under Idris Al-Sanusi, whilst the Tripolitanian 
parties did not initially support this, fearing that problems might arise in the future in 
relation to hereditary issues. Some Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian political parties blamed 
the BMA for dividing the country because it had initially supported the idea of giving 
independence to Cyrenaica instead of the whole of Libya.  
As the examination of this period has shown, these parties spent considerable energy on 
wrangling over the exact form that the future Libya was to take, with numerous models 
being proposed, debated and discarded. However, all those who were involved did share 
the same belief: that the Libyan people had the right to self-determination. It was their 
passionate resolve and sense of purpose that would keep the issue of Libyan 
independence alive through endless rounds of negotiations and interminable 
campaigning and lobbying. Therefore, the BMA’s role remained central in uniting the 
Libyans behind one cause.  
When independence finally appeared to be within the grasp of the Libyans, the various 
warring factions and numerous splinter groups, all with their own viewpoints, worked 
together to achieve their vision. This meant shifting the focus from what it was that had 
divided them to what it was that could bind them together for a common cause. At least 
temporarily, ideals were compromised and personal, tribal and regional rivalries put to 
one side. Finally, on 24 December 1951, the United Kingdom of Libya became the first 
country to achieve independence through the United Nations, a single, unified, 
independent Libya. 
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Overview of This Thesis 
This concluding chapter summarises the key findings of this thesis regarding the social, 
cultural and political developments that took place in Libyan society under the British 
Military Administration (BMA). It also evaluates the success of BMA policies and 
considers their legacy in Libya. It also discusses the contribution that this research has 
made.  
This thesis examined the BMA (1943-51), a crucial eight-year period in the history of 
Libya, that began as the conflict between the Axis and the Allied forces in the North 
African campaign of the Second World War was drawing to a close and then continued 
throughout the immediate post-war years until the birth of an independent state. As this 
thesis has demonstrated, although the BMA lasted less than a decade, the impact that it 
had on post-war independent Libya was to be profound in social, cultural and political 
terms. 
7.2 Contribution of This Research 
Few studies have focused on the end of the Italian colonial era.1108 Very few Arab 
scholars have written about Libyan history, especially during the period 1943-51. They 
were deeply critical of the BMA, viewing this as simply another period of occupation. 
This study aimed to address these gaps in current research by using material that for 
various reasons was not previously available to researchers in this area or accessible 
only to those who were able to read Arabic.  
In Libya, archival material at the National Centre for Historical Studies based in Tripoli 
and the National Library in Benghazi (the majority in Arabic) offered an invaluable 
resource for gaining an understanding of the quite remarkable quantity and diversity of 
activities that cultural, social and political associations encompassed during the BMA 
period and on the state of day-to-day Anglo-Libyan relations during that time. Although 
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the available archival material brought many new facts to light, unfortunately, for a 
range of reasons, including lack of resources and political concerns, this remains 
somewhat limited and fails to paint the whole picture about the impact of BMA policy, 
especially in educational terms.  
It should be remembered that for a good part of the Gaddafi regime, access to resources 
such as historical archives were strictly controlled for Libyan researchers while relations 
between Gaddafi’s government and Western countries often prevented historians from 
outside Libya from gaining any access to archival material. Sadly, more recent events in 
Libya mean limited resources are now available for cataloguing and curating archival 
material and it is likely that some of valuable resources used for this research will once 
again cease to be available. 
One significant contribution of this research is the fact that it was able to draw on 
material from interviews conducted with Libyan citizens who had actually participated 
in the events described in this thesis, allowing the researcher to benefit from hearing 
their personal recollections of lived experiences. Incorporating this dimension of oral 
history into the research helped to provide the researcher with an understanding of the 
impact that BMA policy had at the grass roots level and also how this was perceived 
and interpreted by Libyans at the time.  
In addition, this thesis used archive material helped to shed light on the impact of the 
occupying forces in Libya during the period 1943-51. Useful material on policies and 
decision-making was found in the National Archives (London), with reports produced 
by the BMA for the War Office and Foreign Office providing richly detailed 
information that helped to build up a picture of activities on the ground during the 
period. This material also offered revealing insights into the British agenda 
underpinning such activities given that Britain was not without its own interests in 
Libya as a foreign occupying force.  
This study of the impact of the BMA in Libya highlights the importance of studying the 
small everyday details of the social and cultural life of a particular historical period, as 
this provides valuable insights into broader processes such as the factors that can shape 
the political consciousness of individuals, that serve to build social cohesion and 
ultimately help to create a national identity. Studies of this kind act as valuable case 
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studies illustrating how an ‘imagined community’1109 becomes a nation: how education 
imparts knowledge within a particular ideological frame; how printed materials and the 
media not only disseminate ideas about nationalism but also the idea of a nation itself in 
various ways, and how the minutiae of everyday existence, what Billig1110 refers to as 
banal nationalism, create cultural bonds that can tie together disparate individuals and 
groups into a nation. 
It also shows that the process of cultural development is not a random one, achieved by 
purely informal activity but is also dependent on pinpointing existing weaknesses, often 
meticulous planning, and the enactment of cultural policies as part of a broader 
development process. The BMA’s revitalisation of Libyan culture and modernisation of 
its educational and cultural organisations was seen as the best means of enabling the 
population to maintain the community development process they initiated and to 
continue to facilitate both social and cultural development for the foreseeable future, 
ensuring that Libya would not only survive but also thrive as an independent state. It 
was also intended to underpin these processes with the liberal values of the British 
government, as it was believed that these would play a key role in ensuring good 
governance in a future independent Libya.  
Furthermore, this research provides new insights into a short but crucially important 
period of Libyan history that remains largely unstudied. It also sheds light on Britain’s 
post-war involvement in the region whilst also providing material for a useful 
comparison with Britain’s policies both elsewhere in the Middle East and also in its 
other colonies. Furthermore, this research also provides evidence about the BMA’s role 
in empowering Libyans to reclaim their rights after decades of oppression by foreign 
powers. Prior to the BMA, the human rights of the local population were suppressed 
and the approach adopted in this research illustrates how these rights can be restored. 
This research also sheds light on the attitudes and behaviour of ordinary Libyans during 
this transition to independence and on the personal commitment that led them to act 
responsibly, sacrificing individual preferences for a greater national cause.  
Anderson notes that the spread of literacy, mass communication and mass migration are 
all significant factors in generating cultural discourse about nationalism and ethnic 
                                                 
1109 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 2006). 
1110 M. Billig, Banal nationalism (London, 1995). 
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identity. 1111  The call for a united Libyan nation was nurtured externally by more 
modern-minded political activists who had gone into exile with the waning of local 
colonial resistance in the late 1920s, especially following the public execution of the 
resistance leader Omar Al-Mukhtar in 1931 by the Italians.1112 They became involved 
with pan-Arab nationalist activities in Cairo and Damascus and formed Libyan 
associations and literary circles, and printed booklets during the 1930s and 1940s.  
In Cyrenaica, returning émigrés such as Mustafa bin Amer,1113 Saleh Abobasir,1114 and 
Ibrahim Usta Omer played a crucial role in strengthening socio-cultural and political 
activities. Those who had studied abroad also returned to Libya with the knowledge and 
aspirations that inspired them to work for the Libyan cause. Above all, the role of the 
Arab League1115 was of key importance in offering support and guidance to returning 
intellectuals. This research concludes that the political awareness in among the Libyans 
established nationalistic approach. The educated Libyans were united behind one main 
cause: an independent Libyan nation.  
7.2.1 Educational Policy and Development 
The first finding of major concern in this study is in relation to the impact of the BMA 
on the development of education in Libya. In contrast to the neglect of education that 
had taken place under both the Ottoman and Italian regimes, the educational policies 
enacted by the BMA and its large-scale coordinated action on education actively 
contributed to social, cultural and political developments that helped to revive and 
revitalize Libyan society. These policies focused on building and strengthening Libya’s 
                                                 
1111 Anderson, 1992, p.7 
1112 See: C. H. Kraeling, ‘Now and Then in Libya’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 80, (1960), 
p.106 http://www.jstor.org/stable/595585, Accessed: 11/12/2014 
1113 Mustafa bin Amer (1908-1999) was born in Benghazi and received his first education in a zawaya. In 
1920, he emigrated to Egypt with his family where he continued his education and gained degree in arts 
in July 1941. In 1943, he returned to Libya and worked as a school inspector in Cyrenaica under the 
BMA. He was the editor of Barqa Al-Readia [Cyrenaica sport] and Al-Watan [The Homeland] 
newspaper. He also contributed to the establishment of a night school volunteer programme during the 
BMA. See: Libya home. Al-Shouraffa.http://www.alshouraffa.com/?p=7122, accessed 12/12/2014. 
1114 Saleh Abobasir (1925-1973) was born in Benghazi, and after studying in Italian schools, moved to 
Egypt to study at Al-Azhar. In 1944 he returned home to Benghazi, worked as Editor-in-Chief of Barqa 
Al-Jadida and wrote for many Libyan newspapers. He went on to become a member of the House of 
Representatives in 1953-1955 and was a Minister till 1973. 
1115 The idea of creating such a body emerged during World War Two. In a conference held in Alexandria 
(25 September 25-7 October 1947), an agreement was reached amongst the Arab countries concerning 
cooperation and solidarity under the auspices of this body. On 22 March 1945 seven independent Arab 
countries signed the original Charter of the Arab League: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, East Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Yemen. 
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badly neglected education system, capacity building and empowerment in order to make 
Libya self-sufficient in the future. Their success was reflected in the fact that the system 
remained fit for purpose after the BMA ended. A well-organised education system was 
established, accompanied by meticulous planning which covered every aspect of 
education including administration, institutions, staff and curricula. This had a long-
lasting effect, spreading right across the territories of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and 
covering both urban and rural areas. Using indicators adopted by international 
organisations in recent times to assess the success of educational initiatives, including 
literacy levels, pupil numbers and class sizes, the analysis of the achievements of the 
BMA clearly shows that Libya’s educational base was significantly enlarged. Moreover, 
concerted attempts were made to bring all segments of society into mainstream 
education, rather than this being restricted to the privileged few, as had been the case 
under previous regimes. 
The BMA policy of providing equal educational opportunities for all Libyan children 
meant that for the first-time girls and pupils living in isolated rural areas also had the 
chance to participate in the educational system. The fact that the BMA also succeeded 
in convincing some hinterland tribal peoples to allow their daughters to be educated can 
be considered to be a major social achievement. A mass literacy campaign also made 
concerted efforts to reach out to those adults who had never previously had access to 
education.  
The British also attempted to create a meritocracy in which access to education and to 
social success was not based solely on class or ethnicity but depended on talent, ability 
and a desire to learn. They did not force Libyans to learn English, but created 
opportunities for citizens to participate, using tried and tested models based on their 
previous experiences in Pakistan and India. Their educational policy quite clearly also 
aimed to produce an academic elite and only a tiny proportion of Libyans were 
rewarded with the coveted prize of secondary and higher education. However, this 
education was not intended to merely produce civil servants who would perpetuate 
British rule but rather to develop a class of educated people who would function as 
leaders and high-level administrators in a post-BMA independent Libya. 
The BMA used its educational policies to develop Libyan institutions and those who 
graduated enjoyed social capital. In later years, they played a range of roles in 
supporting and helping their fellow citizens by working in administrative and teaching 
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jobs. This illustrates the strong relationship between the BMA’s educational policy and 
its outcomes in the form of developing social capital.  
Those who were expected to form the country’s intellectual elite were sent to follow 
programmes of higher studies either in the UK or at prestigious institutions elsewhere in 
the Arab world. Libyan school teachers were sent abroad for specialised courses or 
received further training at home. The BMA also supported the zawiyas whilst ensuring 
that these were strictly supervised, understanding that they had a vital role to play in 
teaching children in the remote areas. It further strengthened the education system by 
establishing libraries in different areas with books imported from Egypt. 
Possibly the most important consequence of the BMA’s intense efforts at social and 
cultural development was the formation of a cultural elite that could function at the 
required intellectual, political and administrative level, during that crucial period of 
Libyan independence and beyond. The existence of such an elite serves to foster, 
promote and guide social change and is considered a key factor in developing human 
societies.  
The BMA’s attempts to encourage vocational and technical education and offer training 
opportunities, particularly in rural areas, led to the engagement of many citizens in 
different trades and professions, thereby encouraging economic development that was 
not limited to Libya’s major centres of population. This was especially important given 
that Libya was also experiencing a transformation from a largely rural society to a 
modern, urban one. Many of its smaller cities were beginning to struggle to cope with 
rapid expansion, and rural employment initiatives were also intended to stem this mass 
exodus to urban areas.  
Educational developments also supported the modernisation of Libya by disseminating 
not only advances in scientific knowledge and technology but also a particular set of 
values. This also impacted significantly on other cultural activities, including the 
development of the press, literary societies and intellectual debate. Indirectly, education 
also had an important influence on the development of a new type of political 
consciousness within Libyan society, the spread of which was facilitated by the teachers 
from neighbouring Arab countries who brought with them the latest ideological 
tendencies. 
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One of the reasons for the continued support of the Libyan people for the BMA’s 
educational policy was its reaction to their early criticism of its attempts to adopt a dual 
education system, adopting the Palestinian model in Tripolitania and the Egyptian one 
in Cyrenaica. Rather than attempting to impose this universally unpopular idea, the 
BMA revisited its policy and ultimately bowed to the will of the Libyan people by 
adopting the Egyptian system. This course of action guaranteed that the Libyan people 
would support the BMA since this helped to convince them that the British did not 
intend to force their agenda on the people of Libya, unlike the previous foreign rulers.  
Perhaps it can be concluded that the strength of the British educational policy was that it 
did not make overt attempts to impose a British identity or culture on the curriculum 
itself in mainstream schools, and allowed faith-based educational activities to continued 
in zawiyas or mosques, in stark contrast to what had occurred under the Italians and in 
colonial regimes in other parts of North Africa. While the BMA generally showed 
respect for the Islamic beliefs of the local population, it also challenged those aspects of 
Libyan culture that it believed were at odds with the liberal values of the British 
government and the creation of a modern state, such as the failure to educate girls and 
women. This confirms the pragmatism of the British policy, as it responded to the 
administrative and economic needs of Libya, but did not try to push a particular agenda 
that narrowly focused on religious and ideological indoctrination. 
The great efforts that the British administration invested in improving the education 
system in Libya were underpinned by the idea that education has the power to change 
the ways in which individuals think about values, state, authority, identity, and about 
knowledge itself. 1116  It plays an important role in expanding their capabilities and 
intellectual capacity, in building confidence and social capital. In addition, it should also 
help to form good citizens who care for their homeland and are also concerned about its 
role in the affairs of the outside world.  
7.2.2 The Press: Giving Voice to National Identity 
Moving onto the second major focus of this thesis, it was argued that the BMA also 
made a concerted attempt to improve both the quantity and the quality of the press in 
Libya during the period under study. It allowed the local population to publish their own 
                                                 
1116 W. Feinberg, Common schools/uncommon identities, national and cultural difference. (New York, 
1998), p.49. 
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newspapers, increasing the diversity of what was available with most of the press being 
concentrated in Tripoli and Benghazi. This press policy led to the creation of many jobs 
in this newly established industry, which further boosted national morale. For the first 
time, Libyans had their own voice and were able to write about those issues that 
concerned them. The launch of publications such as Al-Watan [Homeland], Al-Istiqlal 
[Independence], Al-Fajr Al-Libye [Libyan Dawn] and Shualat Al-Huria [Torch of 
Freedom) reflected the impact of growing liberalisation. 
There was evidence that some of the nationalist journalists criticised the BMA and its 
policies, particularly those regarding education, the economy, and health services, 
demanding accelerated reforms in the country. This criticism increased when Libya’s 
independence failed to materialise and it was feared that they had exchanged one 
colonial regime for another, while the BMA’s priority remained to create and develop 
the much needed political and educational institutions that would form the basis for 
change. 
Although the BMA occasionally responded to criticism by temporary or permanent 
closure of offending publications, in general, the administration preferred to use the 
power of positive propaganda rather than rigidly imposing press censorship. As with 
education, the BMA attempted to improve the professional capabilities of Libyan 
journalists by sending them to Britain to develop their knowledge and skills about the 
publishing industry. 
Analysis of a selection of both BMA-backed and non-governmental newspapers in 
Libya during the period 1943-1951 showed that these largely focused on issues relating 
to education, reflecting the key importance that this was seen to have in building a 
modern nation. Press articles and editorials repeatedly linked Libya’s future success as 
an independent nation with education and learning, highlighting the need for schools in 
every city and for Libyans to improve their literacy, in order to advance the country.  
Repeated links were made in press articles between education and learning and the 
future success of an independent Libya.1117  
In addition to serving as a forum for discussing the major cultural and social issues of 
the day, most newspapers also openly addressed the question of Libya’s independence, 
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and the press played a crucial role in detailing the latest national and international 
developments and providing copious political analysis of these.  
One of the notable achievements of the press at that time was that despite the very 
difficult circumstances, it succeeded in awakening interest in cultural issues of all kinds, 
from popular sporting events to high-brow intellectual debates concerning reformist 
views. It also provided an outlet for publishing literary works. Poetry, in particular, 
proved to be a powerful means of building Libyan cultural identity, with works by the 
leading poets focusing on national unity appearing in the press. As such, the renaissance 
of the press had a positive influence more generally on standards of Libyan culture. 
Coverage by the new Libyan press of news and events relating to the social, cultural, 
and economic life of the nation and citizens, helped to bring individuals together and to 
shape their sense of belonging to a community united by common interests. In short, it 
could be argued that during the BMA the press played an important role in helping to 
shape people’s consciousness of national identity. As Bechhofer and McCrone note: 
“Newspapers reproduce ‘national’ culture, reporting ‘home’ events to a ’domestic’ 
audience. The media help to frame what it means to be ‘national’ by reporting, or not, 
events in a particular way and using key descriptors.1118 
7.2.3 Social, Cultural and Political Associations: The Shaping of 
Citizens 
The third major area of concern in this research has been to explore the role played by 
the host of voluntary associations or single-interest groups that focused on social, 
cultural and recreational activities and to assess their contribution to the development of 
Libyan civil society, and to enabling Libyan society to make the difficult transition 
towards modernisation. 
It has been argued that strong civil society is a crucial condition for strong 
democracy1119 and BMA policy was to introduce the concept of democracy by first 
developing and then strengthening civil society in Libya by encouraging the 
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establishment of and commitment to a wide range of cultural and social voluntary 
organisations. As Putnam1120 notes: 
The norms and networks born out of systematic face-to-face association enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. They 
generate the trust, reciprocity and capacity for civic engagement which are 
essential to the functioning of modem democracy.  
The growth of civil society was clearly also seen as paving the way to independence, 
since BMA policy also made provisions for the formation of political parties which had 
never previously existed. The BMA’s arrival saw a shift in policies regarding the degree 
of intellectual and political freedom allowed in Libya, that helped to foster a viable, 
sustainable framework for fomenting the growth of voluntary organisations which were 
also intended to bring social cohesion to a country on the verge of collapse after decades 
of neglect and its more recent involvement in major conflict. This led to renewed 
interest in reviving cultural institutions that had survived previous regimes and citizens 
began channelling their energies into a range of different voluntary activities.  
Libyan émigrés returning from Egypt were the first to establish cultural organisations in 
Tripoli and Jam’iyat Omar al-Mukhtar in Benghazi, and many others followed. Social-
cultural associations covered a broad range of activities including lecture programmes, 
debating societies, theatre groups and literary circles, providing an education in 
aesthetics and intellectual stimulation for all who were interested.  
The development of these single-interest groups also brought a new dimension to 
Libyan society, providing citizens with opportunities to work together to achieve 
collective goals or to fight for common causes. On a practical level, they allowed 
Libyans to gain planning and organisational experience. All those new skills, 
experiences and ideas combined to enact powerful cultural change in Libyan life. New 
cultural tendencies and other products of modern civilization were integrated into 
Libyan society, allowing it to absorb these whilst at the same time maintaining its 
specific national characteristics without abandoning its inherited values of customs and 
culture. 
The period under study also witnessed the formation of many labour organisations, 
evincing the considerable weight of Libya’s labour force. Consciousness of the labour 
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movement took shape, helped by factors such as educational talks, labour strikes and the 
establishment of relations with workers’ organisations in neighbouring countries. New 
laws and regulations issued by the BMA largely supported the labour movement.  
This research has demonstrated that associational life in Libya flourished during the 
British regime. It is unlikely that the social and cultural institutions would have 
developed so quickly and in such numbers in Libya if it had not been for the support of 
the BMA, and this period of cultural revitalisation had major consequences for the 
whole of Libyan society, as it moved towards a more advanced stage of social, political 
and eventually economic development. As the intellectual horizons of Libyan citizens 
were broadened, they became more conscious of the world beyond their borders, of 
their neighbouring states and of the wider international community. This was in sharp 
contrast to their recent past that had been marked by complete isolation from the 
influence of the intellectual and scientific advancements that the rest of the world 
enjoyed.  
These associations were headed by individuals with highly developed feelings of 
nationalism and they helped to provide a platform which enabled many Libyans to 
understand their own role in nation building. Although they initially focused on social 
and cultural activities, many quickly became politicised, with Jam’iyat Omar al-
Mukhtar being one of the first to focus overtly on political issues and form the basis of a 
political party.  
The BMA thus contributed to raising political awareness among Libyan leaders. After 
becoming registered political parties, these organizations were permitted to carry on 
campaigning for independence. Despite taking different approaches, the political parties 
were initially united behind the idea of national unification. Although all the political 
party leaders were acknowledged and invited to discuss the issues of transition with the 
BMA-nominated personnel it became apparent that the political parties of Cyrenaica 
were more experienced and skilled than those of Tripoli. The BMA recommended 
handing over rule to Idris al Sanusi who had the support of all the political parties 
representing both Cyrenaica and Tripoli and on 24 December 1951, Libya finally 
became an independent state, with King Idris as its head of state.  
As this thesis has shown, during the BMA period, changes of a political, cultural and 
social nature took place in Libyan society and contributed to forming new aspects of 
Libyan identity. The growth of cultural and social institutions and new political 
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organisations was the first indication of a move to modernisation. These groups played 
an integral role in creating and shaping the civil and political consciousness of Libyans, 
and made a major contribution to promoting the Libyan national movement which 
coincided with the rising tide of Arab nationalism in the Middle East and anti-colonial 
agitation in neighbouring North African states.1121 Such organisations and institutions 
represented the best features of social and cultural life in Libya at that time, and as the 
number of well-educated citizens increased, they made efforts to spread Libyan culture 
to different classes and sectors of society. Initiatives such as literacy campaigns, 
educational enrichment programmes and evening classes for working men all formed 
part of the cultural activism that was so prevalent at the time.  
7.2.4 Longer Term Influence of BMA Policies 
The BMA started its agenda of community development by permitting the Libyans to 
create social and cultural associations which later emerged as political parties. The 
BMA adopted a two-pronged approach. Educated Libyan émigrés who had attended 
schools or universities in Egypt and Tunisia were encouraged to take part in cultural and 
educational activities whilst at the same time ensuring local schools were suitably 
equipped to provide education for Libyan children. The British government in London 
and the BMA in Libya were also adamant that no other foreign powers, especially Italy, 
would intervene in the Libyans’ affairs in the future. To ensure this was the case, the 
BMA introduced policies that could teach Libyans to be ready to obtain independence 
and then to consolidate this by continuing educational activities.  
This thesis has argued that the policies put in place by the British administration in 
Libya relating to improving education, establishing a free press and encouraging civic 
engagement by means of creating various types of cultural associations were successful. 
However, they were much less successful in their attempts to involve girls and women 
in such activities. Although they made concerted efforts in this regard, especially in 
education, it proved immensely difficult in the space of just eight years to persuade the 
local population, particularly those outside the more developed urban areas, to change a 
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233 
 
worldview on gender roles in society that had existed for centuries as part of the 
country’s tribal system.1122 
Perhaps an indication of the impact of some of the policies put in place during the BMA 
can be seen in the influence they have continued to exert on Libyan state policies, long 
after the British left. Emphasis continued to be placed on education as a vital tool for 
development. The first Libyan university was established just four years into 
independence in 1955, four decades later there were 11, and by 2009 this number had 
reached 29, with experienced teaching staff from Libya and all over the globe teaching 
over a quarter of a million students. Colleges of higher education offering provision up 
to Masters level now exist in every Libyan city. When the oil boom brought dramatic 
increases to Libya’s Gross National Product, the government spent its highest sums on 
health and education.1123 State education in Libya has remained free until the present 
day. 
The Libyan administration remained committed to continuing the British education 
policy concerning compulsory education for all children, both girls and boys, and 
female school attendance rose from just 3.3% in 1960 to 43.2% in 1990. However, 
outside the large urban centres, progress remained slow and in the early 1980s, 
estimates showed literacy rates of 70 percent for men and 35 percent for women. 1124 
However, this gender gap has continued to narrow. According to 2015 US government 
estimates, 96.7 percent of males and 85.6 percent of females aged 15 or older are 
literate.1125 
From the 1950s, Libyan regimes have also sought to encourage women to have the 
same role as men in the society. Originally, only male citizens over 21 were entitled to 
vote until a constitutional amendment in 1963 gave women the vote and also allowed 
them to stand as candidates in the 1964 and 1965 elections.1126  Females were also 
offered equal chances to gain a university education, allowing them to compete not only 
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for jobs in the education sector but also for positions as bank managers, engineers and 
army officers.  
The free press continued to be active in newly independent Libya, playing a key role in 
reporting on the government’s plans for improving education and health services for the 
people. It also continued to play an important role in the process of state building, by 
encouraging Libyans to work together to achieve national unity. 
However, following the 1969 revolution, Colonel Gaddafi and 12 army officers, known 
as the Revolutionary Command Council, began a complete overhaul of Libya's political 
system, its society, and economy. In 1973, Gaddafi’s government nationalised the press 
and mass media and all journalists became employees of the state-owned Al-Jamahiriya 
News Agency. In 1977, Gaddafi dismantled all political institutions. 
7.3 Conclusion 
Kawczynski has remarked that “History has traditionally been something that happened 
to Libyans”1127 and as this thesis has explained, for much of their history, those peoples 
who inhabited the territory now known as Libyan were indeed seemingly at the mercy 
of their conquerors and colonisers. However, during the brief period of the BMA, there 
was a tangible sense for Libyans that they were at long last able to begin to write a 
historical narrative in which, for once, they played a leading role as active participants, 
even though, this was, ironically, to be facilitated by yet another foreign power, the 
British.  
In concluding this thesis on Libya’s past, it is impossible as a Libyan not to reflect on 
Libya’s more recent history post-2011 and the current move towards national disunity 
and conflict. It is also particularly tempting to re-evaluate the role that Muammar 
Gaddafi played in Libya’s unfolding historical narrative, since he considered himself to 
be the ultimate shaper of Libya’s destiny for over four decades. According to 
Kawczynski: 
A ruler like Gaddafi would not have been possible anywhere else in the world. 
[…] a product of the Libya into which he was born – poor, bereft of educational 
infrastructure, deeply scarred by the traumas of colonisation, devoid of talented 
and skilled leaders […] yet at the same time it was a nation poised on the edge 
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of freedom, a nation that had clung onto some of its proud tribal, Bedouin 
heritage, a nation seized by the excitement of an Arab world that was reasserting 
its pride and influence.1128 
This was, of course, the Libya of the BMA period. Perhaps, then, rather than being 
himself a maker of history, Gaddafi was simply made by history. 
 
                                                 
1128 Ibid. 
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